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Abstract 
Responding to the security and privacy issues of information systems, we propose a novel 
pseudonym solution. This pseudonym solution has provable security to protect the identi-
ties of users by employing user-generated pseudonyms. It also provides an encryption 
scheme to protect the security of the users’ data stored in the public network. Moreover, 
the pseudonym solution also provides the authentication of pseudonyms without disclosing 
the users’ identity information. Thus the dependences on powerful trusted third parties and 
on the trustworthiness of system administrators may be appreciably alleviated.  
Electronic healthcare systems (eHealth systems), as one kind of everyday information sys-
tem, with the ability to store and share patients’ health data efficiently, have to manage 
information of an extremely personal nature. As a consequence of known cases of abuse 
and attacks, the security of the health data and the privacy of patients are a great concern 
for many people and thus becoming obstacles to the acceptance and spread of eHealth 
systems. In this thesis, we survey current eHealth systems in both research and practice, 
analyzing potential threats to the security and privacy. Cloud-based eHealth systems, in 
particular, enable applications with many new features in data storing and sharing. We 
analyze the new issues on security and privacy when cloud technology is introduced into 
eHealth systems. 
We demonstrate that our proposed pseudonym solution can be successfully applied to 
cloud-based eHealth systems. Firstly, we utilize the pseudonym scheme and encryption 
scheme for storing and retrieving the electronic health records (EHR) in the cloud. The 
identities of patients and the confidentiality of EHR contents are provably guaranteed by 
advanced cryptographic algorithms. Secondly, we utilize the pseudonym solution to protect 
the privacy of patients from the health insurance companies. Only necessary information 
about patients is disclosed to the health insurance companies, without interrupting the cur-
rent normal business processes of health insurance. At last, based on the pseudonym so-
lution, we propose a new procedure for the secondary use of the health data. The new 
procedure protects the privacy of patients properly and enables patients’ full control and 
clear consent over their health data to be secondarily used. 
A prototypical application of a cloud-based eHealth system implementing our proposed 
solution is presented in order to exhibit the practicability of the solution and to provide intui-
tive experiences. Some performance estimations of the proposed solution based on the 
implementation are also provided. 
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Überblick 
Um gewisse Sicherheits- und Datenschutzdefizite heutiger Informationssysteme zu be-
heben, stellen wir eine neuartige Pseudonymisierungslösung vor, die benutzergenerierte 
Pseudonyme verwendet und die Identitäten der Pseudonyminhaber nachweisbar wirksam 
schützt. Sie beinhaltet neben der Pseudonymisierung auch ein Verschlüsselungsverfahren 
für den Schutz der Vertraulichkeit der Benutzerdaten, wenn diese öffentlich gespeichert 
werden. Weiterhin bietet sie ein Verfahren zur Authentisierung von Pseudonymen, das 
ohne die Offenbarung von Benutzeridentitäten auskommt. Dadurch können Abhängigkeit-
en von vertrauenswürdigen dritten Stellen (trusted third parties) oder von vertrauenswürdi-
gen Systemadministratoren deutlich verringert werden. 
Elektronische Gesundheitssysteme (eHealth-Systeme) sind darauf ausgelegt, Patien-
tendaten effizient zu speichern und bereitzustellen. Solche Daten haben ein extrem hohes 
Schutzbedürfnis, und bekannte Fälle von Angriffen auf die Vertraulichkeit der Daten durch 
Privilegienmissbrauch und externe Attacken haben dazu geführt, dass die Sorge um den 
Schutz von Gesundheitsdaten und Patientenidentitäten zu einem großen Hindernis für die 
Verbreitung und Akzeptanz von eHealth-Systemen geworden ist. In dieser Dissertation 
betrachten wir gegenwärtige eHealth-Systeme in Forschung und Praxis hinsichtlich mögli-
cher Bedrohungen für Sicherheit und Vertraulichkeit der gespeicherten Daten. Besondere 
Beachtung finden cloudbasierte eHealth-Systeme, die Anwendungen mit neuartigen 
Konzepten zur Datenspeicherung und -bereitstellung ermöglichen. Wir analysieren 
Sicherheits- und Vertraulichkeitsproblematiken, die sich beim Einsatz von Cloud-
Technologie in eHealth-Systemen ergeben. 
Wir zeigen, dass unsere Pseudonymisierungslösung erfolgreich auf cloudbasierte eHealth-
Systeme angewendet werden kann. Dabei werden zunächst das Pseudonymisierungs- 
und das Verschlüsselungsverfahren bei der Speicherung und beim Abruf von el-
ektronischen Gesundheitsdatensätzen (electronic health records, EHR) in der Cloud eing-
esetzt. Die Vertraulichkeit von Patientenidentitäten und EHR-Inhalten werden dabei durch 
den Einsatz moderner kryptografischer Algorithmen nachweisbar garantiert. Weiterhin set-
zen wir die Pseudonymisierungslösung zum Schutz der Privatsphäre der Patienten 
gegenüber Krankenversicherungsunternehmen ein. Letzteren werden lediglich genau 
diejenigen Patienteninformationen offenbart, die für den störungsfreien Ablauf ihrer Ges-
chäftsprozesse nötig sind. Schließen schlagen wir eine neuartige Vorgehensweise für die 
Zweitverwertung der im eHealth-System gespeicherten Daten vor, die die Pseudony-
misierungslösung verwendet. Diese Vorgehensweise bietet den Patienten angemessenen 
Schutz für ihre Privatsphäre und volle Kontrolle darüber, welche Daten für eine Zweitver-
wertung (z.B. für Forschungszwecke) freigegeben werden. 
Es wird ein prototypisches, cloudbasiertes eHealth-System vorgestellt, das die Pseudon-
ymisierungslösung implementiert, um deren Praktikabilität zu demonstrieren und intuitive 
Erfahrungen zu vermitteln. Weiterhin werden, basierend auf der Implementierung, einige 
Abschätzungen der Performanz der Pseudonymisierungslösung angegeben. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation of the Thesis 
Thanks to the fast development of information technologies, electronic health systems 
(eHealth systems) (Eysenbach, 2001, Oh et al., 2005) have been turning into reality and 
becoming a hot field in academic research. eHealth systems utilize computer and network 
to store and transmit the data created in various healthcare activities, e.g. making ap-
pointments, recording examinations and therapy details, purchasing medicines with pre-
scriptions, billing health insurance companies, reusing health data for medical research. 
With the help of information technologies, eHealth systems greatly improve the efficiency 
and the quality of health care comparing to the traditional paper-based healthcare systems 
(Black et al., 2011). For example, in eHealth systems, a doctor is able to conveniently re-
view a patient’s previous health records created even by other doctors through a computer 
connected to the network instead of seeking from a large pile of paper files. The efficient 
sharing of the health records helps the doctor to make faster and better diagnosis and 
treat on the patient. Hence, eHealth systems are becoming more and more popular in the 
world  (Borycki et al., 2012, Shu et al., 2014, Stroetmann et al., 2011, Bouamrane and 
Mair, 2011, Rau et al., 2010). 
While eHealth systems facilitate the sharing of health data, they also bring a lot of new 
issues in different aspects. The first one is how to efficiently store and share the electronic 
health records (EHR) of numerous patients created by different healthcare providers (e.g. 
practices, hospitals, and mobile health sensors). Because a patient may visit many hospi-
tals, practices and pharmacies, EHR of the patient are stored at different locations. It is 
challengeable to share the patient’s EHR among different healthcare providers (Jin et al., 
2009). Where to store EHR with huge size and how to share them with low time delay is 
still unresolved. The second issue comes from the security of EHR. The security refers to 
many aspects, e.g. the confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of EHR (Wang and Wulf, 
1997). Because EHR of patients need to be frequently accessed and updated in different 
healthcare activities by different people (e.g., healthcare providers, medical researchers, 
and even patients themselves), the security of EHR may be invaded from outside and 
even inside of eHealth systems. Another major issue is the privacy of patients. EHR, con-
taining highly private information of patients, e.g. the illnesses and the identities, can be 
easily duplicated and disclosed over the network when they are used for different purpos-
es (e.g. for sharing among doctors, medical research). The disclosure of these data will 
seriously infringe the privacy of patients (Slamanig and Stingl, 2008). How to protect the 
privacy of patients while preserving the easy sharing of EHR is still challengeable. The 
privacy of patients involves several aspects: the identity management (patients’ identities 
should be only known by necessary entities), the health data sharing policy (patients’ 
health data should never be disclosed to unintended people) and the consent manage-
ment (patients should have full control on the uses of their health data). The security pro-
tection on the health data does not necessarily guarantee the privacy of patients. For ex-
ample, although EHR are securely encrypted by advanced cryptographic algorithms e.g. 
AES (Daemen and Rijmen, 2013), some side-channel information in the encrypted data 
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(e.g., creating date/time, location, doctor’s signature) may be used to deduce a patient’s 
health status and even the identity. 
According to our best knowledge, these issues are far away from being solved and remain 
as big obstacles to hinder the development and popularization of eHealth systems. For the 
time being, EHR of patients are stored at different locations (e.g., hospitals and practices) 
independently even with different formats (Jones et al., 2010, Drees, 2007), because dif-
ferent eHealth systems are used by different healthcare providers. As a consequence, it is 
difficult to share EHR among different healthcare providers due to many issues, e.g., the 
network connection and authorization problems. Some proposed eHealth clouds (Hu et al., 
2012, Barua et al., 2011, Fan et al., 2011, Narayan et al., 2010, Sunyaev et al., 2010) at-
tempt to enable patients or healthcare providers to register and upload their EHR to a pub-
lic cloud for central storing and easy sharing. However, the security of EHR and the priva-
cy of patients are fully controlled under the protection mechanism implemented by the 
cloud providers. However, the trustworthiness on the cloud providers is doubtful due to the 
business model of cloud, e.g., a public cloud may distribute the storage servers physically 
all over the world (Foster et al., 2008, Vaquero et al., 2008, Mell and Grance, 2011). In 
addition, these eHealth clouds only deal with the security and privacy issues in one special 
healthcare activity (e.g. only for sharing EHR among doctors), but they are not applicable 
or unknown to be generalized to other healthcare activities (e.g. for medical research).  
Besides eHealth systems, there exist many other information systems in our daily lives. As 
a result, more and more private data are stored in and transmitted over them. Our privacy 
is suffering from higher and higher risk to be leaked or maliciously used. Unfortunately, 
due to the differences in the system structure and business model, it is difficult to provide a 
uniform solution to deal with the privacy issues in all of these information systems. Howev-
er, the idea of protecting the identities by pseudonyms is generally adopted in many sys-
tems. We are curious to know what a pseudonym solution can act to protect the users’ 
identities and further to protect the security of the private data in the information systems, 
especially in eHealth systems. 
1.2 Contributions of the Thesis 
We survey the business models of many existing eHealth systems, and analyze the cur-
rent technical solutions in industry and academic research work. Based on the existing 
schemes, this thesis proposes a new pseudonym solution aiming to be widely used in ma-
jor healthcare activities. In summary, the main contributions of the thesis are listed as fol-
lows: 
 We extend the use of cloud into major healthcare activities in eHealth systems and 
propose a new cloud-based eHealth model. In this model, all entities in an eHealth 
system are connected together by the cloud. EHR can be conveniently created, 
shared and managed by different entities though the cloud applications. We even re-
fine the processes of several healthcare activities to be more suitable for cloud envi-
ronment. Based on this new eHealth model, various security and privacy threats from 
different sources are analyzed. Some corresponding countermeasures are provided, 
and also some open questions are raised.  
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
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 A novel pseudonym solution is proposed. The pseudonym solution can be used for 
storing, accessing and sharing the private data of users in the cloud. It provably pro-
tects the security of the data and enables the users to fully control their privacy. Each 
user generates her/his own pseudonyms and encryption keys from a secret key which 
is only known by herself/himself. All the private data and communications are protect-
ed by the secret key only known by the user. The secret key is the only credential to 
control the use of private data. Moreover, the pseudonym solution also enables users 
to prove their ownership of the private data without disclosing any identity information 
to the verifiers. Moreover, the pseudonym solution can work without a single trusted 
third party, which lowers the risk of disclosing the privacy of users.  
 We apply the proposed pseudonym solution in several major healthcare activities to 
demonstrate its practicability in eHealth systems. To comply with the normal process-
es of these healthcare activities, some corresponding protocols for using the pseudo-
nym solution are designed. With the new pseudonym solution, most business models 
of existing eHealth systems do not need to change dramatically. Instead, the new 
pseudonym solution can be introduced as additional features to enhance the efficiency, 
security and privacy for the current eHealth systems. Moreover, using the same pseu-
donym solution in different healthcare activities simplifies the design of security mech-
anism, and decreases the risk of disclosing the privacy of patients due to the weak-
ness in a single activity. 
 A prototypical eHealth system supported by the proposed pseudonym solution is im-
plemented. The eHealth system is deployed on a PaaS (Platform as a Service) cloud. 
It provides several major healthcare activities involving common entities in real health 
care, e.g., patients, doctors, pharmacist and secondary users. These entities can cre-
ate, access and update EHR by web browsers connected to the cloud. Through the 
prototypical eHealth system, we can experience the advantages that our pseudonym 
solution brings, especially in the security and privacy aspects. Moreover, the perfor-
mance of our implementation and the critical algorithms in our solution are examined 
through simulation tests and estimations. The evaluation results indicate the practica-
bility of our pseudonym solution under current software and hardware conditions.  
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
The next chapter 2, “Background Knowledge”, firstly introduces the fundamental notions 
such as pseudonym and eHealth system. Especially for “pseudonym”, we explain it with 
some simple examples and also with the formal definition. Moreover, we briefly introduce 
the history of eHealth systems, and present some open problems in existing eHealth sys-
tems. 
In chapter 3, “Security and Privacy Issues in Different Models of eHealth Systems”, we 
describe in detail various threats to the security of health data and the privacy concerns of 
patients. We will begin with a traditional eHealth model, and then analyze the causes and 
the consequences of these security and privacy threats. Afterwards, we propose a cloud-
based model for modern eHealth systems. This new model addresses many shortcomings 
that appeared in the traditional model, but it also introduces new challenges and threats, 
which are further discussed.  
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The chapter 4, “State of the Art”, reviews literatures on existing pseudonym schemes for 
the purpose of general uses and for using in eHealth systems. A comparison on their sup-
ported technologies and features is made. Based on these existing schemes, we list the 
principles for designing a pseudonym scheme targeting at a cloud-based eHealth system. 
We present a novel pseudonym solution in chapter 5, “A Novel Pseudonym Solution”.  The 
concrete algorithms for secrets setup, pseudonym generation and the authentication pro-
tocol are formally described. Moreover, the provable security of the pseudonym solution is 
theoretically evaluated. 
The following chapter 6, “Applications of the Pseudonym Solution in eHealth Systems”, 
introduces how to utilize the proposed pseudonym solution from chapter 5 in a cloud-
based eHealth system. We choose several important healthcare activities in eHealth sys-
tems, and show how the new pseudonym solution can be applied to solve the security and 
privacy problems in them. 
A prototypical implementation of a cloud-based eHealth system supported by our pro-
posed pseudonym solution is introduced in chapter 7, “Implementation”. The implementa-
tion provides intuitive experiences on the advantages of our proposed solution. Moreover, 
some performance tests and estimations are also presented. 
The chapter 8, “Conclusions”, wraps up the thesis by emphasizing the main insights and 
lists prospects of future work and open research questions. 
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2 Background Knowledge 
2.1 Pseudonym 
2.1.1 Definition 
Pseudonyms, as a general notion, are widely used in many fields with different forms 
(Pfitzmann and Köhntopp, 2001). One major reason for this diversity is that pseudonyms 
are utilized under different settings where different requirements are addressed. Pseudo-
nym schemes are typically used for hiding the real identities of individuals. For example, a 
writer uses a pseudonym to publish articles for various reasons. However, this kind of tra-
ditional pseudonyms is informal and artistic (Calisher, 1998).  
With the appearance of computer science, pseudonyms are closely related to cryptog-
raphy (Katz and Lindell, 2014), which makes pseudonyms more and more formal. Secret 
keys and cryptographic algorithms are used to generate and use pseudonyms. The relia-
bility of the modern pseudonyms has been improved greatly due to the rigorousness and 
security of the cryptographic algorithms. Generally, a definition of pseudonym is presented 
as follows: 
PID = pid_gen ( id, x ) 
Here, “x” is a secret key; “id” is the real identity of a user; PID is the pseudonym of the user; 
and “pid_gen” is the algorithm for generating the pseudonym. The algorithm “pid_gen”, in 
which the cryptographic algorithms are employed, determines the security a pseudonym 
scheme. The secret x is usually only known by specified persons, like administrators in the 
system or the user her/himself. The real identity “id” can be any kind of identifiers (e.g. 
name, national identity number, birthday and address) or a combination of several identifi-
ers. The generated PID can be used to replace the real identifiers where the privacy of the 
user is concerned. In many systems, each user has only one pseudonym. However, in 
more complex systems, a user can possess multiple pseudonyms.  
2.1.2 Basic Requirements for Pseudonyms 
One basic criteria to a pseudonym scheme is that the algorithm for generating a pseudo-
nym must be one-way, i.e., pid_gen should be irreversible (or computational infeasible to 
compute the id of a user from PID without knowing the secret x) (Mollin, 2006).  
id = rev_pid_gen ( PID ) is difficult. 
However, if the secret x is known, many pseudonym schemes can do the following compu-
tation to reverse from a pseudonym to the real identity. 
id = rev_pid_gen ( PID, x ) is easy. 
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Actually, the one-way property of a pseudonym scheme is not difficult to ensure, thanks to 
many one-way functions in cryptography, such as cryptographic hash functions (Rogaway 
and Shrimpton, 2004), cipher algorithm like AES (Daemen and Rijmen, 2000) and public 
key cryptography RSA (McCurley, 1990). By using these cryptographic functions, an irre-
versible pid_gen can be designed with high-level guarantee. 
When a pseudonym scheme is used in an application with a lot of users, another basic 
requirement for pseudonyms is that they are collision-free (Lehnhardt and Spalka, 2011, 
Yoon and Kim, 2011). For example, in an anonymous bank, each user registers with a 
pseudonym computed from a secret key only known to the user. The pseudonym is the 
only identity code for all the financial transactions. Obviously, it must make sure that the 
pseudonyms of no pair of users collide (i.e., any two users A and B should not have the 
same pseudonym).  
PIDA ≠ PIDB 
The collision-free requirement is not easy to satisfy for a decentralized system where us-
ers can choose the secret key x and identifiers separately (sometimes freely) to generate 
their pseudonyms, because many one-way functions in cryptography are not injective 
(Menezes et al., 1996). In a bad case, although two innocent users choose different identi-
fiers and different secret x, they may generate the same pseudonym without knowing each 
other. 
Another additional requirement to pseudonyms is “independence”, when each user has 
multiple pseudonyms. If a user uses different pseudonyms at different organizations, it 
should be impossible to deduce that these pseudonyms are from a same user (Martin-Löf, 
1966). 
“PID1, PID2, … , PIDn” are independent with each other. 
The independence is not difficult to guarantee, because there are many cryptographic 
functions that can produce pseudo-random outputs, such as hash functions (Blum and 
Micali, 1984). However, the independence of pseudonyms may be broken when users are 
able to use the pseudonyms or even credentials across different organizations. E.g., if a 
user presents his pseudonym generated by organization A at organization B, the organiza-
tion B is able to know the user’s two pseudonyms at organization A and B. Even worse, 
organization A and B may collude to find out the pseudonyms of each user in order to 
trace the behaviors of users (Shokri et al., 2011). 
The authentication is another requirement to a pseudonym scheme when users need to be 
validated by organizations, i.e., a user can prove the ownership of the pseudonym to a 
verifier without leaking the identity information (Cachin et al., 1999, Ravi Chandra and 
Sharad, 2006). For example, in an eHealth system, each user (patient) has many records 
in the server, and each record has an independent pseudonym as index. When a user 
wants to update a record indexed by a pseudonym at the server, the system should verify 
that the user is indeed the owner of the record (or the pseudonym) to avoid malicious up-
dating. In order to protect the privacy of users, the server is not allowed to keep any par-
ticular pre-information (e.g. secret key or any registration information) of users. Moreover, 
the server should not get any useful information from the verification process to deduce 
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the identities of users. There are many traditional authentication schemes in cryptography, 
for example, a digital signature can be a candidate solution for the authentication process 
above. However, if a user uses the same certificate and secret key to generate signatures 
for different records, the pseudonyms in these records can be easily mapped to one user 
(i.e., the independence of the pseudonyms is broken), because these records are signed 
by the same public key (i.e. certificate) (Housley et al., 2002). Even worse, the certificate in 
the signature may imply some information (e.g. serial number, location, date) to deduce 
the identity of the user.  
There are also some other requirements to pseudonyms in different application scenarios. 
We will introduce several specific pseudonym schemes in Section 4.1 and 4.2, and more 
additional features of these pseudonyms will be explained. For a pseudonym scheme 
which can be used in eHealth systems, there are also some special requirements. Moreo-
ver, due to the complexity of eHealth systems, the pseudonym scheme is also necessarily 
tuned to the procedure of existing and future business model. We will present our general 
viewpoints in Section 4.4. 
2.1.3 Pseudonym versus Anonym 
Pseudonym may sometimes be confused with anonym (Pfitzmann and Köhntopp, 2001). 
From the literal sense of the words, anonym means “nameless”, and pseudonym means 
“with fake name”. This can tell the difference between them to some degree.  Formally, 
anonym aims at making the corresponding data totally un-linkable to the owners. It can be 
easily achieved by removing all the identifiers (e.g. name, gender, age, address). However, 
sometimes it is not necessary to do such clean removing, in order to anonymize the data. 
We just need to remove some chosen identifiers and ensure that each combination of the 
left identifiers has more than one record  (Samarati and Sweeney, 1998). As an example, 
Table 1 shows an episode of the health records in a database. Each row in Table 1 pre-
sents one record entry from one patient. The 2nd to 6th columns are the identifiers of pa-
tients and the last column contains the concrete health records (e.g. examinations, pre-
scriptions), which are omitted here. 
Table 1: An example of health records with real identities 
No. Name Post code Gender Age Height Data 
1 John 53127 Male 68 175 … 
2 Bob 53128 Male 68 175 … 
3 Alice 53127 Female 60 170 … 
4 Mary 53128 Female 60 170 … 
To anonymize the data, we could certainly remove all columns from 2 to 6. However, when 
the anonymized data are going to be used in medical research, the gender and age are 
necessary to be kept. Actually we have a better way to anonymize the data to keep as 
much information as possible without destroying the anonymity, as shown in Table 2.  
We remove all the names. Although we keep gender, age, height and even some post 
codes at row 2 and 4, the data still preserve the feature in the concept of “anonymous”. 
2 Background Knowledge 
8 
 
Because each combination of the remaining identifiers has two matched rows, it makes 
the data impossible to be linked to the owners directly.  
Table 2: An example of anonymizing the health records 
No. Name Post code Gender Age Height Data 
1 * 53127 Male 68 175 … 
2 * * Male 68 175 … 
3 * 53127 Female 60 170 … 
4 * * Female 60 170 … 
However, in many applications, we not only require the infeasibility of direct linking to the 
real identities, but also keep the ability to retrace the owners. For example, the health rec-
ords used for medical research are preferable to enable “retrace” for consent management 
and feedback. The pseudonym can preserve the link between the pseudonymized data 
and the owners. Taking the above “anonymous” data as an example, we can use the 
pseudonyms of patients to replace the names as shown in Table 3. 
Table 3: An example of pseudonymizing the health records 
No. Name Post code Gender Age Height Data 
1 pid1 53127 Male 68 175 … 
2 pid2 * Male 68 175 … 
3 pid3 53127 Female 60 170 … 
4 pid4 * Female 60 170 … 
The pseudonyms (pidi) can not be linked to the names of patients or any other identifiers 
directly by medical researchers or any other curious attackers. However, patients or the 
administrators who know the secret keys to generate the pseudonyms can recover the 
linkage between real identities and pseudonyms by reversing the pseudonyms as intro-
duced in Section 2.1.2. The application of pseudonym can bring benefits to medical re-
search where patients’ health data are de-identified by a pseudonym scheme, because the 
researchers have the chance to request more data from patients and even send feedback 
to patients through the generators (e.g. administrators) of the pseudonyms. In Section 6.3, 
more details and advantages about the use of the pseudonym in medical research will be 
introduced. 
Through the above examples, the difference between pseudonym and anonym can be 
clearly discriminated. In brief, they are used in different application scenarios with different 
purposes. Anonymity makes effort to remove chosen identifiers of the users to make the 
data unidentifiable, while pseudonyms use dedicated aliases to replace sensitive identifi-
ers (like names, identity numbers) to ensure the data can not be directly linked to the real 
owners without knowing the secret keys for generating the pseudonyms. Being pseudon-
ymous implies being anonymous if the replacement can prevent the direct linking from 
pseudonyms to real identifiers. In this thesis, we will use pseudonyms to achieve anonymi-
ty for health data with many other features. 
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2.2 eHealth Systems 
2.2.1 History of Health Records 
According to the sharing ability of the patients’ health records, we denote different kinds of 
electrical health records as EMR, PHR and EHR. EMR are only used inside one hospital 
or practice; PHR are maintained by patients themselves and shared to persons specified 
by patients; EHR can be shared across different organizations. We will tell the difference 
among them in the following. 
2.2.1.1 EMR 
Traditionally, paper and films are the most common media for recording and managing 
patients’ health records (e.g., diagnosis, prescriptions, familial illnesses, blood group, al-
lergy) during their visits to healthcare providers (e.g. hospitals and practices). The tradi-
tional method is still running even in many countries and areas today. However, the diffi-
culties in storing, retrieving and sharing the health records by paper have inspired the 
reformation of shifting to the electronic healthcare (eHealth) systems where electronic rec-
ords are used instead (Hillestad et al., 2005, Fitzpatrick, 2000).  
With the population of computers and network, healthcare providers individually began to 
deploy internal electronic systems in order to manage the internal resources, in which pa-
tients’ health data are stored as electronic medical records (EMR)  (Waegemann, 2003). 
Within the same healthcare provider, doctors can easily access the EMR on a computer 
via intranet, instead of seeking from piles of paper files. However, these EMR can only be 
used inside the healthcare provider that created them, i.e., EMR can not be shared across 
different healthcare providers due to various problems, e.g., network connection, different 
systems and format of records used, connection protocol and privacy of patients (Garets 
and Davis, 2006). For a workaround, patients have to carry their health records in the form 
of paper or discs across different healthcare providers. 
2.2.1.2 PHR 
Recently, some patient-centered health records (PHR) systems appear both in industry 
and academic research (Tang et al., 2006). Some emerging PHR systems supported by 
cloud have attracted many users, such as Google Health 1 (retired on January 1, 2012), 
Microsoft HealthVault 2, and ICW LifeSensor3. In the PHR systems, the health records are 
created (or imported from EMR systems) and managed by patients, who also are in 
charge of specify the access rights of different persons to their own health records. The 
PHR are usually stored at a publicly available server run by a third service provider in the 
Internet. The third service provider is also responsible for providing solutions to ensure the 
security and privacy protection, e.g. user management and access control.  
                                                            
1 Google Health: https://www.google.com/health/ 
2 Microsoft HealthVault : http://www.healthvault.com/ 
3 LifeSensor: https://www.lifesensor.com 
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PHR systems enable patients to have full ability of defining role-based access rights for 
individual health professionals (e.g., doctors, nurses, fitness coachers) to access their 
PHR. On the other hand, patients have to manage the complex access policy and need to 
understand their implications. Moreover, the third service providers are necessary to be 
trustworthy, which is doubtful to many patients. As a result, many users refuse to upload 
their health records to these PHR systems. At last, the PHR systems require that the users 
have the condition (e.g. computer and network) and knowledge to upload and manage 
their health records, which place obstacles to those plain users. Therefore, the PHR sys-
tems have their inherent limitations to be popularized in practice. 
2.2.1.3 EHR 
EMR or PHR, which can not be shared widely across different healthcare providers or can 
not cover large population, is gradually hindering the development of eHealth systems. 
Because the complexity of clinical trials continues to grow, the data sharing and interoper-
ability become more and more important. With the comprehensive and fast knowledge of 
patients’ anamnesis, doctors can make quick and correct decisions especially in some 
emergency cases; doctors from different hospitals can cooperate and share the common 
examinations like x-ray images; patients’ health records can be easily obtained for sec-
ondary use, e.g. medical research to facilitate the development of medicines (Tang et al., 
2006, Shekelle et al., 2006).  
The widely sharable health records are called electronic health records (EHR) (Garets and 
Davis, 2006). EHR are created by healthcare providers (not patients any more like in PHR 
systems), and can be shared (e.g. via the cloud) with other health professionals at any 
other healthcare providers if authorized. The maintenance of EHR is often done through 
cooperating of different roles (e.g. healthcare providers and patients). There are more ser-
vices such as billing and accounting with the health insurances involved. More participants 
(e.g., doctors, patients, pharmacists, insurance companies) will be engaged in such kind of 
EHR systems compared to the PHR systems. Due to the complexity in technology and 
benefit competition, many current EHR systems are built upon national-wide model to in-
tegrate various resources, for example, the eHealth system in Austria (Schabetsberger et 
al., 2006), and the Taiwan Electronic Medical Record Template (TMT) (Rau et al., 2010). 
Since these systems consider the practical requirements and are serving for real health 
care activities, more and more attention is being paid to them by the academic researchers 
and industrial product developers.  
There are some international standards to unify the formats for storing EHR and exchang-
ing messages among different eHealth systems. E.g., Health Level Seven4 (HL7) (Quinn, 
1998), a non-profit organization, focuses on the development of international standards for 
healthcare informatics interoperability. These standards have been well accepted and 
adopted by many countries to build their eHealth systems to enable the exchange of EHR 
among different healthcare providers (Yang et al., 2006, Nagy et al., 2010). The develop-
ment of information technologies also accelerates the development of EHR. E.g., the In-
ternet technology and the cloud computing (Mell and Grance, 2011) (abbreviated as cloud) 
provide the fast and secure channel for sharing EHR. Especially, cloud computing pro-
                                                            
4 Health Level Seven International (HL7).http://www.hl7.org. 
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vides the accessibility everywhere and anytime by any user through network. Thus the 
cloud is considered as an ideal media for storing EHR and allowing all potential users to 
access EHR conveniently.  
While EHR systems facilitate the storing, retrieving and sharing of EHR, they also bring 
severe problems on security and privacy. During the frequent using and sharing of EHR 
across different healthcare providers, the contents in EHR are prone to be attacked and 
duplicated. As a consequence, the private information of patients might be illegally used or 
even spread maliciously. Even worse, many healthcare providers have outsourced the IT 
service to some third parties, which makes healthcare providers lose the full control of pa-
tients’ EHR. It aggravates the risk of exposing the patients’ private information. In the case 
of public cloud-based eHealth systems, because of the public accessibility of cloud, EHR 
stored centrally in the cloud suffer from ubiquitous attacks from the outside and even the 
inside of the cloud. An instinctive solution is to encrypt EHR in the cloud to avoid malicious 
access. However, the encryption may affect the easy sharing of EHR if the encryption keys 
are not available to the intended person in time. Moreover, if the encryption keys are not 
managed properly, there exists risk of disclosing the patient’s privacy due to the incautious 
leak of encryption keys. For more discussion about the security and privacy issues in 
eHealth systems, please refer to chapter 3. 
2.2.2 Existing eHealth Systems 
2.2.2.1 England 
England has a long history with eHealth. The National Programme for IT (NPfIT) in Eng-
land already begun in 2002 and acted as the basis for eHealth deployments. In conjunc-
tion with this, the 2002 policy paper “Delivering 21st century IT support for the NHS: na-
tional strategic programme” was created. NPfIT has prioritized the sharing of clinical data 
across providers and the automatic transmission of electronic prescriptions to pharmacies. 
To this end, the National Health Service has allocated £12.4 billion to NPfIT to build an 
integrated national EHR system, which will also be used by pharmacies and laboratories. 
Approximately 5% of prescriptions are being transmitted electronically to pharmacies till 
2008. In 2008, a pilot project was the Primary Care Summary Record program, where a 
summary of National Health Service patient data are held on a central database covering 
England (Cresswell and Sheikh, 2009). The purpose of the database is to make health 
data readily available anywhere that patients seek treatment, for example if they are stay-
ing away from their home town or if they are unable to provide information by themselves. 
Despite opposition from some quarters, by September 2010, 424 practices across at least 
36 Primary Care Trusts had uploaded 2.7 million Summary Care Records (SCR). In 2010, 
the Health Secretary announced that the coalition government would continue with the 
introduction, but that the records would 'hold only the essential medical information needed 
in an emergency – that is medication, allergen and drug reactions'. By March 2013, more 
than 24 million SCRs had been created across England5. 
                                                            
5 http://www.wraftonhousesurgery.co.uk/summary-care.asp 
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In terms of ePrescription England has two programs for electronic prescribing in existence. 
One is the Electronic Prescription Service (EPS) which is directed at the primary care sec-
tor, GPs (general practices) and clinics, and synchronizes all steps from the generation to 
the dispatch of the prescription (Van Dijk et al., 2011). The other, ePrescribing, is aimed at 
institutions such as hospitals and includes a decision support component. In 2009 the De-
partment of Health confirmed that over 500,000 prescriptions had been transmitted elec-
tronically in England. It is also known that some institutions have been using some form of 
electronic prescribing for over ten years. (Whitehouse et al., 2010) 
On standards, England is included in the United Kingdom and its membership of the 
IHTSDO(International Health Terminology Standardisation Organisation). Alongside this, a 
Health Informatics Service Benchmarking and Accreditation Scheme was launched in 
2008 to help health informatics providers and Information Management &Technology de-
partments. Telemedicine initiatives in England are not combined under a single national 
programme but rather run at the local authority level. The Department of Health is currently 
funding three demonstrator projects, at local authority level, that aim to develop an evi-
dence base for the use of telecare and telehealth in England. Aside from this, NHS direct, 
which provides health advice and reassurance on the phone as well as through an online 
library of medical advice, could also be considered as a form of telemedicine application 
(Whitehouse et al., 2010).  
2.2.2.2 Netherlands 
In the Netherlands most medical records are updated electronically and are no longer 
available in paper. A 2013 Survey from the National IT Institute for Healthcare in the Neth-
erlands (‘NICTIZ’) and the Netherlands Institute for Health Services Research (‘NIVEL’) 
shows that 93% of general practitioners and 66% of medical specialists update their rec-
ords primarily or exclusively electronically. There are several EHR solutions in place, for 
example the systems offered by ChipSoft, CSC-iSOFT and McKesson (Eijpe, 2013). 
There are also several systems in place for the electronic exchange of patient data insert-
ed in EHR. For example, at the regional local level there are systems that connect the in-
formation systems of general practitioners, GPs out-of-hours surgery and pharmacists (for 
example ‘OZIS-ring’). There are also systems that connect data of medical specialists or 
other healthcare providers who are active in the same chain of care (for example for can-
cer or diabetes).  
One of the current initiatives, launched by the Association of Healthcare providers for 
Health communication (Vereniging van Zorgaanbieders voor Zorgcommunicatie, (VZVZ)) 
is responsible for a system for the electronic exchange of medical data between 
healthcare providers6. The exchange of medical data between healthcare providers takes 
place via a National Switch Point (LSP) which provides a reference index for routing, iden-
tification, authentication, authorization and logging. Nictiz has been founded and mandated 
by the Dutch government to create and manage the national switch point, which should 
form the core of medical information exchange in the Dutch healthcare sector. The objec-
tive of the LSP is that any authorized healthcare practitioner is connected to the LSP, so 
                                                            
6 https://www.vzvz.nl/page/Zorgconsument/Home 
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that the latest and most relevant medical information about a patient can be obtained at 
any time, from anywhere in the Netherlands in a simple, secure and reliable way. The LSP, 
which should become the heart of the ICT infrastructure for Dutch healthcare, is supposed 
to regulate the exchange of health information between healthcare providers7.  
The LSP can be compared to a traffic-control tower which regulates the exchange of pa-
tient data between healthcare providers. At this moment LSP mainly connects general 
practitioners, GPs out-of-hours surgery, pharmacists and a few hospitals. In January 2014 
a spokesman of the VZVZ said that 75% of the general practitioners and 83% of the phar-
macists are connected to the LSP. This system has the potential to be a nationwide sys-
tem, but at the moment it is not (Eijpe, 2013).  
2.2.2.3 Germany 
We found no single approach to eHealth systems in Germany. While major healthcare 
software companies have attempted to create an infrastructure for physicians to exchange 
clinical data, these efforts have had minimal success. Due to security concerns, many 
physicians prefer to store patient records on computers that are not connected to the In-
ternet. Despite this obstacle to eHealth systems adoption, there are currently two pilot pro-
jects focused on providing health information exchange capabilities for providers. The first 
one, called “D2D” (www.d2d.de) is a secure communication standard to exchange billing 
information and patient data. About 2300 (less than 2%) of German physicians in private 
practice are participating in the D2D pilot program, which conducts approximately 70,000 
data transactions per month. The second program, “Vita-X” offers EHR and supports pro-
vider-to-provider exchange. While Vita-X is also in its infancy, its use is expected to be-
come more widespread, as it is provided by the same vendor that supplies EHR systems 
to 50% of the German private practices (Jha et al., 2008). 
The most promising approach to eHealth systems in Germany is the electronic health in-
surance card. As of October 2011, patients in several German states have been testing a 
new national electronic card. As well as being used to reimburse health costs, it offers us-
ers access to their health records online, at a national level. The aim is for the El-
ektronische Gesundheitskarte, or eGK (in German) to stand at the heart of a network of e-
health services, delivered locally. The project has been underway since 2004, and has 
involved a number of setbacks. It was even brought to a halt in 2010, due to the concerns 
of many doctors and IT security specialists, regarding access to patients’ health data. The 
first version of the eGK, launched in 2006, stored medical details directly in the chip of 
each individual’s card. Deemed too risky, the project was abandoned, then relaunched in 
2010 with a new format – by default the card now contains only social security and insur-
ance administrative data, enabling medical costs to be reimbursed8.  
The eGK will replace current, non-secure electronic health insurance cards. It has also 
been designed so that it can be used for several other optional e-health services, some of 
which are still in development, and all of which will be subject to the patient’s consent9: 
                                                            
7https://dutchhealthcare.wordpress.com/2011/04/05/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-national-ehr-initiative-in-the-netherlands/ 
8 http://esante.gouv.fr/en/the-mag-issue-7/germany-and-the-challenges-rolling-out-e-health-a-large-scale 
9 https://www.gematik.de/cms/media/infomaterialpresse/_Broschuere_Englisch_2.pdf 
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 E-prescriptions: patient cards will be able to transmit prescriptions electronically to 
pharmacies with the necessary equipment; 
 Emergency medical data: allergies, intolerances, current treatment, organ donation 
information, and the details of the patient’s doctor can all be registered directly on the 
card, so that they can be easily accessed in the case of an accident; 
 Treatment history and any treatment currently underway;  
 A messaging and document sharing service for doctors, for discharge letters, notes, 
X-rays with reports, and test results, following identification via the “Elektronischer 
Heilsberufsausweis”, the German equivalent to France’s healthcare professional card 
(CPS); 
 Access to the patient’s electronic medical record if it exists. Each regional govern-
ment is responsible for rolling out these records.  
2.2.2.4 North America 
Both Canada and the United States have experienced increases in their adoption rates of 
eHealth. More specifically, 2012 adoption statistics reveal that the electronic medical rec-
ord adoption rate in the United States is 69% and in Canada it is 57% (Borycki et al., 2012). 
In the United States, it seems that there is no nationwide eHealth system. However, the 
2009 Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act au-
thorized incentive payments through Medicare and Medicaid to health care providers that 
use certified electronic health record (EHR) systems to achieve specified improvements in 
care delivery. Eligible Medicare and Medicaid physicians may receive incentive payments 
over 5 years, starting in 2011, if they demonstrate that they are using a certified EHR sys-
tem that meets 15 Stage 1 Core Set objectives and 5 of 10 Menu Set objectives. A federal-
ly funded regional extension center (REC) program was created to provide physicians with 
assistance in purchasing and implementing EHR systems, training staff, and addressing 
how they use EHR systems when they see patients. The REC program seeks to support 
100,000 primary care providers, with particular emphasis given to practices with fewer 
than 10 clinicians and to clinicians who work in settings that tend to serve uninsured, un-
derinsured, and medically underserved populations. As a result, in 2012, 71.8% of office-
based physicians reported using any type of EHR system, up from 34.8% in 2007. In 2012, 
39.6% of physicians had an EHR system with features meeting the criteria of a basic sys-
tem, up from 11.8% in 2007; 23.5% of office-based physicians had an EHR system with 
features meeting the criteria of a fully functional system in 2012, up from 3.8% in 2007 
(Hsiao et al., 2014). 
In the U.S., much of the focus on sharing of data between providers has been organized 
around Regional Health Information Organizations (RHIOs). These entities have already 
been started in many regions. RHIOs are generally nonprofit regional organizations whose 
primary aims are to convene healthcare providers with the hope of initiating health data 
exchange. Preliminary reports suggest that only a small number (fewer than a dozen) have 
begun to exchange clinical data. Furthermore, the financial sustainability of RHIOs, a criti-
cal factor in their long-term success, remains unknown (Protti, 2007). 
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In Canada, the most promising focus on eHealth systems is Infoway. Established in 2001, 
Infoway is an independent, nonprofit organization funded by the federal government. It 
also supports various projects on eHealth and sets up a lot of standards for the interoper-
ated EHR. Across Canada, EHR are at various stages of implementation and maturity ac-
cording to provincial/territorial strategies and priorities. As of February 2014, there were 11 
provinces and territories reporting active EHR users. Clinicians across Canada are in-
creasingly using EHR systems to support the care of their patients. In 2006, there were 
approximately 7,600 users of the electronic health record. By 2014, that number had in-
creased significantly to over 62,000 users across Canada – an increase of more than 700 
percent10.  
2.2.2.5 Other Areas 
Australia and New Zealand have computerized patient administration systems and many 
use laboratory results reporting. However, computerized documentation is limited to elec-
tronic discharge summaries which are sent directly from hospitals to general practitioners 
and there is little to no electronic prescribing in the hospital setting  (Jha et al., 2008).  
Current eHealth systems in Both Australia and New Zealand allows GPs with EHR to au-
tomatically download pathology reports and imaging reports from a variety of public and 
private diagnostic sectors. In addition, both countries also have national immunization reg-
istries (and Australia has a cervical smear registry, as well), which can be fed and ac-
cessed electronically. Finally, in both nations, hospitals are increasingly sending discharge 
summaries electronically to GPs, who in turn are sending referrals and other communica-
tions to hospitals and specialists electronically. Some experts suggest that the lack of a 
single national identifier code has hindered eHealth systems in Australia to a substantial 
degree. New Zealand, by contrast, which does have a single consumer health identifier, 
may have an easier time creating a national HIE program (Jha et al., 2008, Grant, 2012). 
There has been some implementation of eHealth systems in both Australia and New Zea-
land with more likely to come. In Australia, the National E-Health Transition Authority 
(www.nehta.gov.au) has undertaken substantial planning for HIE implementation. In addi-
tion, a New South Wales pilot project is encouraging hospitals and community providers to 
exchange clinical data for some 50,000 patients (Grant, 2012). 
2.2.3 Conclusions on the Existing eHealth Systems 
In previous Sections, some existing eHealth systems in the world are generally introduced, 
and there are also a lot of undergoing eHealth events in academic research. We are not 
going to get into the details of these eHealth systems, because each of them is a very 
complex system not only in technologies, but also in policies and laws. We draw some 
conclusions on these existing eHealth systems based on our survey and understanding. 
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 eHealth Systems Are More and More Popular 
Because eHealth systems have many advantages for health care compared to the 
paper based health systems, it is a common consensus that eHealth systems will 
dominate in the healthcare services in the near future. More and more companies, 
governments are paying attention, investing resources to the development of eHealth 
systems.  
 eHealth Systems Will Cover More Activities 
In current eHealth systems, healthcare activities are still limitedly supported. For ex-
ample, some eHealth systems only provide EHR storing service, without electronic 
prescription support. The absence of full support to healthcare activities will greatly 
decrease the quality of daily health care, even conceal the advantages brought by 
eHealth systems. Nevertheless, with the development of technology and increase of 
patients’ demands, we believe that the future eHealth systems will cover more activi-
ties to serve the health care in our daily lives perfectly.  
 Long Way to Go with the Interoperation 
It is a fact that different countries have been developing their own eHealth systems, 
and even in a same country multiple eHealth systems are being used with different 
support technologies. As a result, the interoperation among different eHealth systems 
is an urgent question, because patients are becoming more and more mobile, e.g., 
moving from one doctor to another, from one hospital to another, from one city to an-
other, and even from one country to another. Interoperation is also necessary for sec-
ondary use of EHR based on the statistics on a great amount of health data. EHR col-
lected from different eHealth systems must be reformed to a common format to be an-
alyzed. It is urgent to set up and adopt some international standards for the storage 
and exchange of health data.  
 Much to Do with Security and Privacy 
Because the health data are electronically stored and transmitted across healthcare 
providers, the security of the health data and the privacy of patients will suffer from se-
rious threats. Some technologies and policies regarding security and privacy have 
been implemented in current eHealth systems. However, when eHealth systems cover 
more activities, these current technologies and policies may become weak or useless. 
The security and privacy issues are being concerned by more and more people. They 
will be the critical factors to the development of the eHealth systems. Thus they should 
be considered carefully beforehand and it is valuable to adopt some long-term effec-
tive technologies and policies to protect the security and privacy.  
 
 
 
2.3 Important Notions 
17 
 
2.3 Important Notions 
EHR (Electronic Health Records). Each patient owns one set EHR, which include all the 
health records during her/his past visits to the doctors 
EHR Entry. A patient’s EHR include many entries, each of which is created during one 
visit to a doctor. This entry can include any information of this visit, for example, date, ex-
amination, diagnose, prescription and so on.  
Security of EHR. A patient’s electronic health records (EHR) stored in server and transfer 
in network should guarantee the following security requirements: Confidentiality, Integrity, 
Authenticity, Availability. 
Confidentiality.  The information in EHR is not available or disclosed to unauthorized 
roles. This is often realized by encryption (e.g. AES) (Daemen and Rijmen, 2013). The 
encryption keys are protected from the unintended roles. 
Integrity. Any manipulation to the EHR should be detected by the EHR users (e.g. doctors, 
patients). Integrity is often realized by HMAC (Krawczyk et al., 1997) and digital signature 
(e.g. RSA) (Shamir, 1985). 
Authenticity. The owners of EHR (i.e. the patients) have the ability to prove the ownership 
of the data, while others are not able to impersonate the data owners (Needham and 
Schroeder, 1978).  
Availability. The EHR should be easily available to intended roles. For example, a doctor 
should be able to view a visiting patient’s EHR easily and comprehensive. 
Privacy of patients. privacy of patients involves several aspects: the identity protection 
(i.e. patients’ identities should be carefully used and never be disclosed to unintended 
roles); the health data sharing policy (i.e. patients’ health data should never be disclosed 
to unintended people including the real identities); and the consent management (i.e. pa-
tients should have full control on the uses of their health data). 
Hash function. If not specified, it means cryptographic hash function (e.g. SHA-2) (NIST, 
2002), which must resist three kinds of attacks: collision, preimage and secondary 
preimage (Rogaway and Shrimpton, 2004). 
Pseudonym, pseudonymous and pseudonymity. A pseudonym is a special kind of 
identifier which can not be linked to the user’s real identity. Being pseudonymous is the 
state of using a pseudonym as ID. Pseudonymity is the use of pseudonyms as IDs 
(Pfitzmann and Köhntopp, 2001). 
Anonymous and anonymity. Anonymity is the state of being not identifiable within a set 
of users. A user is anonymous when he/she does not differ from any other users in the 
system (Pfitzmann and Köhntopp, 2001). 
Smart card. A smart card is composed a plastic card and the inner circuit. On the surface 
of the card, the photo of the holder can be printed. The inner circuit often can function for 
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encryption/decryption/signature and as protected storage for secret keys. If not specified, 
we mean the patient’s smart card. 
Signature. If not specified, it means digital signature with digital certificate and secret key 
(Housley et al., 2002). 
Fully /Semi- trusted third party. A fully trusted party masters all the necessary infor-
mation to disclose the patients’ private data (e.g. EHR and identities), and thus it must be 
fully counted on to behave as expected (e.g. will not corrupt or be compromised). A semi-
trusted third party only possesses limited information of patients, and thus its dishonest 
behavior or being compromised will not disclose the private data of patients, although that 
may disturb the normal process of healthcare activities.  
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3 Security and Privacy Issues in 
Different Models of eHealth Sys-
tems 
3.1 A General Model of eHealth Systems  
3.1.1 Overview 
Due to the different structures of existing eHealth systems, it is difficult to analyze and 
compare the security and privacy levels in a fair way. We notice that almost all eHealth 
systems use some common elements (e.g. basic roles, healthcare activities), and they 
suffer from the similar threats on security and privacy. These common elements are also 
essential to every eHealth system. In this Section we will firstly introduce a common model 
of eHealth systems. Then basing on this common model, we will analyze various threats to 
security and privacy in a basic eHealth system in Section 3.2. It is valuable and necessary 
to set up a general model for eHealth systems due to the following reasons. 
 Denote Common and Essential Elements from Different eHealth Systems 
We have pointed out above that existing eHealth systems have different notations and 
different properties for the same element. However, we find that some common ele-
ments are very essential to a modern eHealth system. If we can list and denote them 
as uniform annotations, it will be helpful to describe a new eHealth system and the de-
sign of any technical solution (e.g. privacy and security solution) which is applied in 
the new eHealth system.  
 Create a Reference for the Undergoing and Future eHealth Systems 
There are still a lot of countries and areas lacking an eHealth system, and they are 
behaving differently in health care compared to those countries with developed 
eHealth systems. It is urgent for these countries to set up such an eHealth system to 
improve the quality and efficiency of health care. This general model can be a valua-
ble reference to them. Moreover, some existing eHealth systems are undergoing revo-
lutions in terms of business model and technical solutions (e.g. adding new functions 
to the current systems). This basic model can also be referenced by them. 
 Act as a Common Platform where Security and Privacy Are Evaluated 
Security and privacy issues are great challenges for each eHealth system. There are 
many solutions responding to the security and privacy in industry and academic re-
search. Because these solutions may focus on different fields of eHealth systems, it is 
difficult to compare, evaluate and integrate them together. In a practical eHealth sys-
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tem, because security and privacy are global problems, any successful attack or in-
fringement to the health data in a single field may cause the failure of the whole sys-
tem. So a qualified solution for security and privacy should be a solution set which can 
secure all essential fields and can even potentially support some upcoming functions 
to eHealth systems. With the help of this general model, we can evaluate a solution on 
security and privacy in a common setting, and locate which fields are addressed. The 
compatibility and interoperability of the solution with existing technologies can also be 
examined accordingly. 
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Figure 1: A general model of eHealth systems 
As shown in Figure 1, we present a general model of eHealth systems. This model con-
sists of the basic entities (denoted by round-corner rectangles), IT infrastructure (denoted 
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by rectangles), and healthcare activities (denoted by arrows). We will describe these ele-
ments in the following Sections one by one. Note that these elements may be named into 
different annotations in different eHealth systems, and there are more or less elements in 
different eHealth systems.  
3.1.2 Basic Entities in eHealth Systems 
 Patient 
Patient is one of the most important roles in eHealth systems. A patient can be any-
body in society and even anonymous in some traditional healthcare systems. However, 
in an eHealth system, patients’ identities need to be uniquely represented for different 
reasons. When a doctor wants to access a patient’s previous EHR, these previous 
EHR must be connected together with a unique identification, otherwise, other patients’ 
EHR may be wrongly thought as belonging to this patient. Moreover, a health insur-
ance company also needs to distinguish different customers by the identifications.  
Considering the privacy of patients, it is not easy to get a simple solution to represent 
patients’ identities. Some currently used methods in existing eHealth systems have 
potential privacy issues. For example, using patients’ identity numbers or any unique 
identifiers will easily disclose patients’ identities (e.g. an identity number may easily be 
mapped to name, address etc.); using an insurance card number may also leak the 
privacy to unintended persons (refer to Section 6.2); using digital certificates from a 
trusted party may also potentially be attacked (refer to Section 3.2.6).  
The privacy issue is mainly concerned by patients in eHealth systems. The disclosure 
of a patient’s health information may cause severe consequences, e.g. cause negative 
impact to the employment of the patient. Note that, not only some intentional attackers 
may infringe patients’ private information for their various kinds of purposes, but also 
some normal use of patients’ health data may leak the privacy of patients unintention-
ally.  
 Doctor 
Another import role in eHealth systems is the doctor. A doctor can be any professional 
physician in a small practice or in a big hospital, and also can be any medical care 
personnel such as a nurse, or laboratory technician. Doctors usually need to be certi-
fied by some trustworthy organizations or government departments. They have to get 
licenses (e.g. digital certificates) in paper or in digital form. So they are typically identi-
fied by their real identities. Because they can directly contact to the EHR of patients, 
they play an important role to protect the security of the health data and the privacy of 
patients. Generally, doctor have little to no privacy problem as they are willing to be 
known by the public e.g. for advertisement reason. However, some doctors may be 
unwilling to disclose the amount of patients they have treated. If patients’ EHR are 
public available to everybody (e.g. in the eHealth model introduced in Section 6), this 
privacy issue of doctors should also be considered. This is can be achieved by trusted 
third parties (i.e. the certificate authority issue to doctors the certificate in which the 
real identities of doctors are not included). For the simplicity, we will not consider the 
privacy of doctor further in this thesis. 
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In most current eHealth systems, doctors are considered to be fully trustworthy. It is 
true to some degree. We also utilize the trustworthiness of doctors in our proposed 
security and privacy solution. Meanwhile, we think that doctors may behave dishonest-
ly in some occasions. E.g., they might disclose patients’ health data intentionally or 
unintentionally, and they might cheat for illegal benefit from insurance companies by 
sending fake bills. We will propose solutions to detect and avoid these malicious be-
haviors of dishonest doctors (refer to Section 6.2.1). 
 Pharmacy 
A pharmacy can be a substantial or online shop where pharmacists sell medicines to 
patients according to prescriptions. In some countries, medicines are sold by hospitals 
or doctors to patients directly. However, in most developed countries and regions, 
pharmacies exist independently to healthcare providers. To be involved in eHealth 
systems, pharmacies also need to be certified by some trustworthy organizations or 
government departments, and get certificates in paper or digital form. Similar to doc-
tors, they are often identified by their real identities and have no own privacy problem. 
However, they are able to read the prescriptions of patients and potentially leak the 
private data of patients. Moreover, like the dishonest doctors, a pharmacy might also 
cheat insurance companies to get illegal benefit by sending fake bills. Thus, not all 
pharmacies can be considered to be fully trustworthy. There should be countermeas-
ures to prevent pharmacies from disclosing the private information of patients and 
other malicious behaviors. 
 Health Insurance Company 
Insurance companies are more and more involved into eHealth systems in many 
countries. Especially in many European countries, a valid health insurance which can 
cover the expenses of health care is mandatory for every citizen. Although in many 
countries and eHealth systems, insurance companies are still absent or run offline, we 
list insurance company as an essential role connected with other roles in eHealth sys-
tems. Insurance companies must also be certified by some trustworthy organizations 
or government departments. They have to get certificates in paper or in digital form. 
So they are often identified by their real identities and have no privacy problems of 
their own. However, insurance companies have full knowledge about each customers’ 
health data, and thus they impose high risk to the security of the health data and the 
privacy of patients.  
In most eHealth systems, insurance companies are considered as trusted, and they 
always promise to keep the privacy of patients when they sign contracts with their cus-
tomers. However, we argue that it is not necessary for insurance companies to obtain 
full EHR of the patients. We will propose a solution to prevent insurance companies 
from knowing too much (just necessary information) about patients and decrease the 
risk of disclosing the privacy of patients (refer to Section 6.2). 
 Secondary User 
Besides the ordinary healthcare activities (e.g. visiting doctor, purchasing medicines), 
health information is also used for secondary purposes such as health system plan-
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ning, management, quality control, public health monitoring, program evaluation, and 
medical research. Secondary users who reuse patients’ health data also need to be 
certified by some formal organizations or government departments. They have to get 
certificates in paper or in digit form. So they are often identified by their real identities 
and have no own privacy problem.  
Although the health data are usually “de-identified” or “anonymized” before they are 
used for secondary purposes, secondary users are still able to deduce the identities of 
the participating patients by the remaining insensitive identifiers (e.g. for various rea-
sons, some identifiers such as age, gender are kept). Especially, when a secondary 
user wants to contact the participants to get more information and consent, or even 
send feedback to them, the secondary user may have a chance to know the real iden-
tities of the participants (e.g. email address, telephone number). Thus, secondary us-
ers also bring potential risk of disclosing the private data of patients. 
In this thesis, we apply the pseudonym solution to protect the privacy of patients 
against secondary users while supporting full communication during secondary uses, 
e.g. de-identification, consent management and sending feedback (please refer to 
Section 6.3 for details). 
 Trusted Third Party (TTP) 
In current eHealth systems, trusted third parties are commonly used. In Figure 1 we 
did not draw them, because they play different roles in different eHealth systems and 
thus exists in different processes. We divide the trusted third parties into two catego-
ries according to the trust level on them. 
The first kind of trusted third parties is powerful and acts as the trust base of the sys-
tem. This kind of trusted third parties must be required as fully trustworthy because 
they have too much power. They play an important role to protect the security of the 
system and privacy of patients. This is actually the most common case of trust third 
parties in current eHealth systems. For example, a trusted third party manages the 
identities of patients and provides the secret keys for encryption and authentication on 
EHR. Unquestionably, the fully trusted third parties can simplify the system design and 
deployment, and they can guarantee the security of the system if they never do evil 
and are strong enough against all kinds of attacks. However, the existence of such a 
powerful trusted third party brings potential risk of disclosing of the privacy of patients. 
They are able to infringe the privacy of patients easily and seriously (e.g. to read the 
private information of every patient, to impersonate a patient) if they want to, because 
malicious insiders (e.g. the administrator of the database) may appear in the trusted 
third party. Moreover, the trusted third party may be compromised by some outside at-
tackers and the private information stored may be stolen. 
The second category of trusted third parties is less powerful and only needs to be 
“semi-trusted”. “Semi-trusted” means that the third party is not able to disclose the pri-
vacy of the users, thus the security of system does not rely on the third party. However, 
it should be somewhat trusted to behave honestly, otherwise, the normal process of 
the system may run into trouble. A semi-trusted trusted third party plays an important 
role in the security of eHealth systems, but it just knows some partial information of 
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patients and is unable to obtain any further private information of the patients. Thus, 
the patients do not have to trust that, a semi-trusted TTP protects their private data.  
Instead, a semi-trusted TTP may behave dishonestly and may be compromised. The 
dishonest behavior or compromising will not lead to the disclosure of patients’ private 
data, although their dishonest behaviors may interrupt the normal process of the 
whole system. For example, if a trusted third party in charge of authentication refuses 
to work or responds wrongly, the healthcare activities may be postponed or disordered. 
In some rare cases, the semi-trusted third parties might collude with other entities in 
the eHealth system to disclose the privacy of patients. For example, a trusted third 
party that issues certificates to patients may collude with doctors or insurance compa-
nies to decrypt all the private health data and the real identity of a patient. Neverthe-
less, compared to the first category of fully trusted third parties, they are much less 
powerful and thus the risks of disclosing the private data of patients decreases. 
In our proposed solution, we assume trusted third parties as semi-trusted. This is also 
a trend in modern eHealth systems due to the strong demand on security and privacy. 
3.1.3 Basic Activities in eHealth Systems 
 Patient Registers at an Insurance Company 
As we have introduced in Section 3.1.2, each patient needs to contact an insurance 
company to sign a health insurance contract as shown in Figure 2. Although in Figure 
1 and Figure 2, only one insurance company is depicted for the sake of simplicity, 
there can be many insurance companies in a practical eHealth system, and one pa-
tient can possess multiple health insurances.  
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Figure 2: Patient registers at an insurance company 
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In the registration process, the real identity of the patient is inevitably known by the in-
surance company, because the insurance company usually needs to evaluate the pa-
tient’s income, health status and so on. Especially, in many countries, the premium for 
the health insurance is indirectly paid by the employers of patients. Each patient has 
to inform the insurance company about his employment. As a result, the patient’s 
identity is difficult to keep as a secret against the insurance company.  
The insurance company issues a certificate (e.g., a digital certificate in a patient smart 
card) with signature (e.g. digitally signed by the private key of the insurance company) 
to the patient. Besides that, the photo of the patient is often printed on the certificate (a 
card or paper) to avoid the abuse of the insurance. Usually, the patient is assigned a 
registration reference number, which the insurance company can use to look for the 
patient’s real identity and index the patient’s data. The reference number is enclosed 
in the certificate issued to the patient. Other persons except the insurance company 
are unable to map the reference number to the real identity of the patient. Thus, the 
patient’s certificate is anonymous to other persons. The registration procedure is im-
portant for the billing detailed in the following paragraph “Billing”.  
 Patient Visits a Doctor 
A patient can visit a doctor (or other healthcare providers) after he/she has registered 
at an insurance company. The patient has to present the certificate to the doctor in or-
der to prove the insurance coverage. The doctor can validate the certificate by check-
ing the photo of the patient and signature of the insurance company. After that, the 
doctor diagnoses the patient, treats the patient, and at last writes down a prescription 
for the patient if necessary. In practice, the procedure of visiting doctor is much more 
complex as shown in Figure 3. The patient may be transferred to different medical 
personnel in the hospital, and there are more data created by them, besides the doc-
tor’s record on diagnosis and prescriptions. E.g., the laboratory experimenter may 
create examination data which are uploaded to the internal server of the hospital to be 
viewed by the doctor and other coworkers. For the simplicity, these medical personnel 
are represented by “Doctor”, and all data of one patient at the internal server will be 
concentrated together as the health records of the patient. 
In current eHealth systems, the identities of patients are often known by doctors, be-
cause doctors need to set up long term EHR (anamnesis) for patients and keep con-
tact with patients. EHR are usually organized (or indexed) according to the identities of 
patients. Therefore, if a patient visits a doctor for the second time, the doctor can 
quickly find out the previous health information of the patient for faster diagnosis and 
better treatment. Since doctors master all the private health information of patients (in-
cluding the identities), doctors are assumed as fully trustworthy to preserve the privacy 
of patients. 
In practice, there are laws to regulate doctors’ behaviors on patients’ health data only 
for internal uses, and doctors have their moral faith to protect the privacy of patients. 
However, we argue that the identities of patients are not necessarily known by doctors. 
The health data of patients can be anonymous to doctors. As a result, it decreases the 
risk of disclosing the privacy of patients by doctors (sometimes the disclosure is unin-
tentional).  
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Figure 3: A patient visits a doctor in hospital 
 Patient Gets Medicine from a Pharmacy with Prescription 
After a patient gets a prescription (refer to Section 6.1.6 for more details about the 
format of a prescription) from a doctor, he/she can purchase the medicines listed in 
the prescription at a pharmacy (certainly patients can buy medicines without a pre-
scription, which can be dealt with other supplementary solutions). The patient has to 
present the certificate from the insurance company to the pharmacist in the same way 
as when visiting a doctor. Then the prescription (e.g. the electrical prescription in pa-
tient’s smart card) must be validated by the pharmacist to check that it is truly pre-
scribed by a doctor. After these successful validations, the medicines are sold to pa-
tients. 
For the same reason as discussed in the last paragraph, it is unnecessarily for the 
pharmacies to know the identities of patients during the medicine purchasing. Howev-
er, in current eHealth systems, the prescriptions often include the identity information 
of patients for the ease of validating. As a result, a pharmacy can easily record the pa-
tients’ identities and prescriptions. From the prescriptions, the pharmacy can some-
how infer the patients’ health status and illnesses. This potentially imposes risks with 
respect to disclosing the private information of patients by the pharmacists. 
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 Billing 
After a patient left a doctor or a pharmacy, a bill including the expenses and the details 
of the health care administered to the patient will be sent to the insurance company by 
the doctor or pharmacist to get paid as shown in Figure 4(a). In the bill, the patient’s 
registration reference number in the certificate from the insurance company will be en-
closed. After the insurance company receives the bill, corresponding fees will be paid 
to the bill senders if the following validations succeed. The insurance company firstly 
examines the origin of the bill, i.e., the bill indeed originates from a registered custom-
er to avoid abuse of insurance by checking the reference number and the signature of 
the patient enclosed in the bill (if available, as introduced in Section 6.2). Moreover, 
the signature of the bill sender must be checked in order to ensure the truth of the 
health care, i.e., the bill was sent by a valid bill sender. 
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Figure 4: Two typical business models of billing 
There is a different business model of billing as shown in Figure 4 (b). The doctor or 
the pharmacy asks the patient to pay the bill at first. Later the patient can send the bill 
to his/her insurance company to get reimbursed. We will discuss this model with more 
details in Section 6.2.3.2. 
As we have addressed in Section 3.1.2, insurance companies involved in the billing 
process impose risk of disclosing the privacy of patients. In many existing eHealth sys-
tems, bills often include almost everything about patients’ healthcare information. So 
insurance companies can build up database for storing the bills for their customers 
with patients’ real identities. That imposes great threats to the privacy of patients due 
to the malicious behaviors from the corrupt insiders and the potential flaw of security 
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protection in the electronic systems of insurance companies. More details will be dis-
cussed in Section 6.2. 
 Secondary Use 
Secondary use of EHR is becoming more and more important and common. The ease 
of access, share, and manipulation of EHR facilitates the secondary use compared to 
paper based health records. In general, there are three important steps in secondary 
use of EHR as shown in Figure 5. 
The first step is to “de-identify” (“anonymize” or “pseudonymize”) the health data. In 
Section 2.1 we already explained this step through some examples. The purpose of 
this step is to block the mapping from the health data for secondary use to the real 
identities of the participants. De-identification is often done by trusted third parties or 
the actual data creators (e.g. hospitals) in current eHealth systems. Therefore, pa-
tients usually have no idea about how their health data are “de-identified” or know the 
actual uses of their health data. 
The second step is that secondary users get consent from patients. In current eHealth 
systems, patients usually are asked by a trust third party to agree or sign some dis-
claims which grant secondary users rights to use their data when patients enroll in 
eHealth systems. Patients are unable to control the uses of their health data after-
wards. Some arguments about the necessity of patients’ clear consent exist in industry 
and research. Obtaining consent can be challenging and there have been major con-
cerns about the negative impact of obtaining patients’ consent on the ability to conduct 
research. Such concerns are reinforced by the evidence that requiring explicit consent 
from participants in different forms of health research can have a negative impact on 
the process and outcomes of the research. For example, recruitment rates decline 
significantly when individuals are asked to consent; those who consent tend to be dif-
ferent from those who decline consent on a number of important demographic and so-
cio-economic variables, hence potentially introducing bias in the results. Moreover, the 
consent requirements increase the cost of, and time for, conducting the research be-
cause of the very large population involved, the lack of contact channel between re-
searchers and patients, and the time elapsed between data collection and the re-
search study. Besides these negative arguments on getting consent, the procedure of 
getting clear consent from patients may itself disclose the patients’ identities to sec-
ondary users, because the consent may contain some information about the identities, 
e.g. name, date, location, and signature. Due to these issues, many current secondary 
uses don’t have the clear consent from patients. 
The last step is that secondary users send feedback to the participating patients. In 
some cases, secondary users may have feedback (e.g. the statistic results or some 
participant-specific information which may interest patients) to the participants. For 
example, when a medical researcher on diabetes finds that a participant is prone to 
get diabetes based on the symptoms and diets of the patient, he would like to send a 
reminder to this patient; when a drug researcher finds a new cure scheme and new 
medicines for curing a patient’s illness, he may also want to notify the participants in 
time. The capability of transmitting feedback is a great incentive for patients to partici-
pate in the secondary use. However, in current eHealth systems, secondary users can 
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not contact patients due to the privacy issues, or the missing of contact information 
with the participants, the feedback is seldom sent out. For more details about the sec-
ondary use of EHR, please refer to Section 6.3. 
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Figure 5: Process of secondary use of EHR 
3.1.4 IT Infrastructure 
 Storages 
In a basic eHealth system as shown in Figure 1, the electronic health data are stored 
at different servers operated by different healthcare providers. For example, in Figure 
1, Doctor A and Doctor B coming from two different hospitals provide healthcare ser-
vice to the same patient, but they create and store EHR separately at Server A and 
Server B operated by two hospital independently; different pharmacies store the pre-
scriptions and other information (e.g. sales records) into their own servers; insurance 
companies also save the billing information and all other information (like the customer 
registration) at their own servers.  
As a result of dispersive storage, EHR of one patient are distributed divisively over the 
multiple healthcare providers (e.g. hospitals, practices) which the patient has visited 
as shown in Figure 6 (a).  
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Figure 6: Two models of storing EHR 
The dispersive storage model causes many problems (e.g. authorization, server relia-
bility, different EHR formats) for those applications where all EHR of a patient need to 
be gathered together. E.g. a doctor who diagnoses a patient wants to review the an-
amnesis of the patient; a medical researcher collects all EHR of a certain kind of pa-
tients (Elkin et al., 2010). Especially for the secondary use of EHR, the scattered EHR 
in multiple locations will bring many other obstacles. One obstacle comes from the de-
identification of EHR. As we have introduced in Section 3.1.2 and 3.1.3, because the 
real identity information of patients is often not necessary in the secondary use, the 
real identifiers need to be removed from EHR in advance (de-identification), in order to 
protect the privacy of participating patients during secondary use. It is, however, a 
technical challenge to remove patients’ identity information consistently and unify the 
pseudonym of the same patient because EHR scattered in different locations are in-
dexed by different identifiers (e.g. identity number, passport number, name and birth-
day). Another obstacle is that secondary users have difficulties in contacting patients 
to get consent for authorizing them to use EHR legally because they can not find the 
contact method of the participants from the de-identified EHR. Furthermore, second-
ary users will also encounter problems in sending feedback to the participating pa-
tients because the participants are not reachable. 
An alternative way is to store EHR of all patients in a centralized server as shown in 
Figure 6 (b). EHR of one patient are indexed by a same identification and stored to-
gether. The sharing and gathering of EHR of patients will be much easier and more 
comprehensive than the dispersive manner. To this end, a cloud (Mell & Grance, 2011) 
is an ideal media for storing EHR, providing wide access to EHR, because it is able to 
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offer ubiquitous services to customers over the Internet (Rui & Ling, 2010). In the ordi-
nary healthcare activities (e.g. patients visit doctors and pharmacies), all healthcare 
entities (e.g. healthcare providers, patients, health insurance companies) can access 
EHR from the cloud any time and any where, thus facilitating all these activities. E.g., 
doctors can view patients’ previous health records stored in the cloud conveniently; 
patients can purchase medicines from pharmacies by using the electronic prescrip-
tions stored in the cloud. Moreover, the cloud can provide great convenience for the 
secondary use of EHR due to the following reasons. Firstly, if EHR of a large popula-
tion segment are stored in the cloud, secondary users have better chance to gather 
more extensive health information. Secondly, the computation power of the cloud can 
provide potential services to secondary users, e.g. the cloud can help a medical re-
searcher to find target participants through powerful searching capability in all EHR 
stored in the cloud. Finally, because the cloud can perform as a media for the com-
munication between secondary users and patients, secondary users are able to get 
the consent from the participants and send feedback to the latter through the cloud 
online more conveniently. 
On the other hand, the public accessibility of the central server (e.g. cloud) brings the 
risk of disclosing patients’ health information to ubiquitous attackers. The security of 
EHR and the privacy of patients will suffer from enormous threats when EHR are 
stored in a centralized manner. As a consequence, EHR must be encrypted and the 
encryption keys should only be known to the intended entities. In addition, the identity 
information of patients should also be strictly managed and never be linked to EHR by 
attackers. However, because patients’ identity information needs to be frequently used 
in a typical eHealth system, the identities of patients confront high risk of disclosure. 
E.g., A doctor needs the identity information of patients to inquire their health insur-
ance coverage from the health insurance companies; the cloud may need to check a 
patient’s identity information in order to grant him to do any modifications on his EHR 
when the patient is managing his EHR online; secondary users may also need the 
identity information to confirm that the consent is exactly signed by the owners of EHR 
and the feedback are sent to the corresponding participants. 
In this thesis, we adopt the centralized storage manner to store EHR due to the ad-
vantages introduced in the last paragraph (refer to Section 3.3 for more discussion on 
the centralized storage manner). 
 Communication Network 
The intranet is often used to share EHR inside one healthcare provider. For example, 
an internal network is deployed to connect the computers of all doctors and other staff 
in the same hospital. Patients’ health data can be easily accessed inside the hospital 
for various uses. The intranet is an efficient communication approach inside a 
healthcare provider. EHR storage and communication can even be clear text which 
can facilitate the access speed and search. With the assumption that the staff inside 
are trustworthy, it provides high level of security and privacy because the potential 
outside attackers are unable to access the internal resources. However, there are 
several shortcomings by using the intranet to share EHR. One obvious point is that it 
is difficult to share EHR across different healthcare providers as we have introduced in 
Section 2.2.1.1. Another one is that the insiders (e.g. the administrators of the intranet) 
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are able to download all EHR of many patients, which will be a potential risk of disclos-
ing the private data of patients. At last, for some healthcare providers, it is not easy for 
them to maintain such an intranet and servers for daily use due to the cost and tech-
nical reasons. 
Some traditional ways such as telephone, fax and email are also used to communi-
cate among different organizations in eHealth systems, e.g. healthcare providers may 
send the bills to insurance companies by fax. However, these traditional ways may 
easily be eavesdropped by attackers and malicious telecom service providers. Be-
sides, they are also inefficient and inconvenient. 
There are also some existing eHealth systems and research groups suggesting the In-
ternet for communication. E.g., the Internet is used to share patients’ EHR across 
healthcare providers; the Internet is used by healthcare providers to send the bills to 
insurance companies; patients can view and manage their own EHR through the In-
ternet using any own devices. However, because the Internet is open (to the skillful at-
tackers) and easily eavesdropped (e.g. eavesdropping at the bone routers), advanced 
security technologies must be used to protect the communication messages. In con-
clusion, compared to the traditional communication way, the Internet brings much eas-
ier connectivity and higher efficiency, but it also brings enormous challenges to design 
secure communication protocols to protect the transmitted messages.  
3.2 Security and Privacy Threats  
A practical eHealth system is a very complex information system, in which many roles, 
activities and transactions are included. Even in a small subset of the system (e.g. pre-
scription system), the analysis on security and privacy threats is very complicated. Moreo-
ver, the structures of different eHealth systems are even different. As a result, instead of 
some standard threat analysis schemes (Schneier, 1999), we are going to analyze the se-
curity and privacy threats in some major aspects, which are commonly referred in different 
eHealth systems. In the following Sections, we consider the major roles and activities in 
eHealth systems, and analyze the common security threats to the EHR and privacy threats 
to patients. These analyses are not complete. However, these threats are common and 
important in different eHealth systems. Our solution in this thesis also mainly aim to resist 
these threats, and is capable to be used in these mentioned activities.  
3.2.1 The Owner of Electronic Health Records (EHR) 
Electronic health records contain highly personal information, from illnesses to family mat-
ters to emotional statuses. They have become invaluable collections of information used 
by a diverse group ranging from government agencies and disease researchers to market-
ing firms and for-profit data brokers (e.g. IMS11)(Tanner, 2014). Government and for-profit 
businesses have long collected, parsed, and used collective patient data to track the path 
of chronic conditions and contagious diseases, follow the success rates of new and old 
treatments, develop new cures, and improve the quality of providers' services. However, 
                                                            
11 Ims: http://www.imshealth.com/portal/site/imshealth 
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because the electronic health records are easily re-identified, and have different rules de-
pending on state and organization, patients have little to no control over the information 
that reveals their very personal health information. 
In many current eHealth systems, the actual holders of EHR are roles other than patients 
due to various reasons. For example, healthcare providers own and control EHR because 
they actually have created them and EHR are most often used inside healthcare providers. 
In some eHealth systems, the government or some trusted third parties are assigned to be 
the owners of EHR, and they are believed to protect the private information in EHR, and 
they are trusted to use EHR in a legal way. 
Why don’t many existing eHealth systems set patients as the owners of EHR? The most 
direct answer is that if patients own and control EHR, it will cause many inconveniences in 
many healthcare activities. For example, if many patients refuse the secondary use of their 
EHR, it will cause bias or error of the results. In medical research, the researchers need to 
use a large amount of de-identified patient data for developing new medicines and for find-
ing relationships between disease factors and influences. Because it is known to many 
patients that the statistically de-identified data are not perfect (i.e., the di-identified data 
might be re-identified) (Bjurstrøm and Singh, 2013), patients may have excessive worries 
but no incentive to contribute their private data for secondary use. These worries come 
true in some reports. E.g., in a study, the Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research, a 
nonprofit research and teaching institution with programs in cancer research, developmen-
tal biology, genetics, and genomics, was able to re-identify 50 people who had provided 
personal DNA data for genomics studies. The odds of being named from a de-identified 
database were 4 in 10,000, according to a 2005 study12. In the recent years, consumers 
share more identifiable information via social media and apps, and more information is 
digitally available, so perhaps they are more likely to be identified today.  
We argue that patients should be the owners of their EHR. If a proper security and privacy 
solution is provided, the worries both from patients about their privacy and from other roles 
that use EHR can be dismissed. The solution should convince patients that they will not 
lose the control over their EHR, and the private information will not be disclosed in any 
case of uses. Moreover, the introduction of the security and privacy solution should not 
hinder the normal uses of EHR, e.g., EHR can be decrypted in time in the ordinary 
healthcare activities and secondary uses. In this thesis, we have proposed such a solution 
to set patients as the owners of EHR and enable patients to have full control in every use 
of their EHR (refer to chapter 6). 
3.2.2 General Attackers 
Because of the high concern on security and privacy, the health data are usually protec-
tively (e.g. encrypted) stored in the servers to prevent the access of persons who are not 
authorized, and every use of the health data is very careful. However, these protected data 
have the risk to be attacked, even if the encryption itself is strong. According to the places 
where the attacker is, we divide the attackers into two types. 
                                                            
12 From https://datafloq.com/read/re-identifying-anonymous-people-with-big-data/228 
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 With Ability to Access the Storage Servers 
The first kind of attackers are the insiders in the systems as shown at the right of Fig-
ure 7. The insiders often refer to the malicious users who have rights to access the da-
ta stored at the server. Plain users like a nurse who can view a part of the data at the 
server are such potential insiders. It is even worse when an administrator of the server 
becomes a malicious insider. The administrator who has full ability to access the data 
server may completely destroy the privacy guarantee. Especially, because more and 
more healthcare providers outsource the IT work to some third companies, the data 
servers are physically out of the control of healthcare providers. In this case, the risk 
of insiders becomes higher. 
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Figure 7: Examples for general attackers to EHR 
Another scenario is that the security mechanism for protecting the data servers might  
be compromised by outside attackers through networks as shown at the bottom of 
Figure 7. Especially when the data server is connected to the Internet, the data server 
and the client computers of the doctors may suffer from high risk to be attacked. Alt-
hough many advanced technologies are used to protect the IT infrastructure from in-
vasion, the bugs or flaws caused by design and implementation still give chances to 
outsider. Depending on what information is obtained by the outsider, the data stored at 
the servers may be infringed to different degrees.  
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Moreover, some eHealth systems reside in public cloud (e.g. the eHealth in this thesis 
as introduced in chapter 6), the resources (e.g. EHR) are publicly available to anyone. 
Malicious users can download and analyze these data to discover interesting infor-
mation, which may infringe the privacy of the data owners.  
 With Ability to Eavesdrop the Network 
When the users in an eHealth system access the data at the server through network, 
eavesdroppers have chances to obtain the private data. An example of such eaves-
dropping is shown at the bottom of Figure 7, where the communication between a 
doctor and the server can be obtained by an attacker. In fact, any other communica-
tions, e.g. between the patient’s device and the server, have the risk to be eaves-
dropped. For the simplification, they are not drawn in Figure 7. 
One kind of such eavesdroppers is the users who eavesdrop in the intranet of 
healthcare providers. Because some devices like intranet hub use broadcasting to 
transmit data, an eavesdropper who connected to the intranet can easily get the mes-
sages transferred among communicators and data server. In many cases, because 
the messages transferred over the intranet are not encrypted, it will cause serious pri-
vacy problems if a malicious eavesdropper exists. 
If the messages are transferred over the Internet, some attackers who have ability to 
access the key devices (e.g. routers) in the bone network may eavesdrop and record 
the private data in the messages. This kind of attacks can be ruled out by encrypting 
the messages. However, the system designers must pay attention to the secret key 
management policy to avoid that the encryption key is leaked to the attackers. For ex-
ample, a key exchange scheme is prone to be attacked by man-in-the-middle scheme 
(Seo and Sweeney, 1999), where an attacker impersonates as a transparent agent 
and obtain the encryption keys without being discovered by the communicators.  
3.2.3 Healthcare Providers 
In many existing eHealth systems, healthcare providers are assumed to be fully trustwor-
thy. However, healthcare providers may still potentially disclose the privacy of patients.  
One scenario is that the data stored in the servers of a healthcare provider may be leaked. 
A doctor in a practice knows the personal identities of all visited patients and all the private 
healthcare information. Although doctors rarely leak or sell the health data to someone 
else, we must take into account that the computer of the doctor may be compromised and 
the data stored in it might be obtained by the attackers. Some countermeasures will be 
discussed in our solution to reduce such kind of risk in Section 6.1 and 6.2. For example, 
patients can be anonymous to healthcare providers; EHR of patients are not stored on 
doctors’ computers at all, or stored on doctors’ computers encrypted by secret keys only 
known by patients.  
Another scenario is that some healthcare providers may attempt to get illegal benefits from 
insurance companies. In many eHealth systems, a healthcare provider sends the bills to 
insurance companies covering patients to get paid. It is possible for a corrupt doctor (or an 
attacker who impersonate a doctor) to forge bills to get illegal benefits (Jesilow et al., 
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1985). In our solution, we also propose some schemes to avoid this kind of behavior (refer 
to Section 6.2).  
3.2.4 Insurance Companies 
In many countries, people have health insurance covering the expenses of their health 
care served by healthcare providers (e.g. practitioners, hospitals, pharmacies). Especially 
in most European countries, the health insurance is mandatory to most residents, e.g. 
through some statutory insurance companies or public health fund. As we have introduced 
in Section 3.1.3, insurance companies receive and pay the bills from healthcare providers 
(where healthcare providers bill insurance companies directly on behalf of patients), or 
from patients (where patients receive the bills from healthcare providers and afterwards 
send the bills to insurance companies to get reimbursed).  
The traditional bills usually contain all important information about the patients’ illnesses, 
e.g., the operations and the medicines administered to patients. This private information 
will be completely disclosed to insurance companies who receive the bills. Insurance com-
panies know whom the bills come from and which patients the bills originate from as the 
identities of both healthcare providers and patients are directly or indirectly enclosed in the 
bills.  
One important reason why insurance companies hold such full information (both identities 
and EHR of their customers) is that insurance companies need to be able to detect fraud. 
In practice, some malicious patients who are not covered by health insurance or limitedly 
covered might steal the insurance information of other people to cheat insurance compa-
nies for invalid benefits. Hence, insurance companies have to firstly verify that the bills 
originate from the customers who are insured by them through checking the identities of 
their customers. Then, insurance companies also have to examine the details of the op-
erations and medicines to find out whether or not all the expenses in the bills are in the 
range of the insurance coverage of the corresponding patients. Another fraud example 
comes from the corrupt doctors or pharmacies who may forge bills to get invalid benefit as 
discussed in Section 3.2.3. The second main reason is that insurance companies also 
claim that they need to conduct some statistical analysis on the healthcare information for 
the benefits of patients (e.g., in the assessment of new treatment approach or medicines, 
in the evaluation of healthcare providers).  
In many current eHealth systems, patients’ private health information with their real identi-
ties is fully disclosed to insurance companies due to such reasons. Although insurance 
companies declare that they will guarantee the privacy of patients under the restraining of 
laws, patients still doubt that insurance companies might use their health information for 
some present or future purposes without their consent even with their identities disclosed. 
Moreover, since the health information of patients is stored in the servers operated by in-
surance companies, there exists risk that the data may be stolen by malicious insiders or 
skilled attackers through compromising these data servers.  
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3.2.5 Secondary Users 
 Re-identify the Participants from De-identified EHR 
The de-identified EHR provided to secondary users sometimes might be re-identified 
as we have introduced in Section 3.2.1. Because the anonymized or pseudonymized 
EHR usually keep some insensitive identifiers (e.g. gender, age and postcode) as in-
troduced in Section 2.1.3, patients’ real identities may be found out (re-identified) from 
EHR through some advanced information analysis technologies as mentioned in Sec-
tion 3.2.1. Especially in some worst cases, the de-identified health data are owned 
and maintained by some third organizations that sell or freely provide EHR to any in-
terested people. That will bring great risk to the privacy of patients due to the various 
purposes for which different people obtain EHR.  
Table 4: An example to re-identify the patient in secondary use 
No. Name Post code Gender Age Height Data 
1 Pid1 53127 Male 68 175 … 
2 Pid2 * Male 68 175 … 
3 Pid3 53127 Female 60 170 … 
4 Pid1 * * 68 175 …  
Taking the example from Section 2.1.3 as shown in Table 4 which are the pseudony-
mized EHR obtained by a researcher, we explain how to potentially re-identify a pa-
tient from the de-identified EHR. If the researcher lives in the area with postcode 
53127, and knows most people there, he might find that there is only one man of the 
age of 68 with height of 175. Obviously, he can know the first row in Table 4 comes 
from the person that he knows (e.g. name). Then from that row he also learns that his 
pseudonym is Pid1. Consequently, he may at least find out all the rows with pseudo-
nym Pid1 in the database (e.g. the line 4), and discover almost all the health infor-
mation of this patient. 
 Find out Patients’ Identities in Inquiring Consent 
Although in many current eHealth systems, patients’ health data are used for second-
ary use beyond the full control of patients, we argue that patients are the real owners 
of the health data and therefore secondary users must get clear consent from patients 
as discussed in 3.2.1. However, the process of inquiring consent may leak the identity 
information (e.g. contact method) of patients to secondary users or any organizations 
that are in charge of consent management. Moreover, because the consent has to in-
clude signatures or any other forms of verification signs, the consent is traceable and 
can potentially be linked to the real identities of patients. That is to say, patients’ full 
ownership and control over the health data, which aim at protecting the privacy of pa-
tients, unexpectedly conflict with the privacy of patients because of the necessary 
communication in the consent management. We need methods to solve the conflict.  
 Disclose the Privacy of Patients in Sending Feedback 
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When a secondary user sends personal feedback to a patient as introduced in Section 
3.1.3, the privacy of the patient and identity may be also disclosed as shown in Figure 
8 through the following ways. Firstly, the feedback containing the private information 
about patient’s health status may be disclosed. If the feedback is obtained and read by 
some people other than the intended patient (through attacking the computers of the 
patient and the secondary user or eavesdropping the network), it will cause privacy 
problems. Secondly, when the secondary user sends feedback, some identifier of pa-
tients must to be leaked to the secondary user or the mediate organization that trans-
fers the messages. For example, the secondary user or the mediate organization 
knows the receivers’ contact methods like email or address, which can be used to de-
duce accurate identity information about the patient. At last, the feedback sending 
through email or other communication methods may also potentially leak the private 
information to the IT service providers (like email service companies). Due to these 
threats, there must be a security approach to protect the messages transmitted over 
the network, and patients’ private identifiers (like contact method) should be kept se-
cret to any unnecessary persons (like secondary users and mediate people). 
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Figure 8: Privacy disclosure when a secondary user sends feedback to a patient 
3.2.6 Trusted Third Parties 
 Insiders in Trusted Third Parties 
It is risky to use any trusted parties with powerful rights (e.g. those in charge of per-
forming secret key management and storing the secret keys at their servers) in 
eHealth systems as we already discussed in Section 3.1.2. A malicious insider can 
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easily get the secret keys of patients and read patients’ private information. More seri-
ously, an insider can even impersonate patients with the secret keys to get illegal 
benefits. Even worse, these insiders are difficult to be discovered as the secret keys 
are sometimes the critical and unique credentials in many transactions. 
Although the semi-trusted third parties (as introduced in Section 3.1.2) are unable to 
behave as fully trusted third parties to discover the privacy of patients directly, they 
can also do something evil. A semi-trusted third party (e.g. a certificate authority) can 
easily create a non-existing person, and use the created person to get illegal benefit 
from the service providers in eHealth systems if the validations are only executed at 
the semi-trusted party.  
 Compromised Trusted Third Parties 
Besides the insiders, we must also notice the risk of that the trusted third parties might 
be compromised by attackers. Because the trusted third parties usually possess many 
important data in their servers, they are often the intended targets for the attackers 
who already have some parts of patients’ information (e.g. the attackers who have ob-
tained some EHR by eavesdropping). Especially some trusted third parties also pro-
vide online service like real-time authentication. They may confront high risk of being 
attacked. The compromised trusted third parties will bring catastrophic influence to the 
privacy of patients and even the whole eHealth systems. 
In the design of eHealth systems, the threats from the trusted parties must be carefully 
considered, and the power of them should be decreased as much as possible. A case 
where TTP with limited power will be introduced in Section 6.1.1, where we only use Certif-
icate Authority (a kind of semi-trusted TTP) to issue certificates to healthcare providers 
other than the patients. 
3.3 A Cloud-based Model of eHealth Systems 
3.3.1 Principles for the Cloud-based eHealth Model 
3.3.1.1 Rule out the Fully Trusted Third Parties 
Basing on the survey into the current eHealth systems in industry and academic research, 
we propose a cloud-based eHealth system model as shown in Figure 9. In this model, we 
exclude all unnecessary trusted third parties which may cause risk of leaking the private 
information of patients. As we have discussed in Section 3.1.2 and 3.2.6, because a corrupt 
insider may appear inside a trusted third party or a skilled outside attacker may compromise 
the servers at the trusted third party, an eHealth system, where patients’ highly private in-
formation is stored, getting rid of the risk of disclosing the privacy of patients due to such 
fully trusted third parties is much preferable.  
Instead, we introduce in our model an entity named “certificate authority”. It issues digital 
certificates to the specified entities. Doctors, pharmacists, insurance companies and sec-
ondary users need to apply for certificates from the certificate authority. Generally speaking, 
it is a normal process in many public key infrastructure (PKI) based systems. Each certifi-
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cate applier needs to generate a self-known private key and a corresponding publicly 
known public key. The public key together with some necessary information of the applier 
(e.g. name, certificate type and valid period) is signed by the certificate authority to form a 
digital file, i.e. the applier’s certificate (Tuecke et al., 2004). 
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Figure 9: An eHealth model for ordinary healthcare activities and secondary use 
The certificate authority is one kind of semi-trusted third party which ensures the relying on 
the signatures or other assertions made by the entities in the system. It brings very limited 
threats to the security of patients’ EHR and private information of patients as we introduced 
in Section 3.1.2. Because the private keys in our model are only known by the certificate 
appliers, any corrupt insiders or outside attackers are unable to disclose the encrypted con-
tent or forge the signatures from knowing the public keys. In practice, the certificate authori-
ty can be the health department of the government or an international trusted organization 
which checks the qualifications of doctors, pharmacists, insurance companies and second-
ary users, and issues them digital certificates. The certificates and the corresponding pri-
vate keys of the appliers are stored and protected by the smart cards owned by the appliers 
with authenticating PINs to avoid abuse of the smart cards (refer to the next Section). A 
corrupt certificate authority might issue invalid certificates to an unqualified person (e.g. a 
fake doctor, potential attacker). However, the unqualified person is not able to get a pa-
tient’s private information unless the patient visits the unqualified person by mistake. In oth-
er words, the corrupt or compromised certificate authority can only cause limited affection to 
the private data of the patients. 
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3.3.1.2 Utilize Smart Card for Trust Computing Module 
We render the smart cards of a doctor and a secondary user as examples in Figure 9, be-
sides the patient’s. Actually, all other roles (e.g. pharmacies, insurance companies) can 
possess smart cards to store their secret keys, digital certificates and any other information 
in reasonable size. These smart cards are not depicted in the Figure 9 for simplicity.  
A smart card is typically a pocket-sized card (or any other shapes) with embedded integrat-
ed circuits. There are contact smart cards and also contactless ones. The independent (not 
relying the connected devices except the power supply) hardware and software in the smart 
card are able to execute some light-weight programs such as encrypting/decrypting and 
digitally signing with the respective secret keys. The secret keys are stored in the protected 
memory of the smart cards. It is difficult to read the secret keys directly from the protected 
memory thanks to hardware protection. Due to the portability in size and the security func-
tions, they are ideal for storing the secret keys in eHealth systems. It is convenient and mul-
tifunctional for all entities to take along the cards when they are participating in all kinds of 
healthcare activities.  
The use of smart card is now a common approach for the users to carry secret keys (Rankl 
and Effing, 2010). Many current eHealth systems are adopting smart card for identification, 
authentication, billing and so on. Due to its high resistance to attacks, smart card can act as 
the trust computing module for the security and privacy in an eHealth system. 
3.3.1.3 Adopt Cloud as Storage and Communication Media 
As we already discussed in Section 3.1.4, we recommend the central storage method to 
store EHR of patients. Cloud, especially the public cloud, is obviously the ideal technology 
for such a central storage due to the following reason. Firstly, cloud can provide convenient 
sharing of the data among all entities in eHealth systems, which is exactly needed for shar-
ing patients’ EHR among different healthcare providers. Secondly, a cloud can decrease 
the cost and the technical difficulty of maintaining servers by individual healthcare provid-
ers. Thirdly the cloud can provide powerful additional services, like searching in the stored 
EHR. Finally, the cloud can also be an ideal communication media across different roles. 
E.g., the communication between secondary users and patients for consent management 
and feedback dispatch can be carried out over the cloud without another third message 
transmitter. 
3.3.1.4 Protect EHR and Messages for Security and Privacy 
Because EHR, in which patients’ highly private information is stored, are transmitted over 
the publicly accessible cloud, the security of EHR and the privacy of patients should be 
carefully considered. For example, in our solution, we suggest to use pseudonyms to pro-
tect the identities of patients. The pseudonyms are generated by patients from the secret 
keys only known by patients. They will be used to index EHR contents stored in the cloud. 
Moreover, the pseudonyms are directly and indirectly related with security and privacy func-
tions. For more details about the design and application of the pseudonym solution, please 
refer to chapter 5 and 6. 
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3.3.2 Refined Procedures and New Threats 
3.3.2.1 Registration at Insurance Company 
The process for each patient registering at an insurance company remains almost the same 
as described in Section 3.1.3. Specially, each patient will generate a pair of private key and 
public key, and the private key is only known by the patient. During the registration, the pa-
tient provides the public key to the insurance company. The public key combined with some 
other information (e.g., the registration reference number and the identifier of the insurance 
company) will be signed by the private key of the insurance company to form a digital certif-
icate of the patient. Both the public key and the certificate from the insurance company will 
be stored in the patient’s smart card. The certificate will be publicly accessible, while the 
corresponding private key must be stored in the protected memory of the smart card. 
One new threat is that the insurance company can also access EHR in the cloud. Under 
the setting that the insurance company is not allowed to know the details of patients’ 
health information, the insurance company is able to combine the information that it has 
mastered (e.g. registration and bills) and the public available data in the cloud to discover 
all the private health information of patients. There must be some protection scheme to 
prevent the insurance company from the linking. For example, in our solution we utilize a 
novel pseudonym scheme and corresponding signature scheme for the billing process. 
Technically, they protect the identities of patients in the bills against insurance companies, 
and at the same time, insurance companies are able to validate that the bills originate from 
the customers insured by them. Our solution excludes any fully trusted third party that 
could impersonate patients or discover all the private information (e.g. disease history) of 
patients in the billing procedure. For more details, please refer to Section 6.2. 
3.3.2.2 Visit to Doctor 
A patient takes along the smart card in which the patient’s information (e.g. certificate and 
private key, secret key, and photo) was embedded to visit a doctor. The doctor can validate 
the patient by challenging the patient’s private key and check the certificate in the smart 
card with the help of the insurance company (e.g. CA service) (Tuecke et al., 2004). After 
the doctor created a record (including examinations, diagnosis, curing, prescription and so 
on), the patient generates an encryption key based on the patient’s secret key to encrypt 
the record. Then the encrypted record is uploaded to the cloud to form an EHR entry of the 
patient’s whole EHR. The encryption of record is executed in the patient’s smart card, i.e., 
the encryption key is even not known by the doctor. 
If the doctor wants to view a patient’s anamnesis, the EHR entries previously stored in the 
cloud must be downloaded on the network. The downloaded EHR entries then need to be 
decrypted by the encryption keys regenerated by the patient’s smart card. The decryption of 
EHR is also executed in the patient’s smart card.  
Some new security and privacy issues related with cloud will appear. For example, the doc-
tor has to be authenticated by the cloud to avoid illegal uploading of the patient’s EHR. 
What's more, when the doctor downloads EHR entries of the patient, the cloud may find out 
that the downloaded EHR entries from one source come from one patient, which might help 
the cloud to discover the identity of the patient. 
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Moreover, if the patient wants to manage or update the information in one EHR entry up-
loaded to the cloud afterwards, the cloud also has to authenticate that the patient is indeed 
the real owner of the EHR entry. In the authentication procedure, the patient might be iden-
tified and leak the privacy to the cloud. 
3.3.2.3 Medicine Purchase at Pharmacy 
With the help of the cloud, a patient does not need to take any paper document (e.g. pre-
scription) from a doctor to get medicines at a pharmacy. Because the prescription was 
stored in the cloud too as introduced in Section 3.3.2.2, the pharmacy can download it from 
the cloud and sell the medicines to the patient after some simple validations.  
Because of the public access to the prescription in the cloud, it is very important for the 
pharmacy to check the validity of the prescription and that the prescription belongs to the 
patient to avoid abuse of the prescription (e.g., another patient may illegally use the pre-
scription to purchase medicines from a pharmacy). We will discuss more details of such 
security threat and countermeasure in Section 6.1. 
3.3.2.4 Billing 
We mainly consider the first kind of billing model introduced in Section 3.1.3. With the help 
of the cloud, the bills from doctors and pharmacies can be stored in the cloud. Then later 
the cloud pushes the bills to insurance companies. We don't depict the billing procedure in 
Figure 9 for simplicity.  
The bills stored in the cloud introduce new risk of disclosing the content in the bills to at-
tackers who can access the data in the cloud. What is more, forged or modified bills may be 
easily created for illegal benefits by malicious attackers. The security of bills should be re-
considered. More details of the new billing procedure and the security issues in a cloud-
based eHealth system will be introduced in Section 6.2. 
3.3.2.5 Secondary Use 
Because EHR of patients are stored in the cloud, secondary users are able to conveniently 
obtain the health data of a large population from the cloud. For example, a medical re-
searcher wants to get EHR for all patients with diabetes, the researcher just need to surf on 
the cloud, and search for all EHR entries including key words “diabetes” or “insulin”. The 
cloud can provide these matching EHR entries to the secondary user directly after the au-
thentication on the identity of the researcher (each secondary user has a valid certificate as 
introduced in Section 3.3.1.1). 
However, because EHR are encrypted by patients’ encryption keys which are not known by 
the cloud or secondary users, secondary users are unable to decrypt them. Moreover, it is 
still a problem when secondary users communicate with patients to get consent and send 
feedback.  
In this thesis, we utilize a pseudonym solution to protect the privacy and guarantee the full 
control of patients during the consent management. This dismisses the patients’ worries on 
the secondary uses of their private health data. We also provide a novel approach to enable 
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secondary users to send feedback to patients without disclosing any private information. 
This improves the incentives of patients to contribute their EHR for secondary uses. For 
more details on the challenges and countermeasure in our solutions, please refer to Section 
6.3. 
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4 State of the Art 
4.1 Pseudonym Schemes for General Purpose 
Although many familiar systems are not clearly claimed as pseudonym systems, they are 
some kinds of pseudonymous systems. For example, many instant communication systems 
(e.g. Skype13, telecom systems) generate and assign virtual “id” for their users, or the users 
can register and set their own personal usernames (e.g. some public forums do not require 
the real identities of the registered users). The “id” or the “usernames” can be considered 
as the users’ pseudonyms. These pseudonyms can be linked to the real identifiers (if pro-
vided in the registration by the users) only by the service providers. The central service pro-
viders perform as trusted parties to manage these pseudonyms and be in charge of protect-
ing the privacy of the users.  
Generally speaking, a pseudonym scheme can be easily designed and deployed if a pow-
erful central party exists. An organization (e.g. the central service provider in the above 
paragraph) that is considered as a central party can use many cryptographic algorithms (A) 
to generate pseudonyms (PID) for users (U) to fulfill the requirements listed in Section 
2.1.1. The organization usually keeps a secret key (sk) to produce the pseudonyms and 
manage the users. For example, a typical algorithm in A is a keyed hash function 
(Krawczyk et al., 1997). The following describes is how the organization uses a keyed hash 
function 𝐾𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑠𝑘 to generate a pseudonym (𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑖) for each user 𝑈𝑖. 𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑖 = 𝐾𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑠𝑘  (𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑖) 
where 𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑖 is an identifier (e.g., name and identity number) of the user 𝑈𝑖, and KHash can 
adopt many cryptographic hash functions (Rogaway and Shrimpton, 2004). There are sev-
eral benefits to generate the pseudonyms by a central party. Firstly, this kind of pseudonym 
systems with powerful central organizations are easy to deploy due to the simple structure 
and algorithms used. Secondly, because all pseudonyms are generated by a unique organ-
ization, it is easy to guarantee that the pseudonyms are collision free. What is more, be-
cause the central organization is also in charge of the management of pseudonyms, users’ 
pseudonyms can easily be maintained, e.g. created, tracked and revoked.  
However, this kind of central party based pseudonym schemes have many limitations when 
they are applied to complex systems. The first limitation is that the pseudonyms can only be 
used inside one organization. When there exist many organizations in a system and the 
users need to move from one organization to another, these simple pseudonym schemes 
can not provide expected privacy protection. E.g., the users’ behaviors can be easily traced 
through the transaction data in many organizations because each user has only one unique 
pseudonym. This will be a big threat to the users’ privacy if malicious insiders exist. For an 
outside attacker, although the traces of users are apparently anonymous (because the out-
side attacker does not know the identities of the users directly), it is still risky for disclosing 
the real identities of the users if some auxiliary information is available and some advanced 
information analysis technologies are used, as introduced in Section 3.3.2.5. The second 
limitation is that the powerful central organization may disclose the identity information of 
                                                            
13 http://www.skype.com 
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the users. Because the central organization with secret key (sk) is able to reversely link the 
pseudonyms to the real identities of the users, insiders in the organization are one major 
risk to disclose the users’ identities intentionally or unintentionally. In addition, the central 
organizations may be compromised by the skilled attackers. As a result, the private infor-
mation of the users is seriously threatened.  
The modern pseudonym systems were firstly introduced in (Chaum, 1985; Chaum & 
Evertse, 1987) and later with more work (Chaum, 1995, Chaum and Pedersen, 1993). They 
proposed a way for users of information systems to avoid being traced in different transac-
tions by using pseudonyms which are not linkable to users’ real identities. They also pro-
vided an implementation by RSA. Each user owns different pseudonyms at different organ-
izations instead of using a unique one. Thus the organizations can not collude to trace the 
users. Moreover, each user can use the credentials issued by organization A at organiza-
tion B without disclosing the user’s pseudonym to organization A. However, their schemes 
rely heavily on the trustworthiness of a trusted third party (TTP). The TTP is in charge of 
pseudonym generation, authentication and even the validation of credentials. This imposes 
risk of leaking the privacy of the users similar to central parties in the last paragraph. 
Soon after that, some researchers proposed other pseudonym schemes trying to release 
the high dependency on the TTP. In (Damgård, 1990), the author presented a new pseu-
donym model, where TTP is only in charge of issuing the pseudonyms to the users (the 
generation of pseudonyms). However, this scheme was based on zero knowledge proof, 
which makes this scheme ineffective in practice. Later, in (Chen, 1996), a more effective 
implementation of Damgård’s model based on discrete logarithm was presented. However, 
in this scheme TTP is also required to be in charge of the pseudonym authentication be-
sides the pseudonym generation.  
In (Lysyanskaya et al., 2000), a pseudonym scheme was proposed to further decrease the 
power of TTP in pseudonym systems. In this scheme, they define a user clearly as “an enti-
ty with a secret key”, and each user chooses a secret key by himself/herself. The secret key 
is only known by the user. Moreover, the pseudonyms are generated by users’ secret keys 
and organizations’ secret keys together. No single powerful TTP is needed in the system. 
Instead, the organizations and users cooperate to generate, authenticate the pseudonyms 
and validate the credentials. This scheme rules out the requirement of TTP in the system, 
and disperses the TTP’s functions to the organizations. The attackers can only hack a sin-
gle organization to get limited private information about the users.  
Except these general pseudonym schemes, there also exist many special pseudonym 
schemes designed for specific systems. For example, in email systems(Mazieres and 
Kaashoek, 1998), RFID (Molnar et al., 2006), and VNET (Lu et al., 2012). These pseudo-
nym schemes aim at different application scenarios and requirements. However, eHealth 
systems are much more complex in structure and include much more entities and transac-
tions. It is not easy or unclear to port these pseudonyms designed for those specific sys-
tems to eHealth systems. 
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4.2 Pseudonym Schemes for eHealth Systems 
Pseudonym schemes are widely adopted in the secondary use (e.g. medical research) of 
health data. When patients’ health data are reused for the purposes (e.g., for medical re-
search) other than ordinary health care, because the real identities appeared in the data are 
not necessary and for the sake of protecting the privacy of patients, the real identities of 
patients need to be removed (often annotated as “de-identified”) as we have introduced in 
Section 3.2.5. Because of the potential advantages brought by pseudonyms as discussed 
in Section 2.1.3, the de-identification process is usually carried out by a trusted third party 
(TTP) who replaces patients’ real identities by pseudonyms in current eHealth systems. In 
(Noumeir et al., 2007), hash functions are mainly used by a TTP to compute the pseudo-
nyms from the identifiers (e.g. name). In (Pommerening and Reng, 2004), a TTP uses a 
secret key to encrypt patients’ identifiers to generate their pseudonyms. In both pseudonym 
schemes, the TTP has the ability to reverse the pseudonyms to patients’ identities by de-
crypting with the secret key or by a hash table, which can facilitate the consent manage-
ment and communication between secondary users and the participating patients as intro-
duced in Section 3.1.3. 
However, the existence of a TTP is a weakness on security and privacy in the system as 
we have discussed in Section 3.3.1.1. Many pseudonym schemes were proposed to weak-
en or rule out the TTP. In (Iacono, 2007), a complex pseudonym scheme based on hash 
and RSA was presented. In this scheme, patients’ real identities are not directly known by 
the TTP, but maintained by the trusted local pseudonym centers. Thus the risk of disclosing 
patients’ identities due to a single corrupt or compromised TTP decreases slightly. In (Elger 
et al., 2010), they proposed a pseudonym scheme using both block cipher AES and Hash 
functions to generate reversible pseudonyms for patients’ health data from different hospi-
tals. The pseudonyms are generated from the secret keys known by the hospitals that own 
(or create) the health data instead of any other trusted parties. Also the hospitals are in 
charge of reversing the pseudonyms to patients’ identities by their secret keys. In 
(Lehnhardt and Spalka, 2011), a pseudonym scheme without a single TTP was proposed, 
and it is based on the cryptographic algorithm ECC. This scheme only requires a central 
server whose responsibility is to control the users’ pseudonyms in order to avoid collision of 
pseudonyms. The pseudonyms of patients are generated by the patient-only-known secret 
keys. In (Dubovitskaya et al., 2015), the pseudonyms are generated based on multi-key 
searchable encryption by the secret keys both from patients and doctors. The trust base of 
the privacy of patients turns to doctors.  
Besides the pseudonym schemes proposed in secondary use of health data, there are also 
some researchers focusing on the pseudonym schemes that can be used in ordinary 
healthcare activities (e.g. visiting doctors).  
In (Neubauer and Heurix, 2011, Riedl et al., 2008), public key cryptography is used to gen-
erate patients’ pseudonyms, which index patients’ EHR at health sever. In these pseudo-
nym schemes, a pseudonym server which is in charge of the pseudonym generation and 
lookup is required. The pseudonym server should be fully trustworthy, which imposes risk to 
the privacy of patients. 
In (Zhang and Liu, 2010), the pseudonyms of patients are generated from the unique identi-
ty number by a hash computation. The pseudonyms are computed when EHR are created 
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and they are the root notes of trees to index EHR. Patients and doctors can use the pseu-
donyms to search and share EHR in the future healthcare activities.  
In (Benzschawel and Da Silveira, 2011), they proposed an eHealth system with pseudony-
mized EHR stored in multiple severs according to data type. Patients’ pseudonyms and 
identities are centrally managed by a powerful trusted third party. However, the pseudonym 
generation algorithm was not specified in the paper.  
In (Li et al., 2011), a complex eHealth cloud was proposed to store EHR online based on 
pseudonyms and encryptions. Patients’ pseudonyms are generated by doctors when pa-
tients visit doctors. Each patient owns a patient-only-known key seed (KS). KS is used to 
generate a new pseudonym through a hash computation on serial number (SN) and a ran-
dom number (R) by the doctor each time the patient visits the doctor. SN and R are gener-
ated by the doctor, and they are uploaded separately to two trusted servers. Meanwhile, KS, 
SN and R are used to produce an encryption key (to encrypt the an EHR entry) through 
another hash computation. The patient’s pseudonym together with the encrypted EHR entry 
are uploaded to a health cloud. When another doctor wants to retrieve the patient’s EHR 
afterwards, the doctor firstly has to fetch the SN and R from the two trusted servers, and 
with the patient’s KS, to reproduce the pseudonym and the encryption key. Then the pseu-
donymized and encrypted EHR stored at the health cloud can be downloaded. In this pseu-
donym solution, the cloud is not necessary to be trustworthy because of the pseudonymiza-
tion and encryption of EHR. However, although the two separate trusted servers used de-
crease the risk from insiders or attackers at a single TTP, it does not eliminate the powerful 
TTP all together. Moreover, the system relies on two online TTP servers, which may poten-
tially cause problems of availability and delay.  
4.3 Comparison of Existing Pseudonym Solutions 
Because the pseudonym schemes reviewed above aim at different purposes in eHealth 
systems, we generally list the features of these previous solutions in the several aspects as 
shown in Table 5 to compare their advantages and shortcomings. 
4.4 Expected Revolutions in Pseudonym Schemes for eHealth Systems 
 Restore the Ownership of EHR to Patients 
As we have discussed in Section 3.2.1, patients should be the real owners of the health 
data. No matter what kinds of pseudonym or encryption schemes are used for protecting 
the security and privacy, patients’ acknowledgment and consent for any use of their 
health data must be guaranteed. Patients should be able to control and manage their 
private information. In most current eHealth systems and research work, this principle is 
not properly followed. Instead, healthcare providers (like doctors, hospitals) actually 
“own” the data and have the full privilege to use the health data of patients for any pur-
pose under unclear consent and insecure privacy protection.  
When a pseudonym scheme is used in an eHealth system, patients should have full con-
trol on their pseudonyms, instead of that other parties (e.g. healthcare providers, TTP) 
generate and manage the pseudonyms.  
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Table 5: A comparison of existing pseudonym solutions in eHealth systems 
Pseudonym solu-
tions 
Crypto-
graphic 
base 
TTP used Application 
purpose 
Cloud 
involved 
Notes 
Noumeir, 
Lemay, & Lina, 
2007 
Hash func-
tion 
Powerful, 
central 
Secondary 
use 
no Collision 
considered 
Pommerening & 
Reng, 2004 
Block ci-
phers 
Powerful, 
central 
Secondary 
use 
no Easy to re-
verse the 
pseudonyms 
Iacono, 2007 RSA Powerful, 
less cen-
tral 
Secondary 
use 
no Use local 
clinics as 
TTP 
Elger et al., 
2010 
AES, hash Powerful, 
less cen-
tral 
Secondary 
use 
no Hospitals 
owns secret 
keys to re-
verse the 
PID 
Lehnhardt & 
Spalka, 2011 
ECC No TTP, 
but a cen-
tral control 
server 
Secondary 
use 
no Pseudo-
nyms are 
collision free 
 (Dubovitskaya, 
Urovi, Vasirani, 
Aberer, & 
Schumacher, 
2015 
multi-key 
searchable 
encryption 
No TTP, 
trusted 
doctors 
Secondary 
use 
no Patients and 
doctors use 
their secret 
keys to gen-
erate PID 
 (Neubauer & 
Heurix, 2011; 
Riedl, Grascher, 
Fenz, & 
Neubauer, 2008 
PKI Powerful Ordinary 
health care 
no  
Zhang & Liu, 
2010 
Hash func-
tion 
No TTP Ordinary 
health care 
no Hash tree 
used for fast 
search 
Benzschawel & 
Da Silveira, 
2011 
- Powerful Ordinary 
health care 
no Use distrib-
uted severs 
to lower risk 
Li, Chang, 
Huang, & Lai, 
2011 
Hash, block 
cipher 
Powerful Ordinary 
health care 
yes Two sepa-
rate TTP to 
decrease 
risk 
This thesis(Xu 
and Cremers, 
2014a, Xu and 
Cremers, 2014b, 
Xu et al., 2014) 
Hash, DLP No TTP Whole 
eHealth sys-
tems 
yes Refer to 
Chapter 5~7 
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 Lower the Power of Trusted Third Party 
As we have discussed in Section 3.2.6 and 4.2, the existence of a TTP brings potential 
risk of disclosing the privacy of patients from many aspects. However, many current 
eHealth systems and research work have granted unlimited power to the TTP which 
knows too much private information about patients. The consequence of corrupt or com-
promised TTP must be seriously estimated in advance if a TTP is used in the system. 
Many existing pseudonym schemes use a TTP, which plays an important role in gener-
ating, managing and/or authenticating pseudonyms. Sometimes, it is not possible to rule 
out the existence of a TTP, but we should lower down the power (the ability to disclose 
the users’ privacy) of the TTP as much as possible. 
 Protect the Privacy of Patients Everywhere 
Most existing pseudonym schemes only work in some chosen healthcare activities as in-
troduced in Section 4.2. However, the privacy of patients is equally important in every 
process. Using different security schemes in different processes not only increases the 
complexity of the system, but also brings potential risk of disclosing the privacy of pa-
tients due to one single flaw in one security scheme. It is desirable that a uniform securi-
ty scheme is used for protecting the privacy of patients everywhere with strong and 
provable security level. 
 Use Cloud to Serve eHealth Systems 
The cloud is becoming more and more important and popular in our real life. With the 
help of a cloud, eHealth systems will provide more convenient and effective healthcare 
service as we have introduced in Section 3.1.4. In some current eHealth systems and 
research work, the cloud is more and more involved in serving as the storage media of 
EHR and even performing as a TTP. However, the introduction of a cloud also brings 
great challenges to the security and privacy as we have discussed in Section 3.1.4. 
There must be an appropriate solution to deal with the challenges while keeping the ad-
vantages that a cloud brings into play. 
A pseudonym scheme applied in a cloud environment must face much more challenges. 
The attacks may come from anybody who can access the cloud. A pseudonym scheme 
must consider the ubiquitous threats, besides it should be practical to be used in such an 
eHealth model with cloud as introduced in Section 3.3. 
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5 A Novel Pseudonym Solution 
5.1 Features of the Pseudonym Solution 
 Basic Requirements 
We have discussed some basic requirements (e.g., collision-free, one-way, independ-
ence) to a pseudonym scheme in Section 2.1.2. In the following we introduce further 
some basic requirements to the pseudonym solution. 
Size and computation. The size of the pseudonyms should be reasonable (e.g. 256 
bits) to save storage space and decrease the network load. The generating of pseu-
donyms should be efficient in current hardware and software condition. 
Multiple pseudonyms. Each user can have multiple pseudonyms. These pseudo-
nyms should be easily generated and reproduced from knowing the secret key. 
Encryption with pseudonyms. Each pseudonym must have a corresponding encryp-
tion key, which will be used to encrypt the data responding to the pseudonym. 
One-way. Each user’s pseudonyms are computed from the user’s identifiers and se-
cret key. It should be difficult to compute the identifiers and secret key from the user’s 
pseudonyms. 
Collision-free. Each user has multiple pseudonyms and a pseudonym system has 
many users. Two arbitrary pseudonyms no matter from the same user or two different 
users must have trivial probability or impossibility to collide.  
Independence. An attacker is not able to find out which pseudonyms belong to one 
user. Even if the attacker knows one or more pseudonyms from one user, he/she can 
not deduce other pseudonyms of the user. 
 Decentral without TTP 
There is no trusted third party (TTP) involved in our pseudonym solution. So the users’ 
pseudonyms are not generated by any TTP or the service providers, but generated by 
the users themselves. The users will generate their pseudonyms from MSK introduced 
in Section 5.2. Because there is no such a central server for maintaining the pseudo-
nyms, the collision control of the pseudonyms will face new challenge. 
 Authentication in Cloud Environment 
The authentication of pseudonyms as introduced in Section 2.1.2 will induce new 
problems in the cloud environment. Due to the distribution feature of the cloud espe-
cially the public cloud, the cloud can not be considered as a trustworthy service pro-
vider that can be expected to keep the private information of the users any more as 
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we have discussed in Section 3.1.4. So in the authentication procedure, the cloud 
should not possess any identity information or any secrets about the users. Instead, if 
the cloud wants to authenticate the users, it must only rely on some publicly available 
information. Moreover, during the authentication procedure, the cloud is unable to get 
any useful information to discover or deduce the privacy of the users. 
5.2 Setup of Secret Key 
5.2.1 Preparation of Setup 
Each user of the pseudonym system needs to set a main secret key which is denoted as 
“Major Secret Key” (MSK). MSK is only known by the user. The secret key is very important 
to the user, because it is the unique identifier for the user and all the private information of 
the user will be related with MSK. So the user must carefully choose and keep it.  
To set up MSK in practice, a setup software will instruct users. So the users do not have to 
know the details of the algorithms for MSK setup. A user’s MSK is initially set when the user 
obtains a blank smart card (we assume the use of smart cards in the pseudonym system to 
identify users). The setup software asks some necessary inputs (e.g. a string of randomly 
chosen letters) from the user to generate a secure MSK automatically. The generated MSK 
is stored in the protected memory of the user’s smart card. Meanwhile, a password denoted 
as PIN (PIN is usually short and easily memorable like numbers) also must be set by the 
user to avoid abuse of the smart card. In many existing solutions for smart card, to avoid 
the brute force guessing of the PIN, the PIN can be protected by another super password to 
recover or reset the PIN(Lassus, 1997). If a user inputs PIN wrongly for several times, the 
smart card will be locked and the super password is needed to unlock it (Deo et al., 1998). 
5.2.2 Algorithm for Setting up Secret Key 
A user chooses a k-bits (k is usually no less than 160) prime integer 𝑞, and another prime 
number 𝑝 (𝑝 >  𝑞) which satisfies 𝑞| (𝑝 − 1). By 𝑍𝑝
∗  we denote a multiplicative group modu-
lo 𝑝. The user finds 𝑔 ∈ 𝑍𝑝
∗ , to be of order 𝑞 modulo 𝑝. Then 𝑔 is the generator of the cyclic 
subgroup 𝐺𝑞. By randomly choosing 𝑥 < 𝑞, the user’s MSK is formed: [𝑥, 𝑔, 𝑝, 𝑞]. The details 
of the algorithm for generating the user’s MSK is presented in the following Algorithm 1. 
In Algorithm 1, the user’s input is not distinctly shown. Actually choosing the rand values 
(e.g. q and g) in the algorithm may require some arbitrary inputs from the user. However, 
the user does not need to remember these arbitrary inputs because they are useless after 
the generation of MSK.  
In some systems, the parameters of 𝐺𝑞 are global, i.e., each user can use the same g, p 
and q. Thus, the setup of a user’s MSK is just to choose a random x, which is much easier 
than the process in Algorithm 1. However, each user could also choose personal parame-
ters to enhance the security (e.g.  a case introduced in Section 6.1.7.3).  
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Algorithm 1: Generating the user’s MSK 
INPUT: NONE 
OUTPUT: MSK 
WHILE (true) 
       Choose a random q with required length (e.g. 160 bits) 
       IF q is not prime THEN  
             CONTINUE 
       p = 2*q + 1 
       IF p is prime THEN 
             BREAK 
 WHILE (true) 
        Choose g randomly less than p 
        IF 𝑔𝑞 mod p = 1 THEN 
             BREAK 
  Choose x randomly less than q 
  RETURN MSK = [x , g , p , q] 
Due to the complexity of solving the discrete logarithm problem(McCurley, 1990), given g, h 
∈ 𝐺𝑞, such that h was selected from 𝐺𝑞 uniformly at random, it is hard to compute an integer 
x such that  
gx = h mod p. 
For ease of notation, we will sometimes drop the “mod p” part of the arithmetic expressions 
in 𝐺𝑞. We build up our secure pseudonym scheme based on the discrete logarithm problem 
in the cyclic subgroup 𝐺𝑞. 
5.3 Algorithm for Generating Pseudonyms 
We denote 𝑃𝐼𝐷0 as (𝑎0, 𝑏0) which is (0, 0) by default (𝑃𝐼𝐷0 could be some variable initial 
values to avoid possible pseudonym collisions and security risk, which will be discussed in 
Section 6.1.7). 𝑃𝐼𝐷0 is the initial pseudonym of the user, but it will never be used else-
where except being used as an initial value for generating other pseudonyms.  
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Assuming that previously a user has already generated i PIDs (i.e., PID0, PID1, PID2, ⋯ , PIDi), 
the i+1th pseudonym PIDi+1  can be generated by the following Algorithm 2. 
Algorithm 2: Generating the user’s pseudonym 
INPUT: 𝑃𝐼𝐷0 = (𝑎0, 𝑏0), i, MSK, PIN (input by the user to enable the smart card) 
OUTPUT: 𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑖+1, 𝐸𝐾𝑖+1 
𝐸𝐾𝑖+1 = KHash (𝑖 + 1||𝑎0||𝑏0, 𝑥) * , 
            where KHash is a keyed hash function with key x 
𝑎𝑖+1 =𝑔
𝐸𝐾𝑖+1+𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ (𝑎0||𝑏0) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞  
𝑏𝑖+1 = 𝑎𝑖+1
𝑥  
       𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑖+1 = Hash (𝑖 + 1||𝑎𝑖+1||𝑏𝑖+1)  
* || denotes the bit concatenation. 
In Algorithm 2, the KHash and Hash can adopt any current cryptographic hash functions 
like SHA-2. In the computation of 𝑎𝑖+1, the hash values are converted into a big integer, 
where the bit-string of hash value is considered as an unsigned binary integer. 
We use a keyed hash to simply generate an encryption key corresponding each pseudo-
nym. The inputs of KHash i.e. (𝑖 + 1||𝑎0||𝑏0, 𝑥) guarantee that the encryption keys from 
one user or from different users have trivial probability to collide. The following computa-
tion of 𝑎𝑖+1𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑏𝑖+1  aims at the authenticity of pseudonyms, which will be shown in Sec-
tion 5.5. The last hash function 𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑖+1 = Hash (𝑖 + 1||𝑎𝑖+1||𝑏𝑖+1) aims to output a pseudo-
nym with reasonable size, and to make the probability of collision of two pseudonyms from 
one user trivial (refer to the security proof in Section 5.6.1).  
Algorithm 2 must be executed inside the user’s smart card protectively due to the using of 
MSK. However, to decrease the computation load of the smart card, some computation 
can be aided by the coupling device (e.g. a card reader or computer). For more details 
about the computation and performance consideration in Algorithm 2, please refer to Sec-
tion 7.4.3. 
Because the serial number of the last used pseudonym, i.e. the number i, is needed to 
generate the next new pseudonym 𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑖+1, the serial number of the last generated pseu-
donym should be stored somewhere, e.g., on the user’s smart card. As an output of Algo-
rithm 2, 𝐸𝐾𝑖+1 can be used as the encryption key (it might be necessary to be truncated or 
padded according to the encryption algorithm) to encrypt the private data related with the 
new pseudonym 𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑖+1 (e.g. the pseudonym 𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑖+1 acts as the index of the private data). 
Alternatively, to decrease the computation of modular exponentiations in Algorithm 2 for 
the consideration of performance in some resource limited applications (refer to chapter 7 
for more discussion on performance), we propose an optional algorithm to generate pseu-
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donyms as presented in the following Algorithm 3. The differences regarding security of 
Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 3 will be discussed in Section 6.1.7.6. 
Algorithm 3: An optional algorithm for generating a user’s pseudonyms 
INPUT: 𝑃𝐼𝐷0 = (𝑎0, 𝑏0), i, MSK, PIN (input by the user to enable the smart card) 
OUTPUT: 𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑖+1, 𝐸𝐾𝑖+1 
IF  i  is zero THEN 
𝐸𝐾𝑖+1 = KHash (𝑖 + 1||𝑎0||𝑏0, 𝑥), 
            where KHash is a keyed hash function with key x 
𝑎𝑖+1 =𝑔
𝐸𝐾𝑖+1+𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ (𝑎0||𝑏0) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞  
𝑏𝑖+1 = 𝑎𝑖+1
𝑥  
       𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑖+1 = Hash (𝑖 + 1||𝑎𝑖+1||𝑏𝑖+1)  
ELSE THEN 
𝐸𝐾𝑖+1 = KHash (𝑖 + 1||𝑎0||𝑏0, 𝑥) 
𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑖+1 = Hash (𝑖 ^ 𝑎1|| 𝑖 ^ 𝑏1), where ^ is bit xor operation, and 𝑖 is represented                                    
                                                as bit string with the same length as 𝑎1 and 𝑏1. 
5.4 Algorithm for Reproducing Pseudonyms 
All pseudonyms and encryption keys of a user can be reproduced one by one through the 
following Algorithm 4. Similar to Algorithm 2, Algorithm 4 must also be executed inside the 
user’s smart card due to the using of MSK. 
Algorithm 4 illustrate the procedure to reproduce a user’s pseudonym and the encryption 
key with any serial number i. In fact, any single PIDi and EKi pair can be reproduced inde-
pendently with other pseudonyms as shown in the above Algorithm 4. For example, to re-
produce PID100, we do not need to precompute PID1 to PID99. Instead, we just set i=100 to 
run Algorithm 4 and get the computed pseudonym PID100. 
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Algorithm 4: Reproducing the user’s pseudonym 
INPUT: 𝑃𝐼𝐷0 = (𝑎0, 𝑏0), MSK, PIN, i, last ( the serial number of last used pseu-
donym 𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡) 
OUTPUT: PIDi, 𝐸𝐾𝑖 
IF  i>last OR i<1 THEN return null.  
ELSE 
𝐸𝐾𝑖 = 𝐾𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ (𝑖||𝑎0||𝑏0, 𝑥), 
         𝑎𝑖 = 𝑔
𝐸𝐾𝑖+𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ (𝑎0||𝑏0) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞 
         𝑏𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖
𝑥 
𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑖 = Hash (𝑖||𝑎𝑖||𝑏𝑖)  
Corresponding to the Algorithm 3, reproducing a user’s pseudonyms and encryption keys 
optionally is presented in Algorithm 5. 
Algorithm 5: An Optional way of reproducing a user’s pseudonyms 
INPUT: 𝑃𝐼𝐷0 = (𝑎0, 𝑏0), MSK, PIN, i, last ( the serial number of last used pseu-
donym 𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡) 
OUTPUT: PIDi , 𝐸𝐾𝑖 
 IF  i>last OR i<1 THEN return null.    
 IF  i==1 THEN 
𝐸𝐾𝑖 = 𝐾𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ (𝑖||𝑎0||𝑏0, 𝑥), 
         𝑎𝑖 = 𝑔
𝐸𝐾𝑖+𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ (𝑎0||𝑏0) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞 
         𝑏𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖
𝑥
 
𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑖 = Hash (𝑖||𝑎𝑖||𝑏𝑖)  
  ELSE THEN 
𝐸𝐾𝑖 = 𝐾𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ (𝑖||𝑎0||𝑏0, 𝑥), 
𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑖 = Hash ( i ^ 𝑎1|| i ^ 𝑏1) where ^ is bit xor operation 
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5.5 Authentication of Pseudonyms 
Following is the algorithm for a verifier (or authenticator), e.g. the cloud (abbreviated as C), 
to validate a user’s (abbreviated as P) ownership of some private data related with a 
pseudonym PID.  
Algorithm 6: Algorithm for authentication of PID 
INPUT: a PID in the cloud; p, q in the user’s MSK are known by the cloud 
OUTPUT: Yes or No. 
 P → C: User sends (i, 𝑎, 𝑏) such that PID = Hash (i||a||b) * 
 C:        checks whether PID ?= Hash (i||a||b). If not, C   returns No; otherwise     
             continues. 
 P → C: User randomly chooses s, calculates and sends (A=a, B=as mod p)  
     C → P: Cloud randomly chooses and sends c 
  P → C: User computes and sends y = s+cx mod q 
 C:       checks ay  ?=  Bbc mod p. If yes, C returns Yes; otherwise returns No. 
 * “→” means sending a message. 
 
Algorithm 7: An optional algorithm for authentication of PID 
INPUT: an PID in the cloud; p, q of the user’s MSK are known by the cloud 
OUTPUT: Yes or No. 
IF PID is the user’s first pseudonym THEN 
   Follow Algorithm 6 for authentication 
ELSE  
   P → C: the first pseudonym PID1  
   Follow Algorithm 6 for authentication on PID1 
   P → C: the index number i of PID 
C:  checks PID ?= Hash (i ^ 𝑎1|| i ^ 𝑏1), if yes, return true; otherwise false. 
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Corresponding to the optional pseudonym generation in Algorithm 3, Algorithm 7 is the 
authentication between the verifier (C) and the user who claim the owner of pseudonym 
(P). The algorithm for authentication of PID does not provide any protection of the followed 
communication between the verifier and the user. If the user wants to make some changes 
to the data indexed by the PID, the changes sent to the verifier (e.g. the cloud) should be 
protected by other schemes (e.g. encrypted by the public key of the verifier). 
In Algorithm 6, there are many message exchanges between the user and the verifier. In 
some network, the cost of sending and receiving message may be high. We alter Algo-
rithm 6 a little bit as shown in Algorithm 8 to decrease the amount of message exchanges 
in the authentication procedure, at the price of the verifier sending a big integer c to the 
user in the beginning of verification. 
Algorithm 8: Algorithm for authenticating with less messages 
INPUT: PID; p, q are known by the cloud 
OUTPUT: Yes or No. 
C → P: Cloud randomly chooses and sends c 
P → C: User computes (𝑎, 𝑏) such that PID = Hash (a||b); 
             User randomly chooses s, calculates (A=a, B=as mod p); 
          User computes y = s+cx mod q; 
           User sends (a, b, A, B, y) 
C:   Checks whether PID ?= Hash (a||b).   
       If not, C returns No; otherwise continues. 
       checks ay  ?=  Bbc mod p. If yes, C returns Yes; otherwise returns No. 
5.6 Security Evaluation 
The security of the above algorithms relies mainly on the difficulty of the discrete logarithm 
problem in 𝐺𝑞 and the one-way property of the hash function. We prove briefly the security 
of these algorithms in this Section. In the following proof, we assume that the outputs of 
hash and keyed Hash have the length of 256 bits, and we also assume that the parame-
ters for secret keys are generated according to Algorithm 1, which generates two secure 
primes (p, q) and a difficult discrete logarithm in a specified subgroup. Thus we assume 
that solving such a discrete logarithm problem has a complexity of 𝑂(2256) if the size of the 
q is 512 bits (Adrian et al., 2015, Shoup, 1997, Lim and Lee, 1997). 
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5.6.1 Proof of Algorithm 2 
One way of pseudonyms. In Algorithm 2, if an attacker wants to reverse the pseudonym 
to obtain the secret key (the number x) of the user, he firstly needs to find out the first 
preimage (i.e. 𝑎𝑖+1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑏𝑖+1) of 𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑖 in the hash function (Rogaway and Shrimpton, 2004). 
The complexity of first preimage attack on a delicate hash function is 𝑂(2256). Then the 
attacker need to solve the DLP to find x in 𝑏𝑖+1 = 𝑎𝑖+1
𝑥 . The complexity of solving this is also 
𝑂(2256). So in total the complexity to reverse the pseudonym of the user is 𝑂(2256). 
Collision-free of pseudonyms. If we assuming that two different users have different se-
cret x or different (𝑎0, 𝑏0) as discussed in Section 6.1.7.4, two pseudonyms (from a same 
user of two users) must have different parameters for calculating 𝐸𝐾𝑖+1. I.e., one user cal-
culates different 𝐸𝐾𝑖+1 with different i, two different users use different x or (𝑎0, 𝑏0). Accord-
ing to the collision features of hash function, two arbitrary 𝐸𝐾𝑖+1 collide with probability of 2-
256. If a user has the same 𝐸𝐾𝑖+1 with different serial number i, as a consequence the same 
𝑎𝑖+1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑏𝑖+1  will be computed. However, because the last step 𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑖+1  = Hash ( 𝑖 +
1||𝑎𝑖+1||𝑏𝑖+1) in Algorithm 2 have different inputs (i.e. i+1), the two pseudonyms collide 
with the probability of 2-256. If two different users calculate the same 𝐸𝐾𝑖+1, they must have 
different 𝑎𝑖+1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑏𝑖+1 computed because they have different x or (𝑎0, 𝑏0). As a result the 
two users get the same  𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑖+1 = Hash (𝑖 + 1||𝑎𝑖+1||𝑏𝑖+1) with the collision probability of 2
-
256 according to the feature of hash function. In one word, the collision of two arbitrary 
pseudonyms have the probability of 2-256. Or we say that a collision happens in 2128 pseu-
donyms with probability of ½. Some systems have very strict requirement to the collision of 
pseudonym. We discuss a case to solve the occasional collision in Section 6.1.7.4. 
Independence of pseudonyms. Due to the hash function used in 𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑖+1 = Hash (𝑖 +
1||𝑎𝑖+1||𝑏𝑖+1), the pseudonyms of a user are pseudo random and independent without 
knowing the secret key x. The complexity of finding the user’s other pseudonym from 
knowing one or more pseudonyms has the same complexity as finding the user’s secret x, 
i.e., 𝑂(2256). 
5.6.2 Proof of Algorithm 3 
The one-way and collision-free features of Algorithm 3 can be similarly proved as Algo-
rithm 2. However, the independence of pseudonyms is not as strong as Algorithm 2. In 
Algorithm 3, a user’s pseudonyms are derived from PID1 by a hash function. If PID1 are not 
know by attackers, all the pseudonyms are still independent. However, if the PID1 is dis-
closed, all other pseudonyms of the user are can be computed by attackers. 
5.6.3 Proof of Algorithm 6, 7, 8 
The Algorithm 7 and 8 are identical to Algorithm 6.  In the following we only prove the se-
curity of Algorithm 6. 
The cloud or the attacker who can eavesdrop the authentication process can obtain (i, a, b, 
c, y, A, B). An attacker wants to get the secret key x of a user according to the obtained 
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information. Obviously, from knowing a and b, the complexity of computing x has the com-
plexity of 𝑂(2256) according the one-way proof in Section 5.6.1. In y = s+cx mod q, there 
are two unknown element s and x, when y and c are known. To compute x, s has to be 
computed from B=As mod p. The computation has complexity of 𝑂(2256). In one word, the 
attacker has the complexity of 𝑂(2256) to compute the secret key of x from knowing any 
authentication messages. 
An attacker who wants to impersonate the user has to answer the verifier the correct y and 
A, B which satisfy Ay  =  Bbc. If the verifier generates the challenge number c randomly (to 
avoid simply replay attack), the attacker who does not know x has to solve the discrete 
problem Ay  =  D where A and D are known in order to get correct y, which has complexity 
of 𝑂(2256). 
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6 Applications of the Pseudonym 
Solution in eHealth Systems 
6.1 Application in Ordinary Healthcare Activities 
6.1.1 Cloud-based eHealth System with Pseudonyms 
We have proposed a model of cloud-based eHealth systems in Figure 9. With the introduc-
ing of pseudonym solution, a cloud-based eHealth system with major ordinary healthcare 
activities is shown in Figure 10.  
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Figure 10: Using pseudonyms in the ordinary healthcare activities 
The cloud plays the role of associating almost all participating entities such as patients, 
doctors, pharmacists, and health insurance companies (will be abbreviated as insurance 
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companies) in an eHealth system. The pseudonym solution can benefit these ordinary 
healthcare activities with featured security and privacy protection. The following para-
graphs will generally introduce the settings to adapt the proposed pseudonym solution in 
chapter 5 in to a cloud-based eHealth system. Section 6.1.2 to 6.1.6 will present the de-
tails of how to protect the security of heath data the and the privacy of patients in some 
ordinary healthcare activities. 
As shown in Figure 10, each patient has a set of secrets consisting of MSK and PIN, which 
are only known by the patient himself. MSK is the main secret key of the patient and 
stored in the protected memory of a smart card, for which a PIN is employed to authenti-
cate the patient to avoid abuse as introduced in Section 5.2. MSK of the patient is used to 
generate pseudonyms, encrypt EHR, prove the patient’s ownership on EHR entries to the 
verifiers, and for even more functions (e.g., the applications introduced in Section 6.2 and 
6.3). Because MSK is tightly related to the security of EHR and the privacy of the patient, 
the patient has the responsibility and incentive to keep them safe. I.e., MSK should never 
be accessed or used by someone else other than the patient himself. In our solution, a 
smart card is employed to protect MSK by secure hardware (Grand, 2004). Moreover, in 
case of losing the smart card, MSK should be safely backed up by the patient at some-
where other than in the smart card, e.g. in the patient’s computer. We will discuss the is-
sues and countermeasures of smart card loss in Section 6.2.3.3.  
The pseudonyms (PID) of a patient will be used in most ordinary healthcare activities as 
shown in Figure 10. Contrarily, each patient’s real identity is only known by the insurance 
company while the patient registers there in the beginning as introduced in section 3.3.2.1. 
In theory, the real identity of the patient is not necessarily known by the insurance compa-
ny. However, in many countries, the insurance premium is paid partly by the employer and 
partly by the patient. Moreover, the patient has to contact an insurance company in person 
to sign the insurance contract. So, the identity of the patient is difficult to be a secret 
against the insurance company in practice. The special aspects of protecting patients’ pri-
vacy against insurance companies are discussed in section 6.2. In fact, the application of 
the pseudonym solution proposed in this thesis does not depend on the existence of in-
surance companies. It is easy to adapt the pseudonym solution in eHealth systems without 
an insurance company, which actually brings troubles to the deployment of the pseudonym 
solution as to be discussed in section 6.2. 
After registering at a health insurance company, each patient will get a digital certificate 
from the insurance company with a corresponding private key which is only known by the 
patient (we will denote the patient’s corresponding private key from the insurance compa-
ny as SKI). The patient’s identity (e.g. name, address) is not included in this certificate. 
Typically, a certificate number, which can only be mapped to the patient’s real identity by 
the insurance company, a token (e.g. company name, registration number) of the insur-
ance company, the public key of the patient, and the validity period are necessary in the 
patient’s certificate.  
As we have introduced in Section 3.3.1.1, the healthcare providers (e.g. doctors and 
pharmacists) need to get certificates from a trusted authority with self-known private keys. 
The trusted authority could be the health department of the government which confirms 
healthcare providers’ qualifications by issuing them digital certificates, in which information 
like healthcare categories and healthcare providers’ identities can be enclosed. The certifi-
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cates and the corresponding private keys can be stored in the protected memory of smart 
cards issued to healthcare providers with authenticating PINs. Healthcare providers’ pri-
vate keys will be used to sign the record sections of the patient’s EHR, prescriptions and 
bills, which will be separately introduced in Section 6.1.2 and 6.2. As a comparison, the 
private keys of patients are only used for signing the bills. The billing procedure is not de-
picted in the Figure 10 for simplicity. For more details of the bills relating to patients’ SKI, 
please refer to Section 6.2. 
We will describe how to utilize the pseudonym solution in some major ordinary healthcare 
activities for the protection of security and privacy in the following Sections from 6.1.2 to 
6.1.6. 
6.1.2 Concealing Patients’ Identities and Protecting the Security of EHR 
A typical pseudonym generation (the execution of Algorithm 2) occurs at a doctor’s prac-
tice when a patient visits the doctor, taking along his smart card as shown in Figure 10. 
The doctor checks the validity of the patient firstly by asking the patient to input the PIN of 
the smart card. If necessary, the doctor can further check the patient’s certificate and chal-
lenge the patient’s SKI, with the help of the insurance company's root certificate which 
could also be issued by the trusted authority. If all validations are successful, the doctor (or 
any other staff in the practice) diagnoses, examines, treats the patient, and then writes 
down a record (including the diagnosis, examinations, treatment and other information) 
and probably a prescription stating the medicines that the patient needs to buy at a phar-
macy. Meanwhile, a new pseudonym (PID) and an encryption key (EK) are generated by 
the patient’s smart card from MSK by using the Algorithm 2 or Algorithm 3. Both the record 
and the prescription will be encrypted by EK and signed by the doctor’s private key. Then, 
all the data from the doctor are uploaded to the cloud along with an index header, the new 
PID, forming a new EHR entry for the patient’s EHR. Thus, an EHR entry needs to be at 
least compatible with the following segments where “||” means concatenation,   
EHR entry =  
                PID || EncEK (record) || sigd (record) ||EncEK (prescription) ||sigd (prescription). 
In the EHR entry, EncEK(…) is the cipher text of the record or the prescription by using the 
encryption key EK. Any secure cryptographic cipher scheme (e.g. AES) can be utilized for 
the encrypting. Importantly, the encrypting operation is executed by the patient’s smart 
card, because EK should not be disclosed to anybody else except the patient. Even the 
doctor does not know the patient’s encryption key. EK can also be used to encrypt some 
extra data (e.g. the access control table on EHR entry, and the communication with sec-
ondary users introduced in Section 6.3.) which are not necessarily known by the doctor. 
sigd (record) and sigd (prescription) are the signatures of the doctor on the record and pre-
scription. 
Due to the use of the pseudonyms and encryption, the EHR of a patient do not contain any 
real identifiers (e.g. name, identity number, age, gender.) in plain text. These identifiers are 
replaced by the pseudonyms which securely conceal the identity of the patient. Moreover, 
as we have introduced in the last paragraph, the doctor does not necessarily know the real 
identity of the patient. But in practice, since the doctor is assumed to be trusted, it is usual-
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ly the case that the identifiers (at least parts of identity information such as gender, age, 
and telephone number) of the patient is inevitably disclosed to the doctor. 
6.1.3 Indexing EHR (Electronic Health Records) Entries 
The cloud stores EHR entries of all patients by indexing the PID segments of all EHR en-
tries. In order to avoid illegal uploading of EHR entries (e.g. attackers may upload useless 
data to form DoS attack), the cloud validates uploaders (doctors) by checking their certifi-
cates and challenging their private keys with the help of the trusted certificate authority. 
From the viewpoint of the privacy of patients, this validation is actually unnecessary, be-
cause any illegally uploaded (forged) EHR entries can be easily recognized by the patients 
due to the following reasons. Without the authorization (by inputting the PIN) of a patient, 
nobody else can generate a valid encryption key or PID of the patient because MSK is 
needed for generating PID and EK according to Algorithm 2. Moreover, each pair of valid 
PID and EK is only used for one EHR entry as shown in Algorithm 2 or Algorithm 3. Thus, 
the forged EHR entries (e.g. an EHR entry with a known PID of the patient) can easily be 
recognized and removed by the patient by checking the correctness of decryption and the 
PID.  
The cloud does not keep any registration information of patients. Hence, it does not know 
the identities of patients except the PIDs (the PIDs will be used to authenticate patients as 
introduced in Section 6.1.5). Moreover, because the sensitive contents in EHR entries are 
encrypted with the encryption keys which are unknown to the cloud, the cloud is unable to 
disclose the identities of patients or any meaningful information in EHR, even if the cloud is 
curious to know. For the same reason, any attackers who can access all EHR entries in 
the cloud can not get any useful information from EHR or discover the identities of patients. 
6.1.4 Retrieving EHR Entries 
The PIDs are reproduced by patients when EHR entries are needed to be retrieved. For 
example, when a doctor who is examining a patient wants to view the anamnesis of the 
patient or when a patient wants to view and manage his own EHR at home, the patient 
regenerates the PIDs one by one using Algorithm 4 or Algorithm 5 and sends them to the 
cloud in order to download the content of the corresponding EHR entries. The cloud simply 
returns all EHR entries indexed by the requested PIDs.  
It is easy to retrieve all EHR entries of a patient but sometimes it is not the desired way. 
Supporting query conditions (e.g. specified date and illness type) is helpful for the inquirers 
(e.g. a doctor) to get a particular subset of EHR entries rather than all EHR entries of the 
patient. Even sometimes, the inquirers just need partial segments (e.g., the general infor-
mation of the illnesses of the patient) of EHR entries, because the size of the whole EHR 
entries is too big to download from the cloud in short time. In that case, the cloud needs to 
have the ability to search information in the EHR. Moreover, the structure information of 
EHR entries has to be disclosed to the cloud. Searching in the encrypted EHR is neces-
sary to support such complex inquiring, which is another research topic in cryptology and 
eHealth systems (refer chapter 8 for more discussion). In the setting of the cloud-based 
eHealth system in this thesis, because the cloud does not know which pseudonyms belong 
to one patient and has no knowledge about the encryption keys of EHR entries, patients 
6.1 Application in Ordinary Healthcare Activities 
65 
 
themselves have to be involved in the construction of encrypted searching index. They 
must cooperate with the cloud to enable complex searching in the encrypted EHR. The 
encryption algorithm in our solution is still quite open to any searchable encryption 
schemes, although we implemented the encryption by block cipher (AES) in our prototype 
introduced in chapter 7. Our implementation currently does not support the search in en-
crypted EHR entries, but we suggest to use partial encryption to support fast search in un-
encrypted data (refer Section 6.3 for more details). 
6.1.5 Authenticating the Ownership of EHR 
Pseudonyms are used to authenticate patients’ ownerships on their EHR entries. When a 
patient wants to manage/change his own EHR entries (e.g. to make some notes or add 
access control properties), the cloud has to verify that the patient is the owner of those 
EHR entries beforehand to avoid malicious modifications. In our system model, in order to 
avoid the risk of disclosing patients’ identities, EHR entries do not contain patients’ certifi-
cates or signatures as introduced in Section 6.1.2, and the cloud does not keep any regis-
tration information about the patient. To our delight, the proposed pseudonym solution 
provides a way for the cloud to authenticate patients’ EHR ownerships without knowing or 
leaking the information of patients’ identities as presented in Algorithm 6 or Algorithm 7. 
Because each EHR entry is indexed (related) by a PID, the cloud can check the ownership 
of the patient on the EHR entry by authenticating the patient’s ownership of the PID. After 
the cloud authenticating the patient, the patient can send the changes to the cloud. It is 
advisable that the changes are sent in a secure channel between the patient and the cloud, 
to avoid eavesdrops and other attacks. For example, the changes could be encrypted by 
the public key of the cloud, thus the encrypted changes can only be decrypted by the cloud. 
6.1.6 Purchasing Medicines from Pharmacy 
Another typical scenario for updating an EHR entry is when a patient goes to a pharmacy 
and buy medicines by using the prescription which is enclosed in the EHR entry as de-
scribed in Section 6.1.2, the EHR entry should be marked that the prescription is used (or 
how many times are used out of the allowed times) in order to prevent the abuse of the 
prescription.  
The patient retrieves the EHR entry from the cloud by providing the cloud the correspond-
ing PID (the PIDs of EHR entries containing unused prescriptions can also be temporally 
stored in the patient’s smart card for fast query). The EHR entry is then decrypted by cor-
responding EK. The decrypted prescription with the doctor’s signature is shown to the 
pharmacist. The pharmacist checks the doctor’s signature on the prescription. If the signa-
ture is valid, the pharmacist generates an additional signature on the prescription to indi-
cate that the prescription has been used (or once). Then the patient must update the origi-
nal prescription’s signature segment of the EHR entry by adding the pharmacist’s signa-
ture (note that the signature segment is not encrypted!). To avoid illegal updating, the 
cloud needs to check beforehand whether the updater (the patient) is the owner of EHR 
entry or not. Only if he is, the cloud updates the old prescription’s signature segment by 
adding the pharmacist’s signature. After the pharmacist confirms that the patient has up-
dated the prescription signature (by reading the signature segments in the cloud), the 
medicines are then sold to the patient.  
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In this procedure, we assume that the cloud has knowledge about the structure of EHR 
entry, and only allows the patient adding new signatures to the prescription’s signature 
segment (i.e., the patient is not allowed to delete a signature). In order to avoid reusing the 
prescription, before accepting the prescription the pharmacist must check whether there is 
already another pharmacist’s signature existing in the prescription’s signature segment or 
not. In practice, a prescription may be used for several times, e.g. in case of chronic dis-
eases. We can equip the prescription with a property indicating how many times it can be 
reused. This property is determined by the doctor who wrote the prescription. The phar-
macist can read this property in the decrypted prescription and check how many times the 
prescription has so far been used (i.e. how many other pharmacists’ signatures exist) to 
determine whether the prescription is still valid or not to be used once again. We assume 
that the certificates of doctors and pharmacists include the information about their 
healthcare roles. Thus the pharmacists can distinguish the signers of the signatures (from 
a doctor or a pharmacist).  
Due to the above updating in the procedure of medicine purchasing with prescription, the 
updated EHR entry with a pharmacist’s signature looks like as follows, 
updated EHR entry = PID || EncEK (record) || sigd (record) ||EncEK (prescription)  
                                   ||sigd (prescription) || sigp (prescription),  
where the segment sigp (prescription) denotes the signature of a pharmacist on the pre-
scription. For the meaning of other segments, please refer to Section 6.1.2. 
6.1.7 Potential Threats and Countermeasures 
6.1.7.1 Cloud’s Knowledge of the PIDs of Patients  
Because all pseudonyms of a patient are independent without knowing the patient’s secret 
keys, common attackers are unable to know which EHR entries (indexed by different PIDs) 
belong to one patient. However, the cloud may know more about the pseudonyms of one 
patient than the common attackers outside. A patient’s frequent access to his EHR may 
potentially disclose all PIDs of the patient to the cloud, and a doctor treating the patient 
may have to access all EHR entries of the patient from the cloud. Under these cases, all 
pseudonyms of the patient may be sent to the cloud for retrieving all the corresponding 
EHR entries in one query. If the cloud wants to, it can record the pseudonym sets from 
different querying sources (e.g., network IP). The pseudonyms in one set come from one 
patient with high probability.  
This knowledge of the cloud does not harm the privacy of patients directly, because the 
real identities of patients are unknown to the cloud and the essential segments of EHR are 
encrypted. However, if this pseudonym set knowledge is disclosed to a close attacker who 
is familiar with a patient and knows the patient’s identifiers and even some extra infor-
mation of the patient’s healthcare activities, the attacker may discover some general in-
formation about the patient’s illness. For example, if the close attacker happens to know 
that a familiar patient has visited doctor A and doctor B recently.  With the knowledge of all 
patients’ pseudonym sets, the attacker can find out the patients who have visited both A 
and B from the doctor’s signature segments of EHR entries. This will narrow the range of 
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candidates and even help to find out the exact pseudonym set that the familiar patient has. 
The attacker can download all EHR entries indexed by the PIDs in the pseudonym set 
from the cloud. Then the close attacker may discover some general information about the 
patient’s illness type from the doctor’s signature segments of these EHR entries, because 
the doctor’s category can be easily obtained from the doctor’s certificate which is enclosed 
in the signature.  
A direct countermeasure is to move the doctor’s certificate into the record segment of EHR 
entry. This can prevent the close attacker from knowing the doctor’s category in certificate, 
i.e., the illness type of the patient, because the record segment with the doctor’s certificate 
is encrypted. However, as introduced in Section 6.1.3, the cloud is able to obtain the certif-
icates of doctors when they are authenticated by the cloud to upload new EHR entries, 
even if doctors’ certificates are enclosed into the encrypted record segment. Fortunately, 
the cloud does not have the close attacker’s extra information about the patient. Thus, the 
pseudonym set knowledge does not interest the cloud.  
In the worst case, the cloud may collude with the close attackers to disclose the patient’s 
privacy, i.e., the cloud discloses the pseudonym set information to the close attackers. 
Hence, it is still valuable to prevent the cloud from obtaining the pseudonym set knowledge. 
Some tricks can be used to blur the knowledge of exact pseudonym sets. E.g., when a 
patient or doctor retrieves EHR entries from the cloud, some fake pseudonyms can be 
sent besides the intended pseudonyms. The fake pseudonyms mean those pseudonyms 
existing in the cloud but belonging to other patients. We assume that the pseudonyms in 
the cloud are public available resources, and anyone can view these pseudonyms freely. 
Another solution is that patients and doctors can use anonymous proxies(Reed et al., 1996) 
and particular network technologies to avoid being traced by the cloud.  
6.1.7.2 Protecting Identities against Eavesdroppers 
When a patient accesses his/her EHR from the computer at home or from a mobile device, 
there exists risk of mapping the pseudonyms to patients’ identities resulting from ISP (In-
ternet Service Provider) and eavesdroppers. In many countries, the customers’ real identi-
ties are known by the ISP. Moreover, the ISP knows which network address (IP address) 
patients are using. As a result, if the ISP wants to, it can easily record the pseudonyms 
that a patient sends to the cloud. Some attackers who can eavesdrop on the patient’s net-
work communication can also record the pseudonyms transmitted. An easy way to prevent 
the ISP or the eavesdroppers from knowing the pseudonyms of patients is to use a secure 
channel (e.g. using SSL)(Viega et al., 2002) for transmitting unencrypted data (e.g. PIDs) 
between patients and the cloud. 
6.1.7.3 Avoiding Guessing Attacks against Secret Keys 
A patient’s main secret key MSK may suffer from brute guessing attack which tries to dis-
cover the patient’s secret keys by random guessing. As introduced in the chapter 5, a pa-
tient’s choice of x in his MSK is usually a large integer with a length of more than 160 bits. 
An attacker tries a random x’ and computes the first pseudonym by Algorithm 2 or Algo-
rithm 3. Then the pseudonym is sent to the cloud to ask whether a corresponding EHR 
entry indexed with this pseudonym exists or not. If exists, the attacker has successfully 
guessed the MSK of one patient in the eHealth system. The attacker only has a probability 
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of 1/2160 to guess the right x in MSK by one random attempt if the size of x is 160 bits. 
However, under the setting of the cloud-based eHealth system in our thesis, the attacker 
may have better luck than random guess. Imagining that there are N patients in the system, 
the probability of a success guess will be N/2160 because there are N such first pseudo-
nyms in the cloud. It is not practical for the attacker to succeed in the attack when N is not 
big. However, the probability is much higher than the theoretical value 1/2160 if N is large. A 
successful guess of one patient’s secret key may cause serious consequences because 
the attacker can view all EHR entries of the patient and even impersonate the patient.  
There are some ways to rule the attack out when N is considerably large. One solution is 
to enable each patient to freely choose g, p, and q besides x in MSK. This will increase the 
computation a little when a patient initializes his smart card for setting up MSK as present-
ed in Algorithm 1, but it can add a big burden to the attacker. The attacker has to guess g, 
p, and q which are also big numbers besides x. This will decrease the success probability 
of the attacker’s guess to a negligible value. Another way is to make use of PID0. In the 
algorithm of the pseudonym generation in Algorithm 2 or Algorithm 3, PID0 is an initial pa-
rameter and is set to (0, 0) by default. To prevent attackers from guessing patients’ secret 
keys, each patient can use a different PID0. Thus, the attacker needs to guess PID0 be-
sides x. It will also make the success probability of the attacker’s guess drop to a negligible 
value. 
6.1.7.4 Dealing with Pseudonym Collision 
In the pseudonym solution presented in chapter 5, the secret parameters (e.g., x) in MSKs 
for generating pseudonyms of patients are chosen by patients themselves separately. It is 
probable that two innocent patients happen to choose a same parameter set, which results 
in that the two patients have the same pseudonyms. Although the probability is very low 
due to the large space of the parameters, the collision of pseudonyms would certainly 
cause serious problems if happened. Because the pseudonyms generated by the two pa-
tients will be equal, and it will confuse EHR entries from the two patients. A solution is to 
utilize 𝑃𝐼𝐷0 to avoid the occurrence. The manufacturer of the smart cards can control that 
all patients have different 𝑃𝐼𝐷0’s, or the 𝑃𝐼𝐷0 can be set by each patient to be (or the hash 
value of) the patient’s unique identifiers (e.g., identity no., passport no., or SSN). Accord-
ing to the pseudonym generation in Algorithm 2 or Algorithm 3, it is expected that different 
pseudonym sequences will be produced due to different 𝑃𝐼𝐷0.  
There is another case of collision where two arbitrary pseudonyms (from one patient or 
two patients) might collide because Algorithm 2 or Algorithm 3 is not injective, i.e., two 
equal pseudonyms can be produced although different inputs are used in the algorithm of 
pseudonym generation. The probability of the collision is determined by the birthday para-
dox (Flajolet et al., 1992). For example, if the bit length of each pseudonym is n bits, a col-
lision of two pseudonyms happens with the probability of ½ if there are 2𝑛/2 pseudonyms 
in the eHealth system. The collision of pseudonyms may also lead to the confusion on the 
EHR entries indexed by collided PIDs. A direct solution is that the cloud forbids the colli-
sion: when a patient uploads an EHR entry with collided PID, the cloud will ask the patient 
to provide a new one. The patient will remember in his smart card that this PID can not be 
used, which requires the smart cards to provide extra storage for collided PIDs. Another 
better responding solution is to count on the encryption or keyed HMAC (Keyed Hashing 
for Message Authentication Code) on EHR entries. That is, when the pseudonyms in two 
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EHR entries happens to collide, the two EHR entries must have been encrypted or 
HMACed with different secret keys (e.g., EK). So, in the procedure of decrypting a collided 
EHR entry or the verification of HAMC, the EHR entry that can be successfully decrypted 
or has the correct HMAC is the correct one. In our design of Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 3, 
two EHR entries with the same pseudonym are highly expected to have different encryp-
tion keys or different HMACs because the formulas for outputting PID and EK have differ-
ent parameters. Thus, a patient can recognize which EHR entry is the correct one if he 
receives more than one answer from the cloud after he sent one pseudonym to the cloud. 
The collided EHR entry which cannot be correctly decrypted or cannot get a correct HMAC 
is considered as undesired EHR entries by patients.  
Due to the collisions of pseudonyms, the authentication in Algorithm 6 or Algorithm 7 might 
be also misused. For example, in the updating procedure of an EHR entry with a collided 
PID (two EHR entries E1 and E2 separately from two different patients P1 and P2 are in-
dexed by a some PID) as introduced in Section 6.1.5, because the cloud cannot tell which 
patient is the exact owner of the two EHR entries, P1 could update P2’s EHR entry E2 (P1 
can prove to the cloud that he is the owner of the pseudonym of E2 in Algorithm 6 or Algo-
rithm 7). One simple solution is that a patient must create a new EHR entry with reference 
to the updated entry, when he wants to update a EHR entry. This can avoid wrong updat-
ing because the original EHR entries keeps unchanged. Another solution relies on the 
cloud to do further checks after the authentication by Algorithm 6 or Algorithm 7. In the 
case where a patient wants to update the prescription’s signature segment of an EHR en-
try with collided PID as introduced in Section 6.1.6, the cloud requires the patient to de-
crypt and present the prescription segment, and checks the signature of the doctor or 
pharmacist. Only if the patient can successfully decrypt the prescription section, the cloud 
can check the doctor’s or pharmacist’s signature to furtherly confirm the patient’s owner-
ship on the EHR entry. Thus, by the further signature check, the cloud can prevent updat-
ing to the wrong EHR entry with collided PID. In Section 6.1.7.1, since we recommend to 
enclose the doctor’s certificate in the encrypted record, the cloud can also ask the patient 
to decrypt and present the doctor’s certificate. Then the cloud can check the validation of 
the doctor’s signature to further verify whether the patient is the real owner of EHR entry or 
not. In other cases, where the updates are made by the patient and appended to an EHR 
entry (e.g., to set custom access control), the updates must be encrypted or have integrity 
protection (e.g. keyed HMAC). The wrong updates can be detected and abandoned by the 
real owner of the EHR entry though decryption check or integrity check, even if the cloud 
did not carry out the further checks or wrongly accepted some malicious updates. 
6.1.7.5 Trust Mode of Cloud 
The cloud in this thesis is not necessary fully trustworthy, but it is expected to be honest as 
introduced in Section 3.1.2. This is usually the case in practice. Because of the security 
and privacy threats to the cloud as introduced in Section 3.1.4, the data stored in the cloud 
are vulnerable for abuse by the cloud itself or easily be obtained by a skilled attacker. Thus, 
we do not store in the cloud more information (such as patient’s registration information) 
other than protected data and publicly available data (e.g., root certificate of trusted au-
thority for validating doctors).  
However, we require that the cloud acts honestly, i.e., the eHealth system deployed by the 
“system provider” on the cloud is executed honestly. For example, the cloud does not in-
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tend to tamper EHR, and it also follows the protocols designed for authenticating the own-
ership of EHR entries by Algorithm 6 or Algorithm 7. As discussed in Section 6.1.6, we 
also require the cloud to understand some structure information of EHR entries and to pre-
vent updating to the undesired segments (e.g. the segments of record and prescription) of 
EHR entries in an honest manner. Due to the feature of the authentication protocols in Al-
gorithm 6 or Algorithm 7, the cloud does not benefit  (e.g. to obtain information of patients’ 
identities) from any dishonesty, except disturbing the normal procedure of the healthcare 
activities. 
6.1.7.6 Extra Threats from Optional Algorithms 
In chapter 5, we presented Algorithm 3, Algorithm 5 and Algorithm 7 for optional pseudo-
nym solution. These algorithms decrease the computation load on the smart card greatly 
especially in pseudonym generation and reproducing. E.g., in pseudonym generation of 
Algorithm 3, only the first pseudonym needs computation of two modular exponentiations 
which need more computation time, and the other pseudonyms only need several compu-
tations of hash functions which are much faster. 
These optional algorithms preserve the same security level as Algorithm 2, Algorithm 4 
and Algorithm 6, because the security still relies on the DLP and hash functions as intro-
duced in Section 5.6. However, there exists one more risk where they are applied in the 
ordinary healthcare activities. That is, the cloud is able to obtain the information about 
each patient’s pseudonyms more easily. During the authentication process in Algorithm 7, 
a patient needs to tell the cloud of his first pseudonym PID1 and (a1, b1). As a result, the 
cloud is able to infer all pseudonyms of the patient from Algorithm 5, i.e., the cloud has an 
easier way to obtaining the pseudonym sets of all patients. The potential risk of the cloud’s 
knowledge on the pseudonym sets of patients was already discussed in Section 6.1.7.1. 
Nevertheless, the cloud or any other attackers who have such pseudonym set knowledge 
are not able to generate a forged pseudonym and create the corresponding EHR entry for 
a patient, because they can not generate the valid EK for encrypting EHR entry. Even if an 
attacker creates and uploads a fake EHR entry for the patient, the fake EHR entry can be 
easily detected and excluded by the patient through checking the decryption or integrity by 
correct EK, because the fake EHR entry must be encrypted or keyed HMACed by an inva-
lid EK. 
6.2 Application in Health Insurance 
6.2.1 A Refined Billing Procedure 
6.2.1.1 Setting in Billing 
The billing process is complex and differs in different implementations of eHealth systems. 
As we have introduced in Section 3.1.3 and 3.3.2.4, in some eHealth systems (e.g. Ger-
man statutory health insurance systems), healthcare providers (e.g., practitioners, hospi-
tals, pharmacies) send the bills to insurance companies directly to get paid as shown in 
Figure 4 (a). Patients are not involved in the billing procedure directly. In contrast, some 
private insurance companies reimburse the bills sent from patients who pay firstly the bills 
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from healthcare providers as shown in Figure 4 (b). In practice, there are even separate 
billing companies (consolidators) in some eHealth systems (Milroy and Li, 2001). The bill 
collectors who work with healthcare providers and insurance companies deal with billing 
affairs on behalf of them. To simplify the interpretation of our scheme, we present a simple 
billing model shown in Figure 11. This billing model is a simplified version of many nation-
wide statutory eHealth systems. We remove some intermediate roles (e.g. bill collectors, 
banks) in order to describe clearly the essential threats that the privacy of patients confront 
in the billing procedure. Some issues and workarounds about adopting our scheme in oth-
er billing models are discussed in Section 6.2.3.2. 
Insurance 
company
Doctor
Patient
Smart card
Pharmacy
Register
 Visit
Get medicines
Bill
Bill
MSK/PIN/s Tokens
Certificate
 
Figure 11: A Simple model of billing procedure with smart card 
As shown in Figure 11, a patient firstly registers at an insurance company. In the registra-
tion, the patient needs to provide the real identities and some other information to the in-
surance company, e.g. the employer information as introduced in Section 3.1.3 and 3.3.2.4. 
After the registration, the patient gets an initialized smart card for the proof of the patient’s 
health insurance. The smart card can be used in many normal healthcare activities as in-
troduced in Section 6.1, e.g., storing MSK and visiting doctors. In order to be used in the 
billing procedure, the smart card needs to store the publicly known tokens (company name, 
billing address) of the insurance company. The smart card also stores a certificate issued 
by the insurance company to the patient. Along with the certificate, a secret private key 
(SKI) which is only known by the patient is stored in the protected memory of the smart 
card. On the smart card, a photo of the patient is also printed. Optionally, a description of 
the insurance coverage can be enclosed. The description must be signed by the insurance 
company. We have required the smart card to store a master secret key (MSK) generated 
and only known by the patient in Section 6.1. MSK is stored in the protected memory of 
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the smart card and used for generating the pseudonyms of the patient. The smart card is 
also set a PIN (only known to the patient) for authenticating the patient to avoid abuse. In 
the billing procedure, similar to x in MSK, another secret key “s” will be used for signing the 
bills, which will be introduced in Section 6.2.2. 
As we have introduced in Section 6.1.1, each healthcare provider (e.g. doctor or pharma-
cist) needs to get a certificate (Certh) from a trusted authority with self-known private key 
(HSK) which is not depicted in the Figure 11 for simplicity. The digital certificate (Certh) 
includes the information like healthcare categories and identities of healthcare providers. 
The private key HSK needs to be stored in the protected memory of a smart card issued to 
the healthcare provider with an authenticating PIN. Certh and HSK will be used to sign the 
bills sent to insurance companies, which will be introduced in Section 6.2.2. 
6.2.1.2 Validating Patients 
As shown in Figure 11, a patient visits a healthcare provider (e.g. a doctor or pharmacy) 
taking along the smart card described in above Section. The healthcare provider can 
check the validation of the patient through checking the smart card. Firstly, the photo on 
the smart card and the PIN required by the smart card are the preliminary checks by the 
healthcare provider. Further, the healthcare provider can validate the patient’s certificate 
stored in the smart card and challenge the corresponding SKI to confirm that the patient is 
truly insured by the claimed insurance company. Optionally, the healthcare provider can 
check the description of the insurance coverage of the patient if available. Although it is 
not necessary, an online certificate service provided by the insurance company would help 
the healthcare provider to validate patients. If the insurance company broadcasts revoked 
certificate list online regularly, the healthcare provider can check whether the certificate of 
the patient is expired or in the list of revoked certificates or not in time, and even further 
inquire the patient’s insurance coverage online (by anonymously sending the patient’s con-
tract reference number to the insurance company). In the process of validating the patient, 
the healthcare provider does not disclose the identity of the patient to the insurance com-
pany. If the healthcare provider is assumed to be trustworthy to protect the privacy of the 
patient in the process of validation, the insurance company is unable to know the identity 
of the patient who is visiting the doctor. 
6.2.1.3 Generating a Bill 
A bill sent from a healthcare provider to the insurance company must enclose all items of 
the services or drugs that a patient has taken. The list of the items is the first basic infor-
mation that the bill should contain. Additionally, the healthcare provider’s tokens (e.g., the 
bank account information, name, address) should also be included. Another important part 
in the bill is the signatures of the patient (Sigp) and the healthcare provider (Sigh). The pa-
tient’s signature includes two parts. The first part is the traditional digital signature by using 
the secret private key SKI corresponding to the patient’s certificate issued by the insurance 
company as introduced in 6.2.1.1. As an exception, the patient’s certificate is not enclosed 
in the signature, in order to prevent the insurance company from knowing the identity of 
the patient directly by the certificate. Thus, the patient’s traditional signature is simply the 
encrypted (e.g. by RSA with SKI) digest (computed from a hash function) of the data to be 
signed. However, the healthcare provider must store both the certificate and the signature 
of the patient in a local storage (e.g. the computer in doctor’s practice), for the sake of 
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fraud detection as introduced in Section 6.2.1.4. The other part of the patient’s signature is 
the signature by the secret s corresponding to the pseudonym scheme which will be de-
tailed in Section 6.2.2.3. The traditional digital signature of the healthcare provider by us-
ing HSK and the certificate (Certh) are the last necessary segments of the bill. 
From the explanation in above paragraph, a bill is created by following Algorithm 9 where 
“||” means concatenation. 
Algorithm 9: Generating a bill 
B = Services/Drugs List || Tokens of healthcare provider 
Sigp = SignSKI (B) || Signs (B)  
Sigh = SignHSK (B || sigp) 
Bill = B || Sigp || Certh || Sigh 
6.2.1.4 Validating a Bill 
After the insurance company receives a bill from a healthcare provider, the first task is to 
validate the bill. The validation aims to confirm that the bill is sent from a valid healthcare 
provider, and that the bill originates from a customer of this insurance company. By check-
ing the validation of the certificate (Certh) and the signature (Sigh) of the healthcare provid-
er, the insurance company can easily verify whether or not the bill is sent from a valid 
healthcare provider. Because the patient’s certificate is not enclosed in the bill as intro-
duced in Section 6.2.1.3, the insurance is unable to check the patient’s traditional signa-
ture (SignSKI (B)) directly in order to verity that the bill originates from a registered customer. 
Instead, the insurance company needs to check the patient’s signature (Signs (B)) corre-
sponding pseudonym which will be introduced in 6.2.2.4. The validation of Signs (B) proves 
that the signature does originate from a customer that is insured by the insurance compa-
ny, while the validation process does not disclose any information about whom the patient 
is exactly. For more details about patient’s signature corresponding pseudonym, please 
refer to Section 6.2.2. After succeeding in all the validations on the bill, the insurance com-
pany pays to the healthcare provider according to the tokens of the healthcare provider 
enclosed in the bill. 
Because the certificate of the patient or any other information about the patient’s identity 
(e.g. contract reference number) is not enclosed in the bill, the insurance company is not 
able to discover the identity of the patient directly from the bill. Moreover, the validation of 
the patient’s signature Signs (B) will not disclose any information about the patient’s identi-
ty as introduced in Section 6.2.2.4. Thus, the identity information of patients is completely 
protected from insurance companies during the billing procedure, i.e., it decreases the risk 
that the privacy of patients is disclosed due to insurance companies. Nevertheless, insur-
ance companies can still validate the bills and run their business normally without the 
knowledge of patients’ identities in the billing procedure, which will be introduced in Sec-
tion 6.2.2.  
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6.2.2 Pseudonymizing Bills 
6.2.2.1 Initialization 
When a patient registers at an insurance company, the patient stores in his smart card 
some numbers [g, p, q] (these numbers are parts of the tokens of the insurance company 
as introduced in Section 6.2.1.1) generated by the insurance company as follows. The in-
surance company chooses a k-bits (k is usually no less than 160 bits) prime integer q, and 
another prime number p (p > q) which satisfy q| (p-1). By 𝑍𝑝
∗  we denote a multiplicative 
group modulo p. The insurance company finds 𝑔 ∈ 𝑍𝑝
∗ , to be of order q modulo p. Then g is 
the generator of the cyclic subgroup 𝐺𝑞. The insurance company stores in the patient’s 
smart card the numbers [g, p, q]. The insurance company just needs to generate these 
numbers only once, because all patients insured by this company will have the same 
numbers [g, p, q] in their smart cards. 
After getting the numbers [g, p, q], the patient chooses randomly a number s < q which is 
stored into the protected memory of the smart card. s is chosen and only known by the 
patient. The process of choosing s can be optionally done at the patient’s own device or a 
trusted family doctor’s computer.  
With the similar theory in Section 5.2, given g, h ∈ 𝐺𝑞, such that h is selected from 𝐺𝑞 uni-
formly at random, it is hard to compute an integer s such that  
 gs = h mod p. 
6.2.2.2 Generation of Pseudonym 
Each patient computes her/his initial pseudonym PIDI = gs mod p. For clarification, PIDI is 
independent with the pseudonyms that we have introduced in Section 6.1. The computa-
tion of PIDI is done at the patient’s own device or a trusted doctor’s computer (e.g. a trust-
ed family doctor). Then, the PIDI of the patient is sent to the insurance company when the 
patient firstly uses his smart card at a doctor. The doctor sends a message (MSG) includ-
ing the patient’s pseudonym PIDI to the insurance company. MSG further includes the 
doctor’s signature on PIDI by using the doctor’s secret key HSK and certificate Certh. So 
the MSG sent from the doctor to the insurance company is defined as follows, 
MSG = PIDI || SignHSK (PIDI) || Certh. 
Before sending the message, the doctor needs to validate the patient to confirm that the 
patient is insured by the claimed insurance company as introduced in Section 6.2.1.2. The 
validation procedure does not disclose any identity information of the patient to the insur-
ance company. Moreover, MSG does not contain any identity information about the patient 
either. Thus, the insurance company is not able to know whom the pseudonym PIDI be-
longs to. However, by validating the certificate and the signature of the doctor on PIDI, the 
insurance company can confirm that the MSG does come from a doctor with the certificate 
Certh. Doctors are usually assumed as trustworthy in most processes in eHealth systems, 
although there exist rare scenarios that a doctor might do fraud. A corresponding counter-
measure against the malicious behavior of doctors will be introduced in Section 6.2.3.1. 
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6.2.2.3 Generation of Pseudonymous Signature 
A patient signs the basic information B in a bill (refer to Section 6.2.1.3) to generate the 
pseudonymous signature by using the following Algorithm 10. 
Algorithm 10: Patient signs the bill with pseudonym 
H = Hash (B) 
Patient chooses a random number r in 𝐺𝑞 
y = r + H*s mod q 
σ = [𝑔𝑟, y, PIDI] 
The output σ is the pseudonymous signature on B of the patient with pseudonym PIDI. 
The signature σ only includes the pseudonym PIDI and some numbers computed from the 
secret s without the identity information of the patient.  
Because the signature is generated by the patient’s secret key s which is only known by 
the patient, nobody else can generate a valid signature except the patient himself. The 
security of the signature is based on the one-way property of the hash function and the 
difficulty of discrete logarithm problem. The difficulty of forging the signature of the patient 
(i.e., to find out s) is equal to solve the discrete logarithm problem which is unfeasible in 
current computation condition. This guarantees that attackers are unable to steal any pa-
tient’s identity (e.g. contract reference number of health insurance) for malicious usage 
unless obtaining the secret key s of the patient. 
6.2.2.4 Verification of Pseudonymous Signature 
Each insurance company stores all initial pseudonyms PIDIs of all the insured customers 
when MSGs are received from the firstly visited doctors as introduced in Section 6.2.2.2. 
The PIDIs can be stored in a table of a database operated by the insurance company. 
Along with PIDIs, other information in received MSGs is also stored by the insurance com-
pany for further usage. By the way, the insurance company can easily guarantee that each 
patient chooses different s, because the insurance company centrally maintains PIDIs and 
thus is able to check collision. If a patient chooses an existing s and PIDI, the insurance 
company can ask the patient to choose a new one. 
Once the insurance company receives a bill from a healthcare provider, it extracts out from 
the bill all the segments as shown in Section 6.2.1.3 and 6.2.2.3, and executes the follow-
ing Algorithm 11 to verify whether the bill originates from an insured customer by this in-
surance company or not. 
If a customer has submitted his initial pseudonym PIDI to the insurance company by the 
procedure introduced in Section 6.2.2.2 and signed the bill by his secret key s using Algo-
rithm 10, the insurance company is able to confirm that the bill originates from one of its 
insured customers when Algorithm 11 returns YES. However, the insurance company is 
not able to know who the patient is (i.e., the identity of the patient) except that the patient’s 
pseudonym is PIDI. Moreover, the insurance company is not able to gather any useful in-
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formation to infer the identity of the patient from the bill, because the identity of the patient 
is never implied in the MSG (refer to Section 6.2.2.2) or the bill (refer to Section 6.2.1.3). 
Thus, the patient’s identity information is completely protected from the insurance compa-
ny in the billing procedure. 
Algorithm 11: Insurance company verify the pseudonymous signature on the bill 
Check whether PIDI in the bill exists in the database, 
if not, returns NO. 
else 
   H’ = Hash (B) 
   Check 𝑔𝑦 ? = 𝑔𝑟 𝑃𝐼𝐷𝐼𝐻
′
, 
      if not, return NO, 
   else return YES. 
The verification procedure of the pseudonymous signature does not involve the randomly 
generated number r (𝑔𝑟 was already enclosed in the signature σ) in the generation proce-
dure of the signature as introduced in Section 6.2.2.3. Therefore, neither the patient nor 
the insurance company needs to store the number r. 
6.2.3 Potential Threats and Countermeasures 
6.2.3.1 Trustworthiness of Healthcare Providers 
In the initialization procedure as introduced in Section 6.2.2.1, a patient without necessary 
knowledge or resources needs to find a trusted doctor for help to set the patient’s secret 
key s and generate the initial pseudonym PIDI of the patient. It is reasonable to assume 
that the patient is able to find such a trusted doctor to assist with these matters. In prac-
tice, a patient usually has a family doctor who is considered as fully trustworthy for keeping 
the privacy of the patient. Fortunately, some products of smart card have the internal ini-
tialization function, e.g., generating a random secret s. Thus, the generation of patients’ 
secret key s and PIDI can be done in smart card automatically. In this case, the initializa-
tion module of the smart card must be trustworthy. 
In existing eHealth systems, registered healthcare providers holding valid certificates are 
assumed as trustworthy in keeping the privacy of patients. In practice, the registered 
healthcare providers are publicly monitored and are obligated by laws to protect the priva-
cy of patients. Nevertheless, in our proposed billing procedure, a dishonest healthcare 
provider might commit a fraud to get cheated payment from an insurance company. E.g., a 
corrupt healthcare provider might send a forged message MSG including an invented 
(nonexistent) patient’s initial pseudonym to the insurance company, i.e., the healthcare 
provider could invent a nonexistent patient with fake secret key s’ and PIDI’. Thereafter, 
the healthcare provider could send fake bills to the insurance company on behalf of the 
invented patient. Responding to this, one solution is that the parameters such as g, p and 
6.2 Application in Health Insurance 
77 
 
q are only known to insurance companies, and they are embedded in the protected 
memory of the smart cards (even not directly accessible to patients) of patients. As a re-
sult, a dishonest healthcare provider is unable to invent such a nonexistent patient without 
knowing these parameters.  
However, the solution in above paragraph (keeping parameters as secrets only known by 
insurance companies) has risk of disclosing the identity information of patients to insur-
ance companies in the billing procedure. A corrupt insurance company is able to use dif-
ferent parameters for different customers to obtain their identities and trace their 
healthcare activities. E.g. when two patients A and B register at the insurance company, 
the insurance company assigns (𝑔𝐴, 𝑝𝐴, 𝑞𝐴) and (𝑔𝐵, 𝑝𝐵 , 𝑞𝐵) separately to them. Their initial 
pseudonyms (𝑃𝐼𝐷𝐼𝐴 = 𝑔𝐴
𝑠𝐴  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝𝐴,𝑃𝐼𝐷𝐼𝐵 = 𝑔𝐵
𝑠𝐵  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝𝐵) are received and stored by in-
surance company. Later, if a bill including pseudonymous signature σ = [𝑔𝑟, y, PIDI] is re-
ceived by the insurance company, it can try (𝑔𝐴, 𝑝𝐴, 𝑞𝐴) and (𝑔𝐵, 𝑝𝐵 , 𝑞𝐵) one by one to veri-
fy the signature. If (𝑔𝐴, 𝑝𝐴, 𝑞𝐴) can succeed to verify the signature, then the bill is believed 
to originate from patient A. Otherwise, the bill originates from patient B. 
To solve the rare issues presented in above paragraph, it is necessary that each insurance 
company has assigned same publicly known parameters to its customers except secret 
key s. Meanwhile, in order to prevent a dishonest healthcare provider from sending fake 
bills, we required in each bill sent to the insurance company, the patient signs the bill by 
SKI using the traditional digital signature scheme (e.g. RSA) without enclosing the certifi-
cate of the patient in the signature as introduced in Section 6.2.1.3. The healthcare provid-
er who sent this bill has to save the bill including both the certificate and the traditional sig-
nature of the patient at a local storage. Afterwards, a third party trusted by the insurance 
company is authorized to select some bills randomly to check with healthcare providers. 
Healthcare providers are required to provide the certificates of the corresponding patients 
in the bills. With patients’ certificates, the third party can verify patients’ traditional digital 
signatures in the bills and finally confirm the bills originate from the insured customers. 
Because the certificates of patients are issued by insurance companies, any dishonest 
healthcare providers cannot generate valid certificates and valid signatures. Thus, the 
fraud behavior of the dishonest healthcare provider could be partially detected. The dis-
honest healthcare providers have to confront such risk to be detected and punished. 
Instead of requiring healthcare providers to store the complete bills (along with patients’ 
certificates) at local storage, an alternative way is to enclose the encrypted patient’s certifi-
cate into each bill sent to the insurance company. The patient’s certificate is encrypted by 
the public key in the healthcare provider’ certificate Certh. That is, 
Sigp = SignSKI (B) || Signs (B) || EncPKH (Certp), 
where Certp is the certificate of the patient, and PKH is the public key in the healthcare 
provider’ certificate Certh. 
Once the healthcare provider is asked by a third party to verify a bill, the healthcare pro-
vider decrypts EncPKH (Certp) in the bill by using the corresponding secret key HSK. The 
third party can finally validate the traditional digital signature of the patient with the de-
crypted certificate Certp to confirm the origin of the bill. 
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The above solution has one disadvantage, if a patient’s certificate used to sign the bills is 
known to the insurance company during the fraud detection, the insurance company may 
map the PIDI of the patient to the certificate (real identity) forever. That is to say, if the pa-
tient next time signs a bill with PIDI, the insurance company can easily trace the patient 
and know the illnesses of the patient. The patient can certainly change PIDI to avoid to be 
traced in the future. Instead of enclosing the patient’s traditional signature SignSKI (B) in 
the bill, the insurance company has some other options to detect fraud from corrupted doc-
tors. For example, if a corrupted doctor sends a forged MSG to the insurance company, 
the PIDI enclosed in the MSG will be later used to generate fake bills. Thus, the insurance 
company can do statistic on such behavior and detect high doubtable fraud.  
6.2.3.2 Adapting to Practical Billing Models 
In practice, different patients may be covered with different ranges by the insurance com-
pany. As a result, before a healthcare provider sends a bill to the insurance company, the 
healthcare provider must check whether the expenses in the bill are covered by the pa-
tient’s health insurance or not. If not, the expenses that are not covered should be paid by 
the patient. One simple solution is to store a statement of the coverage range provided 
and signed by the insurance company in the patient’s smart card as we introduced in Sec-
tion 6.2.1.2. Another solution is to enable the healthcare provider to inquire the insurance 
range of the patient online from the insurance company by using secure multi-party com-
putation(Yao, 1982). Secure multi-party computation is a popular technology to protect the 
participants’ privacy in a system without a trusted third party. It enables multiple partici-
pants to compute the value of a function with their own private inputs, while protecting their 
private inputs from being known by other participants. The secure multi-party computation 
can enable healthcare providers to query the insurance coverage range anonymously from 
the database of insurance companies. Insurance companies do not know what healthcare 
providers have queried, but healthcare providers can get desired answers from such 
anonymous queries.  
In many practical billing systems, healthcare providers and insurance companies may use 
bill collectors as agents to deal with the billing. To be adapted in this case, healthcare pro-
viders and insurance companies can issue sub-certificates to the bill collectors who exe-
cute our proposed solution on behalf of them.  
In the billing model with private health insurance companies, a bill from a healthcare pro-
vider is firstly sent to a patient and the patient pays the bill to the healthcare provider. Later 
the patient sends the bill to the insurance company to get reimbursed. In this case, the 
patient needs to add the personal tokens (e.g. bank account information) into the bill and 
sign it using the secret key s and initial pseudonym PIDI. It will be difficult to protect the 
patient’s identity against the insurance company because the personal tokens somehow 
disclose the patient’s identity. One countermeasure is that, the patient’s tokens in the bill 
are anonymous and the patient can send the bill to the insurance company and get reim-
bursed in an anonymous manner (e.g. sending bills from an anonymous email address or 
a trusted agent and get reimbursed through anonymous payment provided by a trusted 
financial organization). 
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6.2.3.3 The loss of smart card 
Because a patient’s secret keys (MSK, s, SKI) are stored in the protected memory of the 
smart card which is protected by a PIN, a person who obtains the patient’s smart card is 
unable to gain any private information of the patient or get any illegal benefits. The smart 
card is useless to the person if we assume the security protection in the smart card is 
trustworthy. 
The important matter upon loss of the smart card is to recover its uses in normal 
healthcare activities, because the secret keys and other information stored in the smart 
card are lost. When a patient’s smart card is lost, the patient must apply a new smart card 
with new certificate and SKI from the insurance company. At the same time the insurance 
company will revoke the old certificate in the lost smart card. The patient then generates a 
new initial pseudonym PIDI (he may use the old s or a new s) and goes to a trusted doctor 
to register the new initial pseudonym with the insurance company as introduced in Section 
6.2.2. The patient can then use the new smart card in a normal way. 
A patient’s secret MSK must have a secure backup in the custody of each patient in case 
the smart card is lost, because MSK is only known by the patient, nobody else can recover 
it. Once the patient lost his smart card, after getting a new smart card re-initialized by the 
insurance company, he restores the backup MSK into the new card. Thereafter, the EHR 
entries stored on the cloud (they are created by the old card) can be reused by the new 
card. The order number last of PIDlast can be recovered by the patient as follows. The pa-
tient reproduces his pseudonyms one by one using Algorithm 4 or Algorithm 5 and sends 
each one to the cloud to inquire the corresponding EHR entry. Until the cloud returns that 
the corresponding EHR entry does not exist, the patient stops running Algorithm 4 or Algo-
rithm 5 and gets the serial number last of the last pseudonym that lost smart card has ever 
produced. Then last has also to be restored into the new smart card. The feasibility of hav-
ing all patients back up binary secrets depends on the practical condition. Some optional 
solutions are available. E.g., patients can use public storage service (e.g. cloud disc ser-
vice) to store their secrets; the general doctors of patients can also help to back up their 
secrets. The secrets stored at the public storage or general doctors’ computers must be 
protected by patients-only known passwords.  
In some rare cases, the smart card and even the secret keys MSK, s and PIN of a patient 
might be stolen by an attacker. The patient needs to report this to the insurance company 
in order to revoke the certificates as soon as possible to avoid the abuse of the lost smart 
card.  
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6.3 Application in Secondary Use of Health Data 
6.3.1 Setting of Secondary Use in Cloud-based eHealth Systems 
6.3.1.1 Secondary Users 
In Figure 12, we render the procedure of secondary use of health data in a cloud-based 
eHealth system as introduced in Section 6.1.1. Secondary users are also connected to the 
cloud to conduct their uses of EHR in the cloud environment. 
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Figure 12: A cloud-baded eHealth system enabling ordinary healthcare activities and 
secondary use 
Unlike existing secondary use solutions, secondary users in this thesis do not get EHR from 
healthcare providers or any trusted third parties. Instead, they obtain EHR from the cloud 
directly. Moreover, they are able to communicate with patients who are the owners of EHR, 
to get consent and send feedback.  
As a consumption in this thesis, secondary users must be certificated, i.e., the identities of 
secondary users must be publicly verifiable. To this end, we introduce in our model an enti-
ty named “certificate authority”. It issues digital certificates to other entities. Like doctors, 
pharmacists, and insurance companies, secondary users need to apply certificates from the 
certificate authority. Each secondary users needs to generate a self-known private key and 
a corresponding publicly known public key. The public key together with some necessary 
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information of the secondary user (e.g. name, certificate type and valid period) is signed by 
the certificate authority to form a digital file i.e. the certificate. The certificate authority could 
be the health department of the government or an international trusted organization which 
confirms the qualifications of doctors, pharmacists, insurance companies and secondary 
users, and issues them digital certificates. The certificates and the corresponding private 
keys of the appliers can be stored in the protected memory of smart cards owned by them 
with authenticating PINs to avoid abuse of the smart cards. We render the smart cards of a 
doctor and a secondary user as examples in Figure 12. 
6.3.1.2 Patient’s Secrets and Certificate 
Each patient generates a major secret key (MSK) which is only known by the patient him-
self. MSK is very important to the patient, because all the private information in EHR and 
the private communications with other entities associated to the patient will be protected by 
MSK. In an eHealth system where smart cards are widely used, the patient’s MSK is usual-
ly stored in the protected memory of a smart card owned by the patient as shown in Figure 
12. A PIN set by the patient is employed to authenticate the patient to avoid abuse. 
Unlike the certificates of doctors, pharmacists, insurance companies and secondary users, 
a patient’s certificate is not issued by the certificate authority but by the insurance company 
in registration procedure as introduced in Section 6.1.1. Each patient generates a pair of 
private and public key (SKI, IPK), and the public key IPK will be sent to the insurance com-
pany in order to get a certificate. The corresponding private key SKI which is only known by 
the patient could be stored in the protected memory of the smart card owned by the patient. 
In the registration process, the patient’s real identity will be known by the insurance compa-
ny. However, the patient’s identity information is not included in the certificate issued by the 
insurance company. Typically, a certificate number which can only be mapped to the pa-
tient’s real identity by the insurance company, a token of the insurance company, the public 
key of the patient, and the valid period are necessary in the patient’s certificate. For the de-
tails of the registration with insurance company, please refer to Section 6.1.1 and 6.2.2.1. 
6.3.2 Pseudonymized EHR from Ordinary Healthcare Activities 
A patient’s ordinary healthcare activities include visiting doctors, get medicines from phar-
macies by prescriptions, viewing and managing his own EHR, and so on. In these activities, 
EHR entries will be created, retrieved and updated by different entities in the systems. Be-
cause the secondary use process is directly based on EHR entries stored in the cloud from 
these ordinary healthcare activities, it is valuable to review the format and content of EHR 
entries. In following two Sections, we review how the pseudonyms of patients are generat-
ed and used to manage EHR. During the review, we also discuss how to refine the format 
of EHR to facilitate the secondary use. 
6.3.2.1 Visiting a Doctor 
A patient visits a doctor, taking along his smart card. The doctor firstly validates the patient 
by checking the patient’s certificate and challenging the patient’s SKI with the help of the 
insurance company's root certificate. As introduced in 6.1.2, after the doctor’s diagnosing 
and treating, the doctor writes down a record (including diagnosis, examinations, treatment 
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and other information), with a prescription stating the medicines that the patient needs to 
buy at a pharmacy. Meanwhile, a new pseudonym (PID) and an encryption key (EK) are 
generated from MSK by the patient’s smart card. Both the record and the prescription will 
be encrypted by EK and signed by the doctor’s private key. Afterwards, all the data from the 
doctor are uploaded to the cloud along with an index header, the new PID, forming a new 
EHR entry for the patient. Thus, an EHR entry needs to be at least compatible with the fol-
lowing sections where “||” means concatenation,  
EHR entry =  
           PID || EncEK (record) || Signd (record) ||EncEK (prescription) ||Signd (prescription). 
According to the above definition of EHR entry, a patient’s EHR contains many EHR entries 
as the patient visited doctors many times. Each EHR entry has a unique pseudonym PID 
and a separate encryption key EK.  
The cloud stores EHR entries of each patient by indexing their PID section. The cloud can 
check the validity of doctors by verifying their certificates and challenging their private keys 
with the trusted authority’s help to avoid illegal uploading of EHR entries as introduced in 
6.1.3. The PIDs are regenerated by patients when EHR entries need to be retrieved. For 
example, when a doctor wants to view the anamnesis of a patient or a patient wants to view 
his own EHR, the patient regenerates all the PIDs one by one and sends them to the cloud 
in order to retrieve the content in corresponding EHR entries. 
Due to the use of pseudonyms, the content in an EHR entry could actually be partially en-
crypted. For example, the diagnosis, examinations and even prescription in one EHR entry 
could be plaintext. However, some sensitive information such as age, gender, DNA infor-
mation and other identifiers are encrypted by EK, because this information could be used to 
deduce the real identity of a patient. A partial encrypted EHR entry looks like as follows, 
Partial encrypted EHR entry = PID || EncEK (sensitive identifiers) || record  
                                             || Signd (record) ||EncEK (prescription) ||Signd (prescription). 
The partial encryption of EHR entries will benefit secondary use as introduced in Section 
6.3.3.2. 
6.3.2.2 Getting Medicines from a Pharmacy 
A patient goes to a pharmacy to buy medicines by using a prescription which is enclosed in 
one of his EHR entries. The patient retrieves the EHR entry from the cloud by providing the 
cloud a PID (the EHR entry with this PID has an unused prescription) and shows the de-
crypted prescription with the doctor’s signature to the pharmacist. The pharmacist can vali-
date the prescription by checking the signature of the doctor. If the signature is valid, the 
pharmacist generates an additional signature on the prescription indicating that the pre-
scription has been used and asks the patient to update the original prescription’s signature 
section of EHR entry by including the pharmacist’s signature. The cloud needs to check 
beforehand whether the patient is the owner of EHR entry or not by authenticating PID. For 
more details about the process in pharmacy, please refer to Section 6.1.5. Due to the up-
dating of the prescription’s signature, the updated EHR entry with a pharmacist’s signature 
looks like this, 
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updated EHR entry = PID || EncEK (sensitive identifiers) || record  
          || Signd (record) ||EncEK (prescription) ||Signd (prescription) || Signp (prescription). 
6.3.3 Secondary Use of Pseudonymized EHR 
Although all patients’ EHR stored together in the cloud can be publicly accessed (even in 
plaintext due to partial encryption) by any secondary user directly, a secondary user needs 
more information from patients for further use of EHR. E.g., to get consent from patients, to 
obtain encrypted identifiers like ages and genders.  
Formally, the process of secondary use is as follows: the secondary user sends an invita-
tion to a patient by marking one EHR entry of the patient; the patient then responds to the 
secondary user by sending the secondary user a reply; the secondary use sends feedback 
to patients if available. The detailed process of secondary use of the pseudonymized EHR 
will be presented in the following Sections based on the pseudonym solution presented in 
chapter 5. In the process, the pseudonyms will play an important role to protect the patient’s 
real identity against the secondary user in the communications. We emphasize the re-
quirements to such a pseudonym scheme in Section 6.3.3.1. 
6.3.3.1 Requirements to the Pseudonyms 
 Decentralized, unique and independent  
This requires that the pseudonyms cannot be generated by others without knowing the 
patient’s major secret key MSK. Only the patient can generate a new PID for each EHR 
entry. The PIDs should be independent from each other and collision free (unique).  
 Irreversible 
One or more pseudonyms of one patient cannot be used to deduce the real identity of 
the patient. An attacker without knowing MSK cannot find out other pseudonyms of one 
patient from the knowledge of some PIDs of the patient.  
 Ownership proof 
Pseudonyms can be used to verify the patient’s ownership on one EHR entry without re-
vealing the patient’s real identity to the verifiers. 
Such a pseudonym scheme proposed in chapter 5 protects the privacy of patients and se-
curity of EHR stored in the cloud when EHR are used in both ordinary healthcare activities 
and secondary use.  
Besides a proper pseudonym scheme, some corresponding protocols to utilize the pseudo-
nyms are also important to prevent the disclosure of the patient’s privacy. Especially in the 
secondary use, because secondary users need to contact patients to get consent from and 
send feedback to patients, communication protocols based on the pseudonym scheme 
should be carefully designed to avoid potential disclosure of patients’ private information. 
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6.3.3.2 Searching for Participants 
As introduced in Section 6.3.1 and 6.3.2, the pseudonymized EHR entries of all patients are 
publicly accessible in the cloud. A secondary user such as a clinical researcher on cancer 
project is able to surf in the cloud to look for target patients as participants. Due to the par-
tial encryption of EHR as introduced in 6.3.2.1, the researcher can use keywords such as 
“cancer OR tumor” for fast search in the record segment. Because the record segment is 
not encrypted, the cloud can provide powerful search service based on plaintext. The cloud 
returns to the researcher all available EHR entries which match the key words.  
The researcher finds out the target EHR entries, but they are owned by unknown patients. 
The researcher usually needs more information for his research. Firstly, the researcher 
needs to know which of these EHR entries belong to one patient. A patient may have multi-
ple separated EHR entries regarding one disease, e.g., a chronic disease needs to be 
treated for many times, and each time a new EHR entry with a new PID is created. Be-
cause the PIDs of these EHR entries are independent from each other without knowing the 
secret key as introduced in Section 6.3.3.1, the researcher is unable to concentrate the 
EHR entries of the same patient. Secondly, the researcher may want to obtain some further 
health information (e.g. related diseases) about patients. However, the researcher is unable 
to find out any other EHR entries of a patient, because the researcher has no way to know 
what other pseudonyms the patient has. At last, the researcher may want to know some 
personal identifiers of patients (e.g., age and gender) and even some more information 
which is encrypted in EHR entries by the encryption key EK only known by patients. As a 
result, the researcher has to be able to contact these target patients for help because the 
desired information can only be provided by the owners who knows MSK. 
6.3.3.3 Contacting Target Patients for Consent and More 
Because EHR are highly private information, using these data outside of clinics or hospitals 
is usually restricted in laws and regulations. A researcher is obliged to get signed consent 
from patients to use their EHR for some special purposes (e.g. medical research) other 
than ordinary health care. Moreover, the researcher may be eager to know more infor-
mation about patients as introduced in Section 6.3.3.2. 
After finding out in the cloud an EHR entry which may come from a potential participant, the 
researcher prepares a digital file (denoted as invitation) to ask for the patient’s consent. The 
invitation must declare the purpose and other concerned information about the research. 
Moreover, the invitation can also include what information the researcher needs more (e.g. 
gender, age, other EHR entries for related diseases) from the patient.  
Then the researcher sends the invitation to the patient who owns the EHR entry by asking 
the cloud to mark that found EHR entry as follows, 
 Marked EHR entry = Original EHR entry || Invitation || SignR (Invitation),  
                                       where Invitation =  uid || CertR || Consent. 
The content of “Original EHR entry” was introduced in Section 6.3.2.1 and 6.3.2.2. CertR is 
the certificate of the researcher, which was introduced in Section 6.3.1.1. SignR (Invitation) 
means the signature of the researcher on the “Invitation”. In the “Invitation”, uid is a long 
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serial number (collision free) that the researcher generates intending to assign a unique 
number to each patient. Because the researcher does not know which EHR entries come 
from a same patient, he just labels each different EHR entry with a different uid. We use 
“Consent” to denote all the information which the researcher wants to inform the patient 
(e.g. purpose of the research) and ask for from the patient (e.g., age, other EHR entries on 
related diseases). “Consent” may look like a questionnaire.  
Before accepting the researcher to mark EHR entries, the cloud must validate the re-
searcher by checking the certificate and challenging the private key of the researcher. We 
assume that the cloud is semi-trusted and has the structure knowledge of EHR entries as 
we have discussed in Section 6.1.7.5. Some more discussion about the trustworthiness of 
the cloud in secondary use is presented in 6.3.4.3. 
6.3.3.4 Responding to the Secondary User 
The patient who is the owner of the “Marked EHR entry” gets a notification when he ac-
cesses his EHR entries in the cloud afterwards. All information enclosed in the invitation 
can be directly read by the patient. The patient has right to make own decision whether par-
ticipates or not. Before accepting the invitation, the patient can at first check the validation 
of the “Invitation”. He can check the researcher’s certificate and the signature of the “Invita-
tion”. To accept the invitation, he can update the “Marked EHR entry” by attaching a “Reply” 
to the marked EHR entry as follows, 
          Agreed EHR entry = Marked EHR entry || Reply,  
                 where Reply = EncPKR (uid || Filled Consent || Signp (Filled Consent)  || EK).  
EncPKR means encrypting by the public key of the researcher in the researcher’s certificate. 
The patient fills the requested information, e.g., the identifiers like age and gender, into the 
consent to form the “Filled Consent”. Signp means that the patient signs the “Filled Con-
sent” to generate a signature. EK is the encryption key of the corresponding EHR entry as 
explained in Section 6.3.2.1. If a patient has only one EHR entry marked by the researcher, 
he just encloses the uid provided by the marked EHR entry into the reply. If a patient has 
multiple EHR entries marked by the researcher, each EHR entry was assigned with a dif-
ferent uid. The patient has to choose an arbitrary one from the assigned uids and enclose it 
into all his agreed EHR entries. If the researcher required the patient to provide other EHR 
entries of some related diseases, the patient can attach the corresponding EncPKR (uid || 
EK) to the end of other related EHR entries which were not marked by the researcher. 
Meanwhile, the patient needs to enclosed the PIDs of these related EHR entries to the filled 
consent.  
In the reply, the patient has to tell the researcher EK to enable researcher to decrypt the 
required information which is encrypted in an EHR entry. If the EK was used to encrypt the 
patient’s private information which is not intended to be known by the researcher, the pa-
tient can derive a new EK’ from EK (e.g. EK’ = Hash (EK+1)) to encrypt the information that 
can be known by the researcher. Instead of EK, EK’ is enclosed in the “Agreed EHR entry”.  
Before the cloud accepts the patient’s reply which needs updating on an EHR entry, the 
cloud must verify whether the patient is the owner of the EHR entry or not in order to avoid 
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malicious updates. The algorithms in Section 5.5 can be used to do the verification without 
disclosing any identity information of the patient to the cloud.  
The patient can also decline the invitation from the secondary user by saying “No” in the 
“Reply” or simply removing the secondary user’s “Invitation” or giving no “Reply” on the 
“Marked EHR entry”. 
The patient can use the certificate from the insurance company and the corresponding pri-
vate key (SKI) to sign the “Filled Consent”. However, sometimes the patient may mind the 
secondary user’s knowing his certificate from the insurance company, because a second-
ary user might collude with the insurance company to discover the patient’s real identity and 
private information in his EHR entries. Responding to this case, the patient can apply an-
other certificate at the certificate authority in order to communicate with secondary users. It 
could be a kind of anonymous certificate where the patient does not need to provide the 
real identity to the certificate authority. However, the anonymous certificate and signature 
enable an attacker to impersonate the patient to reply a secondary user, because the at-
tacker can use an arbitrary certificate applied from the certificate authority. The attack can 
be ruled out due to the following two reasons. Firstly, the attacker can not pass through the 
ownership verification challenged by the cloud when the attacker tries to attach the forged 
reply at the end of a marked EHR entry. The cloud will not allow the attacker to add forged 
“Reply” if the attacker fails to prove the ownership of the EHR entry by the algorithms in 
Section 5.5. Secondly, even if the attacker succeeds in adding a forged reply to a marked 
EHR entry, the secondary user can easily drop the forged reply by checking the encryption 
key EK. Because the attacker does not know the correct EK, the secondary user can distin-
guish the forged reply from a failure of decrypting by incorrect EK. Moreover, if the patient 
has multiple EHR entries marked by the secondary user, because the attacker cannot know 
which marked EHR entries belong to the same patient, the secondary user can check the 
consistence of the information (e.g. birth date) in these multiple EHR entries to drop forged 
replies.  
Besides the anonymous certificate and signature, there is another solution if EK is manda-
tory in “Reply”, i.e., the patient needs to provide EK to the secondary researcher. Because 
EK is only known by patients, EK can be used to “sign” the reply to prove the reply does 
come from the owner who knows EK. The patient uses EK to generate a digest by a keyed 
hash function. Signp (Filled Consent)  = KHash (Filled Consent, EK). After the researcher 
extracts EK from the Reply, the researcher can check the digest by the extracted EK. Be-
cause the EK is only known by the patient, the digest can only be generated by the patient. 
Thus the digest can be seen as a signature from the patient. 
6.3.3.5 Sending Feedback to Patients 
The researcher gets a notification if a marked EHR entry was replied by the owner. The 
received “Reply” in the agreed EHR entry can be decrypted by the researcher’s private key. 
Then the filled consent and the signature of the patient can be extracted out and validated. 
Afterwards, the encrypted data (e.g. gender and age) in the EHR entry can be decrypted by 
using the EK enclosed in the reply.  
The researcher distinguishes different patients by uid, i.e., all “Agreed EHR entries” with the 
same uid come from one patient. From the filled consent, the researcher could find out all 
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necessary information to conduct the research. After the researcher finishes the research 
project, there may be some feedback which interests the participating patients. The feed-
back can be sent to a patient by the researcher through updating the agreed EHR entry like 
following,  
Feedback EHR entry = Agreed EHR entry || EncEK (Feedback || SignR (Feedback)).  
The “Feedback” can include any messages sent from the researcher, e.g., the result of the 
research, advice to the patient’s disease. SignR (Feedback) is the researcher’s signature on 
the “Feedback”. The “Feedback” and the signature from the researcher are encrypted by 
the encryption key EK of the corresponding EHR entry. Only the patient who knows the EK 
can decrypt the feedback. It prevents attackers from discovering any private information in 
the feedback. 
6.3.4 Potential Threats and Countermeasures 
6.3.4.1 Partial Encryption 
For the sake of secondary use, we suggest to use partial encryption on EHR entries as we 
introduced in Section 6.3.2 and 6.3.3.2. Actually, partial encryption can also benefit the or-
dinary health care activities. For example, a doctor can discover desired information in a 
patient’s EHR entries more efficiently. E.g., if the doctor wants to know the allergic history of 
the patient, he can use keyword “allergy” to search in all EHR entries with the powerful 
searching service from the cloud, instead of searching in all downloaded and decrypted 
EHR entries.  
Partial encryption has no harm in theory to the privacy of patients if our proposed pseudo-
nym solution is applied. However, in practice, some contents in EHR entries may contain 
identifiers not easily discoverable. E.g. the name of the patient in the X-ray picture. Thus, 
the risk of partial encryption depends on the degree of removing all sensitive identifiers of 
patients and encrypting these identifiers by EK. 
In the procedure of secondary use, a secondary user has chance to obtain these encrypted 
identifiers through the communication with patients as introduced in Section 6.3.3.3 and 
6.3.3.4. The secondary user may request some sensitive identifiers from patients, and be 
able to deduce the real identities of some patients by using advanced analysis technologies 
introduced in Section 3.2.5. Regarding to this issue, there should be a trusted party, e.g. the 
organization who issues certificates to secondary users, to evaluate the information en-
closed in the invitation sent to patients. Only necessary information is allowed to request 
from patients. 
6.3.4.2 Decision on Own Risk 
Even if there is a trusted party to evaluate the information enclosed in the invitation sent to 
patients as introduced in Section 6.3.4.1, patients must rely themselves to decide whether 
to participate in the secondary use or not. This may require that patients have some basic 
knowledge on medicine and secondary use. Especially, patients may be asked to provide 
some other EHR entries on related diseases. It may impose risk to the privacy of the par-
6 Applications of the Pseudonym Solution in eHealth Systems 
88 
 
ticipating patients. Although a patient may decline the invitation easily, it might cause devi-
ations and even errors to the results of the secondary use if too many patients say no. One 
practical countermeasure is to involve doctors, who can give professional suggestion to 
patients, into the procedure of secondary use to help patients. A communication channel 
between patients and doctors can be set up by the similar solution in Section 6.3 to dis-
cuss the questions on the details of secondary use. 
6.3.4.3 Trustworthiness of Cloud 
In this thesis, the cloud is not only used as a scalable storage media for EHR, it is also re-
quired to perform some validations. E.g., it verifies the ownership of EHR entry when a pa-
tient wants to update EHR entry to send a reply in the secondary use, and it also validates 
a secondary user who wants to send an invitation to an EHR owner by marking one target 
EHR entry. This may require the cloud be honest or semi-trustworthy. It is reasonable in 
practice, because a dishonest cloud cannot benefit from the unexpected operations (e.g., 
modifying or forging the messages in secondary use) to get more private information of pa-
tients. It only disturbs the normal process of secondary use. Furthermore, a dishonest op-
eration can be easily detected by patients or secondary users, because all the messages 
between patients or secondary users have integrity check (e.g., encryption or signature).  
6.3.4.4 Other Potential Attacks in Secondary Use  
A skilled attacker would succeed in modifying a marked EHR entry by replacing a second-
ary user’s certificate with the attacker’s certificate. This attack can be easily ruled out by the 
patient from validating the certificate and signature of the secondary user before he pro-
ceeds to the next step of the secondary use.  
Because the communication between patients and secondary users takes place in the 
cloud, an attacker can easily eavesdrop the messages transmitted over the network or up-
dated to the cloud. However, in our communication protocols, all critical information in the 
messages is encrypted by the secret keys only known by the communicators. Thus, the 
eavesdropper cannot get any private information of patients from the communications be-
tween patients and secondary users, except the pseudonymized EHR contents existing in 
the cloud. 
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7 Implementation 
7.1 About the Implementation  
7.1.1 Joint Work 
This implementation is a collaboration work with Tobias Wilken. He made a deep survey 
on the appropriate tools and platforms to implement the pseudonym solution and the 
eHealth system presented in this thesis and our published papers (Xu and Cremers, 
2014a, Xu and Cremers, 2014b, Xu et al., 2014). Then he developed the first version of 
the implementation under Linux. After that, based on the reviews and comments from me 
and Prof. Dr. Amin B. Cremers, some updates and fixes were made. 
I continued to work on the implementation after the graduation of Tobias Wilken. Firstly, 
the development environment under Windows was set up. Then I revised the source 
codes to fix some bugs and re-designed some user interfaces. Moreover, I added the full 
support to the secondary use of EHR. 
7.1.2 Development Environment  
The web front UI (user interfaces) are written by HTML and JavaScript. The backend serv-
er is supported by Python. We also have used a lot of public tools in Python, e.g., Flask, 
Jsonschema, and Gunicorn. For the detailed development tools, please refer to our source 
codes. 
We have chosen MongoDB as the database software. MongoDB is a cross-platform doc-
ument-oriented database. Classified as a NoSQL database, it eschews the traditional ta-
ble-based relational database structure in favor of JSON-like documents with dynamic 
schemas (MongoDB calls the format BSON), making the integration of data in certain 
types of applications easier and faster. The instructions of setting up MongoDB are also 
detailed in the source codes. 
The PaaS cloud is supported by cloudControl14. We deployed the eHealth system on this 
platform and it can be accessed publicly. We also did a lot of performance tests of our im-
plementation on this cloud. However, the implementation is not depending on the cloud 
server. It can also be deployed at any servers which are properly configured as described 
in the documents of our source codes. 
                                                            
14 https://www.cloudcontrol.com/ 
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7.1.3 Availability of the Implementation 
The source codes of the application are uploaded at GitHub15. The current the eHealth 
system resides at cloudControl16 which is publicly accessible. 
7.2 Architecture of the Implementation 
The implementation is divided into three layers as shown in Figure 13: local clients, PaaS 
applications, and database. The clients can be run at any web browsers with HTML5 and 
JavaScript support. Patients, doctors, pharmacies and any other entities in the eHealth 
system use the clients (with user interfaces) to view and operate EHR. The PaaS layer 
running in the cloud includes a lot of applications which serve different healthcare activities, 
e.g. visiting doctor, purchasing medicines and secondary use. The Database layer can be 
distributed MongoDB’s in the cloud. They provide storage and access of all EHR.  
Client App
MongoDB
Client
Client
Client
Client
App
App
MongoDBMongoDB
MongoDBMongoDBMongoDB
Local PaaS Database
 
Figure 13: Architecture of the prototypical eHealth system 
7.3 User Interfaces 
7.3.1 Patient’s Secret Key Setup 
When a patient uses the eHealth system for the first time, a secret key MSK and PIN are 
needed to set up according to Section 5.2. In our implementation, the procedure of choos-
ing MSK is automatically done by a JavaScript module executed in the browser that the 
patient uses. The patient just needs to set a PIN for the smart card as shown in Figure 14.  
                                                            
15 Source codes available from: https://github.com/TooAngel/Implementation-PaaS-Reference-Implementation-
of-a-pseudonymity-based-eHealth-cloud-system 
16 Application experience at: https://prioapbecs.cloudcontrolled.com 
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Figure 14: A patient sets up the PIN and secret key 
A patient’s smart card is simulated by the Cookies of web browser (which can be seen as 
the memory of the smart card) and a JavaScript module (which can be seen as the pro-
gram in the smart card). The patient’s MSK and other information will be stored at the local 
client (i.e. the Cookies of web browser) which are protected by PIN. Different patients are 
distinguished by PIN if more than one patient logs in the same client (e.g. uses the same 
PC). A “Delete” button is provided to clear all the smart cards stored. However, the EHR 
entries related with the deleted smart cards will not be deleted. The secret keys of each 
patient can be backed up just by coping and saving the corresponding Cookies in the 
browser. A patient’s records can be accessed from another computer where the backup of 
the patient’s secret keys is restored. 
7.3.2 Visiting Doctor 
The interface provided to doctors for writing records and prescriptions is shown in Figure 
15.  A doctor asks a patient to input the PIN of the smart card when the “Create” page is 
accessed. 
In this page, a doctor can write anything about patient’s illness in the records. For example, 
the blood sugar of the patient can be input in the left-bottom blank. The doctor can also 
prescribe to the patient by adding different medicines and the doses in the right side. Both 
the record and prescription can be chosen as encrypted or not. After writing down all these 
things, the doctor clicks the “save” button to upload EHR entry to the cloud according to 
the description in Section 6.1.2.  
7.3.3 Viewing and Managing EHR 
A patient or any doctor who is treating the patient can view all EHR entries of a patient af-
ter the patient inputs the correct PIN and provides the “smart card” (Cookies) at “View” 
page as shown in Figure 16. 
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Figure 15: A doctor creates an EHR entry for the patient 
 
 
Figure 16: EHR of the patient is viewed 
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In Figure 16, all information about the patient’s EHR is displayed. On the left side, the 
pseudonyms of all EHR entries of the patient are listed according to the algorithm in Sec-
tion 5.4 and the protocol in Section 6.1.4. Each pseudonym can be clicked and the details 
about the corresponding EHR entry will be popup. The patient can manage EHR entry at 
the popped page, e.g. deleting it. The cloud will in background check the patient’s owner-
ship on the EHR entry to be deleted. Moreover, in the right top of Figure 16, a statistic 
about the patient’s blood sugar is depicted in a chart.  In the right bottom, all examinations 
and prescriptions of the patient are displayed. 
7.3.4 Purchasing Medicines 
The patient goes to the pharmacy and inputs the PIN for the “smart cards” as introduced in 
Section 6.1.5, the pharmacist retrieves all the patient’s prescriptions and sells the medi-
cines written in them at “ePrescription” page as shown in Figure 17. 
 
Figure 17: A pharmacy sells the medicines in the prescription to the patient 
The pharmacist clicks the “sell” button, which simulates one dose of the medicine is sold to 
the patient. The cloud will update the EHR entry by adding the pharmacist’s signature on 
the prescription after successfully checking the patient’s ownership on the EHR entry. 
7.3.5 Secondary Use 
A secondary user can view all EHR entries of all patients in the cloud as introduced in Sec-
tion 6.3.3.2. Some basic searching functions in the unencrypted segments of EHR entries 
are also possible as shown in Figure 18.  
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Figure 18: A secondary user views all EHR entries from the cloud 
On the left side of Figure 18, the pseudonyms of all available or filtered (by search) EHR 
entries are listed. The secondary user can click any entry and the detailed content in the 
corresponding EHR entry is displayed as shown in the top of Figure 19. 
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Figure 19: A secondary user sends the requests to the patient 
The secondary user can not read the encrypted contents of an EHR entry, as named by 
“Encrypted*”. If the secondary user wants to request consent, the encryption  key (EK) and 
any other information from the patient, he can select the “Request EK?” checkbox and in-
put these requests in the bottom of the page in Figure 19. At last the secondary user clicks 
the “send” button to send all requested information (invitation) to the patient as introduced 
in Section 6.3.3.3.  
The patient will receive a notification after the secondary user sent out the invitation as 
shown in Figure 20. The patient can view all requests from the secondary user, and decide 
what kinds of information to be replied as introduced in Section 6.3.3.4. 
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Figure 20: The patient replies to the secondary user 
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As shown in Figure 20, the patient answered some questions and agreed to send the en-
cryption key (EK) to the secondary user. After the patient clicks the button “reply”, all in-
formation will be sent to the secondary user. 
The secondary user afterwards can view the unencrypted and encrypted information (as 
listed in “Record” segment) if the encryption key (EK) was provided by the patient as 
shown in Figure 21.  
 
Figure 21: The secondary user views the responses from the patient 
In this page, the secondary user can view the communication history including all the re-
sponses from the patient in “Notification” area. The secondary user can continue to use 
the page in in Figure 21 to send further feedback to the patient as introduced in Section 
6.3.3.5. 
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7.4 Performance Evaluation 
7.4.1 Evaluation on the Cloud Side 
In our pseudonym solution and its applications, the cloud just performs as storage and 
deals with light-load transactions (like authentication, indexing, and searching), The critical 
operations like encryption and pseudonym generation are not done by the cloud. Instead, 
they are executed at the clients. Our pseudonym solution does not impose heavy compu-
tation pressure to the cloud compared to an ordinary cloud based application, except that 
a cloud-based eHealth system might have huge data size (EHR entries) and numerous 
users. The cloud does excel in the big data storage and heavy concurrence with scalable 
resources. 
Having done a lot of tests on the server side to examine the performance of the applica-
tions in the cloud, we conclude that the implementation is suitable to be deployed in a pub-
lic cloud and have good performance in scalability. For more details about these tests, 
please refer to the load tests in the thesis of Tobias Wilken (Wilken, 2014). Also we will 
present some test results in the Appendix. 
7.4.2 Evaluation on the Client Side 
The performance of the clients (e.g. patients) is also expected as sufficient for practical 
use, based on tests we have done in Section 7.4.2.1 and estimation presented in Section 
7.4.2.2. Although we did not test on real smart cards due to the limitation of condition, we 
have simulated the smart card by computer software and conducted sufficient estimation 
on the performance in real smart cards as introduced in the following Sections. 
7.4.2.1 Performance of Simulated Smart Card by Computer Software 
According to Algorithm 2, each pseudonym generation needs two modular exponentiations, 
each of which (assuming that the length of q is 256 bits) needs about 192 modular multi-
plications which are most time-consuming,. The computation complexity of a modular ex-
ponentiation is O(n) (Knuth, 1981) where n is the bit length of exponentiation without pre-
computation (Dimitrov et al., 1998). In our implementation, we use JavaScript module to 
simulate the smart card for generating pseudonyms, encrypting/decrypting and authentica-
tion, and we find that the clients (i.e. the browsers) response very fast on the computer 
with a plain configuration. According to (Jahani et al., 2014), one computation of modular 
multiplication with 256 bits costs 0.087ms on a test PC (AMD Phenom 9950 Quad-Core 
processor). So each pseudonym generation nearly costs 0.087*192*2 = 16.704 (ms). Thus, 
in our eHealth system, if a patient has 100 EHR entries, the time for generating all pseu-
donyms of the patient is no more than two seconds.  
To examine the software performance of our proposed solution in chapter 5, we imple-
mented and evaluated the Algorithm 1 (setting up secret key MSK) and Algorithm 2 (gen-
erating pseudonyms) with computer software. The test software is written in Python 2.7.9 
with gmpy2 2.0.3 under windows 10 64bits. The hardware platform is Intel Core i5 520m 
2.4GHZ CPU with 8G bytes RAM.  
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The test result for evaluating Algorithm 1 is shown in Figure 22. In the test, we vary the 
length of the secret key (MSK) from 128 bits to 256 bits. For each key length, we repeat 
the initialization for 20 times (i.e., to find out 20 MSKs). The curves in Figure 22 represent 
the average, maximum and minimum time for initializing a single MSK. From the test, we 
can see that the worst initialization time is no more than 10 seconds. Because the initiali-
zation process only runs once when a patient receives the smart card, a reasonable long 
time for the initialization is acceptable.  
 
Figure 22: The performance in initializing a patient’s MSK with computer software 
The test result for evaluating Algorithm 2 is shown in Figure 23. In this test, we have cho-
sen 128 MSKs from 128 bits to 256 bits. For each MSK, we generate 500 pseudonyms. 
The average time, maximum time and minimum time for generating one pseudonym are 
depicted in Figure 23. From the test, we can see that the maximum time for generating 
one pseudonym is less than two milliseconds. Therefore, for a patient with 500 pseudo-
nyms (i.e., 500 EHR entries), the worst time for generating all pseudonyms of the patient is 
no more than one second. 
From the experience in the hardware and software development, the smart cards with 
special hardware (e.g. ASIC) should have no worse computation performance than an or-
dinary PC for a same algorithm. Please refer to the next Section for the current hardware 
performance of computing modular exponentiation and hash functions. 
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Figure 23: The performance of generating the patient’s pseudonyms in computer soft-
ware 
7.4.2.2 Performance Estimation of Real Smart Cards 
Thanks to the development of hardware technology, the computation speed of many cryp-
tographic algorithms in smart cards is becoming faster and faster. According to the claims 
from some hardware design providers (Xilinx, 2015a, Kurniawan, 2002, Blum and Paar, 
1999), the computation capability of modular exponentiation can easily achieves up to 
several hundred times per second with the exponentiation size of 256 bits, and the compu-
tation of hash functions (e.g. SHA-256) can reach 100Mbps (Xilinx, 2015b). 
In our pseudonym solution and applications, each pseudonym generation needs two mod-
ular exponentiations and three hash functions (hashing on about two 256 bit-length values) 
according to Algorithm 2. So a smart card with such hardware can easily generate several 
hundred pseudonyms per second. That should be enough even if a patient has thousands 
of EHR entries. The patient only needs to wait no more than ten seconds to produce all of 
his pseudonyms if all EHR entries need to be downloaded from the cloud. The download-
ing of all EHR entries from the clouds should need more time according to the common 
speed of current network connection. Actually, the generating of pseudonyms in the smart 
card and the downloading of EHR entries over the network can be done simultaneously. 
In our optional pseudonym solution as introduced in Algorithm 3, Algorithm 5 and Algo-
rithm 7, only the first pseudonym generation needs computation of two modular exponen-
tiations and three hash functions, and other pseudonyms only need computation of hash 
functions. The speed of generating and reproducing the pseudonyms is expected to be 
much faster. 
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7.4.3 Decreasing the Computation Load of Smart Card 
To further decreasing the computation load of the smart cards of patients, we provide a 
solution as follows. According to Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 4 shown in chapter 5, one sin-
gle pseudonym generation or reproduction needs computation of three hash computations 
and two modular exponentiation, where hash computation is usually fast but the modular 
exponentiation computation is more time consuming. Because the last two hash computa-
tions and the first modular exponentiation computation (i.e., the left top formulas in line 4 
and 5 in Figure 24) do not involve the secret x, they can be computed by outside connect-
ed devices (e.g., the doctor’s or the patient’s computer). In a typical implementation (line 6 
to 13 in Figure 24) of the modular exponentiation computation (Black et al., 2011), about 
two thirds of the modular multiplication computations (line 12 in Figure 24) in the second 
modular exponentiation computation (the blue formula in line 4 of Figure 24) will not in-
volve the secret x, so these modular multiplication computations can also be moved to 
outside devices as shown in Figure 24.  
 
Figure 24: Use of outside devices to decrease the computation load of smart card in 
pseudonym generation Algorithm 2 
According to the statistic in right part of Figure 24, the computation needed to be done by 
the smart cards is only one hash computation and a part of one modular exponentiation 
computation (about 1/6 modular multiplications of total). Thus, the solution can greatly de-
crease the computation burden of the smart cards, with the price of a bit increase of the 
serializable IO manipulations between smart card and the outside connected device.  
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7.5 Future Work for the Implementation 
Supporting more activities in eHealth systems. Till now we have simulated some basic 
healthcare activities in out implementation. There are still more activities which are also 
related with the security of EHR and the privacy of patients. It is valuable to examine 
whether these activities can be supported by our pseudonym solution or not. Moreover, it 
is also important to know how these activities can be compatible with existing functions in 
the implementation. 
Using real smart cards. The performance of the clients is very critical to the experience 
of a cloud-based eHealth system. It is valuable to test real smart cards in our implementa-
tion to examine the resource cost and the performance in practical healthcare activities. 
The actual resource cost for the algorithms proposed in this thesis determines the price of 
smart cards. 
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8 Conclusions 
This thesis proposed a novel pseudonym solution which is applicable to protect the securi-
ty and privacy in eHealth systems. The pseudonym solution has provable security and rule 
out the requirement of any powerful trusted third parties in the system. This is very helpful 
to dismiss the privacy worries of patients who are the real owners of the health data. Pa-
tients keep the secret keys to generate their pseudonyms, encrypt their EHR, and author-
ize the uses of their health data. Thus the health data are under patients’ full control in 
every process. In the meantime, we have designed special protocols cooperating with the 
pseudonym solution for easing the uses of EHR in the healthcare activities, e.g. sharing 
EHR among doctors, secondary use.  
We applied the proposed pseudonym solution for several typical healthcare activities in a 
cloud-based eHealth system. In these applications, the security of the health data and the 
privacy of patients are strongly protected by various algorithms and protocols.   
Firstly, we utilized the pseudonym solution to create, store and share EHR in the ordinary 
healthcare activities of a cloud-based eHealth system. Each patient owns multiple pseu-
donyms for his/her EHR entries, and these pseudonyms are un-linkable, independent and 
irreversible without knowing the patient’s secret key. EHR contents are encrypted by the 
encryption keys derived from the pseudonyms, and thus well protected. Moreover, the 
pseudonym solution provides an authentication algorithm. The authentication process 
does not disclose any identity information about patients to the verifiers. Each patient who 
knows the secret key can update EHR entries after being authenticated on the ownership 
of the pseudonyms by the cloud. With the help of the cloud, EHR can also be easily 
shared to any doctor who is examining the patient. We demonstrated that using the pseu-
donym solution in ordinary healthcare activities is sufficient in performance and profitable 
in security and privacy protection. 
Secondly, we applied the pseudonym solution in protecting the privacy of patients from 
insurance companies. We refined the billing procedure in the existing eHealth systems to 
disclose only necessary information about the privacy of patients to insurance companies 
while preserving the ability to check the origin of bills. To our knowledge, patients’ privacy 
disclosed to insurance companies has not yet attracted the attention of public. In this the-
sis, we at least provide a preliminary solution upon this issue.  
At last, we also utilized the pseudonym solution to exploit a new model for secondary use 
of health data. We introduced a new consent management procedure to enable patients’ 
full control on their own EHR when their health data are used in any other places. A com-
munication protocol between secondary users and patients is also proposed to enable 
secondary users to get more information from patients and send feedback to patients. This 
is a new attempt to utilize the cloud for the secondary use while protecting the privacy of 
patients with the help of pseudonyms. 
We used one unique pseudonym solution in these applications, which is beneficial to the 
security and privacy in eHealth systems. Each patient’s secret key (MSK) is the only criti-
cal factor to protect the security and privacy in all these healthcare activities. Comparing to 
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those eHealth systems where there are multiple secret keys and security mechanisms to 
protect the security and privacy of patients, our solution decreases the risk of disclosing 
the secret or private information due to the weakness in a single scheme.  
Since the security and privacy in eHealth systems are a challengeable topic which refers 
to many aspects in theory and practice, there is still much work expected to do. 
Efficient structure of EHR. In this thesis, we assume that a patient generates an inde-
pendent pseudonym for each EHR entry. At the end the patient will have many EHR en-
tries with independent pseudonyms after he/she has visited doctors for many times. The 
independence of the pseudonyms benefits the protection of security and privacy, but it 
sometimes may cause trouble when a doctor wants to access some particular segments of 
EHR or specified type of EHR entries. Reorganizing after full downloading of all EHR en-
tries is inefficient in the situation with slow network connection and process speed. Thus 
an efficient structure to organize EHR entries of each patient in the cloud is desired. 
Meanwhile, such kind of structure should not disclose any private information to the cloud 
or any other general attackers.  
Fast search in the encrypted EHR. A patient or a doctor sometimes needs to search 
on the patient’s EHR to find some specified EHR entries. It can be certainly done by 
searching in the decrypted EHR after downloading all the encrypted EHR entries. However, 
that may cause delay if the size of EHR is big and the network connection is not so fast. It 
is valuable to adopt a scheme for searching in the encrypted EHR entries. Then the search 
can be efficiently done in the encrypted data by the cloud. Some research work is being 
done by a researcher in our group Jan Lehnhardt (Lehnhardt et al., 2015, Lehnhardt et al., 
2014). On the other side, for the sake of search in EHR by secondary users, we have sug-
gested that EHR entries be partially encrypted as introduced in Section 6.3.3.2. The cloud 
can provide powerful plaintext-based search service to secondary users to filter target 
EHR entries. However, the partial encryption brings difficulties or fuzziness when EHR en-
tries are created, because it might be hard to determine which parts of EHR entry are im-
portant for the search from secondary users and should be left as unencrypted without 
leaking the private information of patients. So it is ideal to encrypt everything when EHR 
entries are created in the beginning and the cloud can provide efficient search service in 
the encrypted data.  
Further evaluation in practice. Although we have implemented a prototypical eHealth 
system to demonstrate the performance and feasibility of our proposed pseudonym solu-
tion, it would be better if it can be evaluated further in various aspects. At first, it is im-
portant to examine whether the performance of the solution is acceptable or not in real 
eHealth systems with real smart cards, because we have used some resource exhausting 
algorithms in our solution and the time delay is sensitive in real healthcare activities. Sec-
ondly, as we have proposed several new models or refined procedures for the use of EHR, 
it is uncertain that the existing business model of eHealth systems could adopt them with-
out big earthquakes. At last, there will be a lot of unexpected problems when a new tech-
nology is deployed in practice, and we need to find out these issues to fix and enhance the 
existing solution. 
Extension of the pseudonym solution to other information systems. Although 
in this thesis we mainly focused on the security and privacy issues in eHealth systems, we 
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noticed that there are many other potential systems which may potentially adopt our pseu-
donym solution. For example, it might be probable to use our pseudonym solution in the 
online shopping applications. The shopping information of the customers can also be 
stored with pseudonyms and may be secondarily used by the big-data analyzers. Another 
potential application scenario is the car-to-car communication. When the cars on road 
need to form a self-organized network, it is important to protect the real identities while 
sending and receiving messages. The pseudonym solution in this thesis may be applicable 
to deal with the privacy issues. 
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Appendix: Load Tests on Cloud and Database 
To examine how many simultaneous requests can be handled by the cloud where our ap-
plications reside in, different load tests are conducted for different application scenarios. 
These load tests provide the application throughput and give suggestions for the scaling 
up or down the resources depending on the load. In Figure 25, we give two examples of 
our tests for simultaneous access to the cloud by the clients. We define a successful re-
sponse as returning result without any errors. The results of the two tests show that the 
average response time of cloud stays almost stable with the proper scaling of resources.  
 
(a) One minute load test with 10 to 80 clients on a three 512 MB container setup. 
Within the last seconds the average time increases, giving a hint the the system 
reaches its resource limit. 
 
(b) One minute load test with 60 to 120 clients on a six 512 MB container setup, with a 
stable response time.  
Figure 25: Load tests on the cloud throughput (Wilken, 2014) 
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To examine the performance of MongoDB resided in the cloud, we also simulate a scenar-
io where a lot of users are creating and storing EHR entries to the database simultaneous-
ly. From the test results in Figure 26, we can find out that the average response time of 
database stays almost stable with the proper scaling of resources. 
 
(a) One minute load test for a single MongoDB server setup from 60 to 180 clients. Up 
to 80 clients the response time stays stable. More clients result in fluctuating results 
with up to 173 ms response time. 
 
(b) One minute load test for a three server sharded MongoDB setup from 60 to 80 
clients. The response time stays mostly stable. The peak around 00:38 can be 
explained by a new allocation of data files on one of the servers. 
Figure 26: Load tests on the database (Wilken, 2014) 
